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ESTABLISHING ‘LOSS OF POSSESSION’ IN MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
To what extent should insureds expect compensation on interruption to their 
voyage by loss of possession or free use or disposal of their property where 
it remains undamaged? Marine insurance does not compensate for partial 
losses occasioned by delay. Recent authority (Masefield v Amlin Corporate 
Member1) confirmed an insured could not recover for an actual total loss 
following capture where pirates would accept ransom then release the 
property. Property was not an actual total loss even after condemnation by 
a foreign tribunal (Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v 
Wright2), although condemnation might establish constructive total loss. 
Where the voyage becomes impossible by detention or embargo, the 
insured’s right to abandon to insurers for constructive total loss may be 
unpredictable (eg after one year’s duration in The Bamburi3). In each 
scenario, insurers are excused making prompt payments, and from dealing 
themselves with the consequences of the peril. In each the insured is either 
uncompensated, or at best must wait. 
 
These authorities document an evolution; historically, English and 
American laws allowed the insured to abandon and recover for a total loss 
while these perils lasted, ignoring ongoing hopes of recovery. This thesis 
argues that a presumption of total loss still applies to all perils causing loss 
of possession. This appeared first in Continental treatises and was later 
applied in English law. No universal test of total loss applies equally to all 
marine perils. Instead, situations of loss of possession should be governed 
by peril-specific rules, including the presumption of total loss for perils 
causing loss of possession.  
  
                                                     
1 [2011] EWCA Civ 24, [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm) 
2 [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365; KAC v KIC [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 
3 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312 
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J M W Turner 
 
The Slave Ship; Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying, Typhoon coming on (1840), inspired 
by the circumstances of Gregson v Gilbert (The Zong),4 an early English authority excluding liability 
for losses proximately caused by delay. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 (1783) 3 Doug KB 232  
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1 A PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS 
 
Where a marine voyage is interrupted by marine perils causing loss of possession, when will 
a policy holder be compensated by their insurer? When will their losses be deemed to flow 
from delay, and be unrecoverable? Where an insured’s property is ultimately restored, will 
the losses inevitably be deemed to flow from delay? Do the same rules apply to perils engaged 
by losses of possession as to stranding or other marine perils, or perils of the sea? This thesis 
argues that before 1906 a presumption of total loss provided that constructive total loss 
occurred at the moment possession was lost by a marine peril. It suggests the presumption 
remains arguable, and is not overruled in English law by statutory change, or judicial 
authority.  
     
1.1 Issues arising on Loss of ‘Possession’ or ‘Free Use and Disposal’ 
  
Marine insurance law1 informs the interpretation of a policy. It should give effect to the 
parties’ intention when fixing the policy, and meet their expectations when a claim is made. 
Where insureds claim loss of possession of the specie, recent authorities adopt an ostensibly 
pragmatic commercial approach and restrict total loss claims. In Masefield v Amlin Corporate 
Member2 no actual or constructive total loss was found when pirates held the vessel on which 
insured cargo was laden to ransom, since it was foreseeable the vessel’s release following a 
ransom payment was probable within a few months of capture. In Fooks v Smith (the 
Stambul)3 no actual total loss occurred where insured cargo was laden on a vessel restrained 
by a hostile government in anticipation of war, and subsequently sold after hostilities were 
declared. In Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright,4 there was no actual total 
loss where the vessel was confiscated and condemned by a military tribunal. In each situation, 
the insured was held not to have been ‘irretrievably deprived’ of their property by the initial 
and ongoing loss of possession. Given these strict results, it appears ‘irretrievable deprivation’ 
now has little meaning in context of actual total loss claim following dispossession.5 
 
In the Bamburi6 a constructive total loss arose on detention exceeding one year, but other 
authorities illustrate no constructive loss arose on a capture lasting about one month7 or three 
                                                     
1 “Most of the law of marine insurance is in essence pure interpretation of the contract contained in the common 
form of marine policy. We have all got into the mental habit of thinking of it as substantive law…” Kulukundis v 
Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1937] 1 KB 1, [34] (Scott LJ) 
2 [2011] EWCA Civ 24, [2011] 3 All ER 554; [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm), [2010] 2 All ER 593 
3 [1924] 2 KB 508 
4 [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365, [1971] 2 All ER 1028 
5 eg Rubina Khurram, ‘Total Loss and Abandonment in the Law of Marine Insurance’ 25 JMLC 95 (1994) 95, 
97-98 
6 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312 
7 Masefield [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm), [2010] 2 All ER 593; [2011] EWCA Civ 24, [2011] 3 All ER 554 
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months.8 Academic commentary indicates a more permissive approach to total loss claims: 
“It is far from unknown for a court to adjudge that a vessel was a CTL even though, by the 
time of trial, the vessel had been repaired and was again trading… Indeed, in seizure cases 
this may apply also to an ATL”.9 No recent reported authority suggests periods of 
dispossession shorter than a year could justify a total loss claim. Prima facie, total losses, 
actual or constructive, only arise after a long period of dispossession, perhaps lasting a year 
or more. These results appear to protect insurers, while more permissive dicta recognising 
potential compensation after property was returned might suggest shorter periods of time 
justify abandonment.  The recent authorities do not clearly answer an insured’s fundamental 
concerns: (i) when does the law regard my property as lost; and (ii) when am I entitled to 
compensation? 
 
Consideration of these results against the variety of possible loss of possession scenarios 
highlights commercially significant issues. When are losses following loss of possession, 
potentially falling within the defined perils of ‘capture’, ‘seizure’, ‘arrest’, ‘restraint’ or 
‘detention’, potentially causing a ‘loss of the voyage’, recoverable? When are such losses 
excluded from recovery as being proximately caused by ‘delay’? Further, is insurance law 
sufficiently consistent in the extent of its cover across different perils, and fair to both insureds 
and insured? Does the contemporary law assist parties to fix policies that properly reflect their 
legitimate expectations? Is the law on this area sufficiently certain?  
 
Compensation for loss of possession or interruption to a planned voyage is commercially 
significant. This issue was highlighted by piracy incidents between 2008 and 2014, frequently 
involving hostage and ransom negotiations.10 Somali piracy may now be supressed,11 but 
piracy and barratry remain ever-present perils. Similar issues following loss of possession or 
free use or disposal of property arise in a wider variety of contexts, such as capture or seizure 
in conventional warfare, requisition of vessels by the insured’s government, enemy or neutral 
blockade or embargo in port, from unconventional terrorist attacks,12 and potentially from 
infringement, with or without the barratrous knowledge of the vessel’s crew, of a state’s anti-
                                                     
8 Marstrand Fishing Co Ltd v Beer (the Girl Pat) [1937] 1 All ER 158 (KB) 
9 Referring to Scott v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 190, where aircraft were 
lost on seizure in conflict, and recovered by the time of action; Robert Merkin and Kate Lewins, ‘Case Note: 
Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd; The Bunga Melati Dua; Piracy Ransom and Marine Insurance’ 
(2011) 35 Melb UL Rev 717, 728 fn 89 
10 $135m paid to Somali pirates in 2011, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the coast of 
Somalia; Tenth Report of Session 2010–12 (HC1318, 2012), 15, 55 
11 The European Naval Force Operation Atlanta recorded about 170 reported attacks annually in 2010 and 2011, 
falling to 2 in 2014, ‘European Union Naval Force—Somalia, Key Facts and Figures’ http://eunavfor.eu/key-
facts-and-figures (accessed 26.06.2015) 
12 For a summary of the variety and regularity of incidents that have led to litigation on these issues throughout 
the twentieth century to the present, see Keith Michael, War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004 Informa), Ch 1 
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narcotics or customs laws. Insureds should know the likely interpretation of the terms fixed 
when agreeing cover, and when and to what extent they might recover. In each situation, the 
physical specie may remain undamaged. Yet in each the vessel is taken from the control of 
the owner or charterer. Owner, charterer and cargo interests alike are prevented, for a time, 
from dealing with or disposing of their property. In each situation the insured’s business is 
disrupted, and the time when their property may be released – and the voyage resumed – may 
be unknown. Their potential claims will be for ‘loss of possession’. What principles apply to 
govern their entitlement to compensation?  
 
1.2   Voyage or Time Insured; Compensation for Delay Excluded 
 
i. Nature of the Policy  
Why might mere interruption to a voyage justify compensation for a total loss, when insured 
property is neither destroyed nor damaged? What is the nature of such loss? Marine insurance 
covers not only the physical safety of subject matter, but also contemplates that a voyage be 
performed to a destination port, or the insured subject matter remain safe for a specified period 
of time. In 1782 Mansfield LCJ recognised that on voyage policies, ‘The point of the insurance 
is not the ship alone, but her arrival’.13 In a dispute concerning a policy on linseed for a 
voyage to Germany, abandoned by British owners after the outbreak of war in 1914, the bare 
insured value of the cargo was recognised as “…only part of its description or designation or 
identification. Its full description, as shown by the policy itself, is, linseed… shipped on board 
this vessel to be transported on a voyage at or from a port on the River Plate to Hamburg”.14 
Significantly this aspect of the description: 
“…connotes rights and characteristics attached by the insurance law to goods so 
placed, one of which is this, that they may be treated as constructively totally lost if, by 
one of the perils insured against as the proximate cause, the adventure of taking them 
to their destination be destroyed”.15 
When does interruption to this voyage by an insured peril, causing, for a time, a loss of 
possession, amount to a loss for which the insured may be compensated? What constitutes a 
total loss of this ‘adventure of taking goods to their destination’? How does an interruption to 
the voyage interact with the rules excluding recovery for losses caused by delay? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 Manning v Newnham Trin 1782, report recorded in Wilson v Royal Exchange (1811) 2 Camp 682 
14 Sanday v British and Foreign Marine Insurance Company [1916] 1 AC 650, 664 
15 ibid, 664; cf Fooks v Smith [1924] 2 KB 508, 513 
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ii. Compensation for Delay Excluded 
Where after loss of possession the specie is released or recovered, the contemplated voyage 
may be completed, albeit late. Total loss payments following loss of possession potentially 
operate as exceptions to the rule excluding losses proximately caused by delay,16 now codified 
by s 55(2)(b) of the 1906 Act: ‘the insurer on ship or goods is not liable for any loss 
proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured against’. The 
Act is silent as to freight, but the Institute Freight Clauses now exclude ‘any claim consequent 
on loss of time whether arising from a peril of the sea or otherwise’,17 so a similar exclusion 
often applies in practice. The exclusion evolved concurrently to decisions finding total loss of 
the property, despite ongoing hopes of restoration to the insured (a “spes recuperandi”). The 
chronology establishing this exclusion is important to understanding the persuasiveness of 
loss of possession cases. 
 
1.3 Total Loss Claims 
 
Arguably, total loss claims were formerly successful in circumstances that resolved the 
tension between cover for the voyage and exclusion for ordinary delay in a way that did justice 
to the needs of both insurers and insureds. Total loss claims were successful where possession 
had been lost by the insured, and so long as the abandonment was made quickly, they would 
be successful if made while the peril lasted. 
 
i. Total and Partial Losses 
Total loss provides an ‘extreme’ remedy allowing recovery from the underwriter for the full 
value of the specie insured,18 relative to partial losses reimbursing an insured for specific 
recoverable losses, for example damage. Recovery for total loss matters to insureds since 
recovery for partial losses may be restricted by the exclusion of compensation for losses 
caused by delay. After restoration, any partial loss would be characterised as by delay. 
Consequently, an insured, in a loss of possession situation without damage, conceivably 
recovers for total loss or not at all, as recovery for a total loss effectively avoids the exclusion. 
Even where payments are available these might provide inadequate compensation for the 
                                                     
16 Originally a common-law rule; e.g. losses for delay during repairs following a collision were not recoverable 
in Shelbourne v Law Investment Corpn (1898) 2 QB 629; Chalmers and Owen, The Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(1st edn, 1907), 73 
17 Institute Time Clauses Freight, cl 15; Voyage Clause Freight, cl 11  
18 ie the sum fixed by a valued policy or the insurable value of the specie on an unvalued policy; Guidon de la 
Mer, Ch 7, [1]; Emerigon XVII, II; Lidgett v Secretan (1871) LR 6 CP 616; s 68 of the 1906 Act; Arnould (17th 
ed 2008), [28-01] 
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losses actually sustained from the peril’s effect on underlying transactions. Total losses 
include both ‘actual’ and ‘constructive’ total loss, unless the policy specifies otherwise. 
 
ii. Historic Presumptions of Total Loss 
Early modern English authorities provide simply that whenever the voyage was interrupted 
by an insured peril causing loss of possession, as insureds lost the free use and disposal of 
their property, they could recover at once for a total loss while that peril lasted, whatever the 
predicted duration of the peril. Both specie and the voyage were considered lost. In 
Rodocanachi and others v Elliot it was accepted that a total loss occurred on any capture, 
arrest or embargo:  
 
“In Goss v Withers, Lord Mansfield says: "I cannot find a single book, ancient or 
modern, which does not say that, 'in case of a ship being taken, the insured may demand 
as for a total loss, and abandon'. And what proves the proposition most strongly is, 
that, by the general law, he may abandon in the case merely of an arrest, on an 
embargo, by a prince not an enemy”.19 
 
Goss v Withers (the David and Rebeccah),20 the first English decision on capture on a valued 
policy, permitted a total loss on capture despite strong hopes of recapture and restoration. The 
right to claim was ‘not suspended’, allowing an instant right to abandon on capture.21 
Similarly, where vessels were kept in port by embargo there might be recovery, even when 
later released, as in Fowler and another v The English and Scottish Marine Insurance 
Company (the Ernest Jacob).22 These authorities followed a presumption of total loss 
established in Continental treatises which was regularly applied in English decisions until 
after the Marine Insurance Act 1906: 
“Capture by an enemy or a pirate, or an arrest of princes, or even an embargo, is 
prima facie total loss; and immediately upon the capture, or upon a mere arrest, or at 
any time while the ship continues under detention, the insured may elect to abandon, 
and give notice to the insurer of his intention so to do; and thus enable himself to claim 
as for a total loss from the insurer”.23 
This presumption of total loss was founded on pragmatic commercial considerations: 
“…from the moment of the capture, the owners lose their power over their ship and 
cargo, and are deprived of the free disposal of them; and, in the opinion of the 
merchant, his right of disposal being suspended or rendered uncertain, is equivalent to 
                                                     
19 (1874) LR 9 CP 518, [1874-80] All ER Rep 618, 667-8 
20 (1758) 2 Keny 325, (1758) 2 Burr 683, (1758) 96 ER 1198 
21 (1758) 2 Burr 683, 696 
22 (1865) 2 Mar Law Rep 202, (1865) The New Reports 66 
23 Goss v Withers; Marshall (1802), 483-4; Emerigon, Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse (Mossy 
1783) 
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a total deprivation. It would therefore be unreasonable to oblige the insured to wait 
the event of capture, detention, or embargo”.24 
 
This was never a test of ‘uncertainty’ capable of being later modified by the 1906 Act in 
England to a test of ‘unlikelihood’. This presumption has apparently not survived into the 
modern law, as Panamanian and Masefield illustrate. How and why was this right to instant 
compensation lost?  
 
iii. Statutory Tests of Total Loss  
The statutory tests of total loss do not refer to named perils. Section 57 of the 1906 Act 
provides a general test of actual total loss: 
‘(1) Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a 
thing of the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof’.25 
 
This drafting reflected a long recognised reality, that matter can never be totally destroyed, 
‘destruction’ or ‘damage’ here contemplating change in form. Arnould confirmed that the 
phrase ‘wholly destroyed or annihilated’ does not contemplate complete destruction, but an 
end of utility: 
“It is quite clear that these words cannot mean a change from entity into non-entity, as 
that is even a physical impossibility, and must, therefore, of course, be thrown out of 
consideration in treating of a contract of practical indemnity against substantial 
losses”.26 
  
Arnould continued, stating that there could be an actual total loss in the case of shipwreck, if 
it were not physically possible to recover the specie. The statutory test of irretrievable 
deprivation reflects his proposition: 
“…if the thing insured go in bulk to the bottom of the ocean, or be reduced by fire to a 
heap of ashes, though, in either case, its remains have an existence in natura rerum, 
yet the thing itself is practically, and, as a subject of insurance, wholly destroyed, so 
as to entitle the assured, without notice of abandonment, to claim a total loss”.27   
 
Section 60 of the 1906 Act defines a constructive total loss, so far as material, as: 
‘(1) where the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual 
total loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual 
total loss without an expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure 
had been incurred. 
 
(2) In particular, there is a constructive total loss: (i) Where the assured is deprived of 
the possession of his ship or goods by a peril insured against, and (a) it is unlikely that 
                                                     
24 ibid 
25 1906 Ch 41 6 Edw 7 
26 Arnould (2nd edn, 1866), Vol II, 882 
27 ibid, 882 
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he can recover the ship or goods, … , or (b) the cost of recovering the ship or goods, 
… , would exceed their value when recovered…’ 
 
Where a loss may be claimed under s 60, s 61 permits an insured to elect whether to abandon:  
‘Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a 
partial loss, or abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as 
if it were an actual total loss’.  
 
Accordingly, on a loss of possession, there will be actual total loss where the insured is 
‘irretrievably deprived’, and may be constructive total loss where it ‘appears to be 
unavoidable’, or ‘unlikely that he can recover’ his property.  To claim a constructive loss, an 
insured is not limited to s 60(2), but can rely on the general wording in s 60(1), as:  ‘The two 
sub-sections contain two separate definitions, applicable to different conditions of 
circumstances…’.28 It was later clarified that: ‘…the two sub-sections contain two separate 
definitions which may be applied to different conditions of fact. Thus an assured can base his 
claim on the terms of sub-s. 2, which give an objective criterion in each case, ship, goods or 
freight, not only more precise but substantially different from that in sub-s. 1. Sub-sect. 2, as 
compared with sub-s. 1 is thus cumulative, not merely illustrative’.29 Policy terms may limit 
an insured’s right to claim under aspects of s 60. The Institute Cargo Clauses (A)30 Cl 13 
provides that:  
‘no claim for Constructive Total Loss shall be recoverable hereunder unless the 
subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned either on account of its actual loss 
appearing to be unavoidable or because the cost of recovering, reconditioning and 
forwarding the subject-matter to the destination to which it is insured would exceed its 
value on arrival’. 
 
These terms take priority over the statute, so that care must be taken when reviewing authority 
to question whether the losses were total or constructive, as the giving of notice may not be 
determinative. No authority before Steel J’s judgment in Masefield restricted an insured from 
claiming under s 60(1). Arguably, an insured, on any peril, may claim under either sub-
section, subject to the terms of the policy. Given the apparent completeness of this statutory 
test, it might be that it applied equally to all maritime perils. Arguably, however, caselaw on 
different factual classes of loss indicates that a different approach applies to each class.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28 Robertson v Petros M Nomikos Ltd [1939] AC 371 
29 Rickards v Forestal Land, Timber and Railways Co Ltd; Robertson v Middows Ltd; Kann v W W Howard 
Brothers & Co Ltd [1942] AC 50 (HL), [1941] 3 All ER 62, [1941] 1 KB 225 (CA), [1940] 4 All ER 395, reversing 
[1940] 4 All ER 96 
30 Clauses B and C exclude piracy claims under Cl 6, the ‘War Risks Clause’ 
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iv. Diluting the Presumption 
The presumption of total loss recognised in Rodocanachi has not remained settled. Litigation 
arose where claims alleging loss of possession or of free use and disposal of the vessel were 
made but where the peril had ended before the insurers paid, and insurers relied on the quick 
change in circumstances. While it remained that on deprivation the insured did not have to 
demonstrate that there was no chance of recovery to claim on the policy, the simple position 
that any deprivation of possession justified an abandonment for a total loss appeared by 1917 
to be diluted: 
“Mere temporary deprivation would not under any circumstances constitute a loss. On 
the other hand complete deprivation amounting to a certainty that the goods could 
never be recovered is not necessary to constitute a loss”.31  
The test identified a middle ground between the clear situation where there was certainty that 
the loss would never end, and a clearly temporary obstruction which would not justify 
recovery. In the context of a claim on motor insurance, but relying on marine authorities, it 
was confirmed that it was never necessary for a claimant to prove that insured property was 
irrecoverable in all circumstances. While an insured was not entitled to ‘sit by and do nothing’, 
insureds were ‘not bound to launch into proceedings’ let alone appeal to the House of Lords. 
The test was “whether after all reasonable steps to recover a chattel have been taken by the 
assured, recovery is uncertain”.32 Accordingly, a claim for loss of possession may involve 
identifying what measures are reasonable for an insured to take, and when these have been 
exhausted. 
 
v. Contemporary tests for total loss 
Following Masefield, the contemporary law on capture claims appears twofold: (a) a test of 
‘unlikelihood’ of ‘recovery within a reasonable time’ test for constructive total loss, replacing 
an earlier test of ‘uncertainty’,33 and (b) a test of ‘irretrievable deprivation’ for actual total 
loss.34 A ‘wait-and-see’ approach may be applied by the courts to both, to ascertain what the 
ultimate result of the loss might be.  
 
                                                     
31 Moore v Evans [1917] 1 KB 458, 471 
32 Webster v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd [1953] 1 QB 520, 531 (Parker J); cf 2.4.i 
below 
33 Pollurian v Young [1915] 1 KB 922 (CA), Irvine v Hine [1950] 1 KB 555, [1949] 2 All ER 1089, The Bamburi 
[1982] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 312; Colinvaux’s law of insurance (9th edn, 2010, Sweet & Maxwell), 1158-9 
34 Total losses in marine insurance have since about the 1850s been characterised as either actual or constructive 
(in earlier cases ‘real’ or ‘technical’ losses). These tests were codified separately by the 1906 Act. 
9 
 
Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright35 indicated that the test for actual total 
loss of ‘irretrievable’ deprivation is difficult to satisfy on a loss of possession claim. There, a 
vessel detained by Vietnamese customs officials was confiscated and condemned by a military 
tribunal. Mocatta J held in relation to actual total loss: 
 
“[The] claim … on the basis that the plaintiffs were irretrievably deprived of the Anita 
is somewhat academic. … It may be true that the order of confiscation divested the 
plaintiffs of the legal ownership as is the case of a ship by a Prize Court. But the test 
of irretrievable deprivation is clearly far more severe than the test of unlikelihood of 
recovery of possession, and despite the gloomy prospects for the future as of Aug 29, 
1967, I feel unable to find that the plaintiffs were at the date irretrievably deprived of 
their vessel”.36 
 
Subsequently, Masefield v Amlin Corporate Member37 confirmed that an insured could not 
recover for a total loss, actual or constructive, immediately after a piratical capture. The 
academic consensus following Masefield is that an insured, under English law, must ‘wait-
and-see’ if he is ‘irretrievably deprived’ of the subject matter before recovering for an actual 
total loss, and that, ‘mere seizure of a vessel or cargo by pirates is insufficient to ground a 
claim in either actual or constructive total loss’.38 Recently, an insured vessel covered by, 
inter alia, a War Risks policy was boarded by pirates who ordered the vessel sail to Somalia. 
After a fault developed with the main engine, the pirates disabled the vessel, and abandoned 
her. Salvage tugs were engaged, and recovered her. It was not apparently argued that the vessel 
became a total loss by capture, following the explanation of the law propounded in 
Masefield.39 Arguably, Masefield established a new consensus on the law of total loss.  
 
The test on detention for constructive total loss on restraint or detention was once similar to 
that on capture. However, it is now unclear whether there is a deemed loss of property on 
these perils, or merely a deemed loss of the voyage. On either basis, these situations have been 
tested by a 12 month period before abandonment.40 Further, it appears that actual total loss by 
restraint of princes is difficult or impossible a test to satisfy.41 Of course, the situation 
following capture or detention may not be static, and the property may be sold by those 
authorities in control of property taken or restrained, or even destroyed. Eventual sale may42 
                                                     
35 (1970) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365, [1971] 2 All ER 1028 
36 ibid, 383 
37 [2011] EWCA Civ 24, [2011] 3 All ER 554, [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm) 
38 eg Michael Underdown ‘Case Notes; Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd’ (2010) 21 ILJ 62 
39 Suez Fortune Investments Ltd v Talbot Underwriting Ltd and others (The Brillante Virtuoso) [2015] EWHC 42 
(Comm)(Flaux J) 
40 The Bamburi [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312 
41 Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright (The Anita) [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep 365; [1971] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep 487 
42 Le Cann [1886-90] All ER Rep 957 
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or may not43 result in a total loss to the insured. If an insured must wait-and-see, the 
consequence of failing to abandon early has been untested in recent authority.  
 
This brief survey illustrates that on claims for loss of possession, what was in 1756 a simple 
rule has evolved into a significantly stricter test for insureds. This study aims to answer: (i) 
how was it that a presumption that allowed an insured to abandon and recover instantly 
evolved into a rule where he could not; and (ii) what is the contemporary law?  
  
1.4 Research Methodology  
 
This study aims to state the contemporary law – or construction of marine policies – in 
England and Wales. In doing so, it identifies once settled principles, and questions the 
accuracy of decisions deviating from these. The law of marine insurance is largely that of 
construction of the clauses in the policy.44 These terms entered English policies by the Lloyd’s 
SG Form, and find contemporary expression in the range of marine policies currently 
available in the Lloyd’s market, primarily the Institute clauses, or other policies subject to 
English law. A thorough analysis of English marine insurance law requires a historical 
approach, tracing the development of authority on the clauses. A comparative study with 
American authorities, in particular those of the Federal courts and the state of New York, adds 
useful context to this interpretation. 
 
i. Justification for a Historical Approach 
As there is comparatively little express academic consideration of these issues, any exposition 
of insurance law depends directly on primary authority – often older cases and early treatises. 
Continuity in insurance practice and law justifies consideration of older reported decisions, 
treatises and textbooks than might remain practically relevant to other areas of contemporary 
commercial law. The factual matrix of total loss claims ‘reflect the political and commercial 
history of the Western world for the last two hundred years’;45 the editors of Arnould note 
most principles were established during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.46 The 
form of marine insurance policy changed little between about 1613 and 1982. The SG Policy 
preserved an earlier of wording, found in the earliest surviving policy known to have been 
                                                     
43 Fooks v Smith [1924] 2 KB 508 
44 Kulukundis v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1937] 1 KB 1, 34 (Scott LJ) 
45 The Bamburi [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 312, 312 (Staunton J) 
46 Arnould (17th edn, 2008), v 
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issued in England (1613),47 recorded in early textbooks,48 and possibly used in England from 
1450.49 Lloyd’s formally adopted the form in 1779. It is a statutory form of policy scheduled 
to the Stamp Duties Act 179550 in near identical terms to the Marine Insurance Act 1906.51 
The SG policy was used for ‘centuries without [significant] change’, and the English 
formulation, due to the commercial influence of Lloyd’s, acquired a global influence not far 
short of a ‘lingua franca’ or ‘common currency’ of international insurance.52 The SG policy 
was used in the English market to insure both ship and cargo53 and against marine and war 
risks, until superseded by the 1982 reforms. 
 
English Authorities 
 
Although vessels were undoubtedly captured or detained throughout English history,54 few 
authorities consider captures on wagering assurances before the Glorious Revolution.55 The 
development of a body of English insurance authorities on valued policies begins with Lord 
Mansfield. Earlier cases on wagering policies remain relevant to the doctrine of ‘loss of the 
voyage’, although these are few. These authorities remain relevant for understanding 
contemporary law. Early authority may identify longstanding customary or trade usage. 
Mansfield CJ’s 1780 guidance that ‘the material rules to be adhered to in the construction of 
policies are the intention of the parties entering into the contract and the usage of trade’56 
remains applicable and persuasive. In 1791 it was recognised that the SG policy ‘has at all 
times been considered in Courts of Law as an absurd and incoherent instrument; but it is 
founded on usage, and must be governed and construed by usage’.57 Lord Mansfield noted 
difficulties in interpretation, and viewed the court’s role as applying a ‘system of construction 
                                                     
47 Martin, Frederick; The History of Lloyd’s and of Marine Insurance in Great Britain (MacMillan & Co, London 
1876), 46-8; Gow, Marine Insurance; A Handbook (MacMillan 1917), App B 
48 Policy issued 1753, Magens (1755) Vol I, 50, Vol II, 384  
49 Maclachlan suggested use in England from c.1450, cf Arnould (6th edn, 1877), 814; the earliest surviving marine 
policy is that contained in a Florentine ordinance of 1525 – English policies, written in Italian, survive from 1547 
onwards, C Wright, CE Fayle, ‘A History of Lloyd’s (1928, MacMillan), Ch 6; DEW Gibb, ‘Lloyd’s of London’ 
(1957, MacMillan) 
50 35 Geo 3 c63; Arnould (17th edn, 2008), [2-21] fn 113 
51 eg in 1850, "Be it known that" replaced the solemn preamble "In the name of God, Amen" 
52 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co The Al Wahab [1984] AC 50, 65; [1983] 2 All ER 884, 
891, 895 
53 “SG” probably meaning “ship and goods”, Fayle Wright, History of Lloyds, 132-133 
54 The oldest insurance dispute recorded in England, decided 1426 at the Guildhall, concerned a vessel seized by 
Spanish privateer; Florentine law and custom, or the ‘law merchant’ was applied, presumably on an Italian policy, 
Ferrantyn’s case (The Seint Anne of London) (Plea Rolls, City of London)  Thomas, AH (ed): Calendar of plea 
& memoranda rolls of the City of London preserved among the archives of the Corporation of London at the 
Guildhall, AD 1413-1437, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943, 208-210 
55 few reported decisions until Mansfield LCJ, De Koning (1997) 
56 Syers and others v Bridge (the Mary) (1780) 99 ER 335 (KB), (1780) 2 Doug KB 526 (Mansfield LCJ); Steel, 
David, The Ship-Master's Assistant and Owner's Manual (9th edn, 1801, Steel and Galabin) 211, (20th edn, 1832, 
Longman and others), 841 
57 Brough v Whitmore (1791) 4 Term Rep 206, 210, (1791) 100 ER 976, 978 (KB) (Buller J) 
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established, upon the ancient and inaccurate form of words in which the instrument is 
conceived’.58 Consequently, early authorities remain useful in construing a document of such 
longevity, as the wording acquired a settled judicially approved usage,59 so that when “asked 
to construe an expression in a mercantile document of ancient origin, interpreted by decisions 
that have stood for more than a century... the only safe rule for a Court is stare decisis”.60 
 
It was recognised from an early date that the ordinary meaning of words may be overruled by 
a customary interpretation.61 Further, settled judicial interpretation may reinforce customary 
usage, in a process by which the ‘law merchant’ – the custom of merchants and traders – 
became ratified by courts of law.62 Where words were for many years given a settled judicial 
construction, it was reasonable to suppose that parties believed this accepted construction 
would be applied.63 The policy of insurance was recognised from an early date to have a settled 
meaning ascribed to terms, in consequence of being a written document from a time when 
much commerce was not reduced precisely to writing. The standard nature of the policy, 
through extended use and practice, gave its terms a comparatively known and definite 
meaning.64 
 
This applicability of stare decisis is even stronger where it is recognised that a document has 
an international usage. Precedent would be respected not only where words were identical, 
but also where substantially the same. Courts would be reluctant to interfere with long-
established constructions. The international aspect was particularly important, in that 
insurance "is commonly offered in standard form policies which have a national or 
international provenance. Courts recognise this fact and the consequence that risks may be 
assessed, and reinsurance procured, on the footing that settled interpretations of commonly 
used language will not be disturbed without good reason…”65 While non-standard terms or 
riders added in writing would be given greater weight, as being specifically negotiated by the 
parties,66 total loss claims have usually turned on standard terms. Few if any commercial 
documents have been settled in such longstanding, widespread use as the SG policy. Janson 
                                                     
58 Pelly v Royal Exchange Assurance Co [1558-1774] All ER Rep 405, 409 
59 Becker, Gray & Co v London Ass Corp [1918] AC 101, 114 (Sumner LJ); The Mihalis Angelos [1971] 1 QB 
164, 194 (Denning MR) 
60 Becker, Gray and Co v London Assurance Corporation [1918] AC 101, 109 (Dunedin LJ) 
61 Olivera v Union Insurance Company (1818) 16 US 183, 191 (US Supreme Court) 
62 Goodwin v Robarts (1874-75) LR 10 Ex 337, 346 
63 Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company, Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (the Inchmaree) (1887) LE 12 
App Cas 484, 490 (Lord Halsbury LC) 
64 Robertson and another v French [1803-13] All ER Rep 350, 353 (Ellenborough LCJ) 
65 Malcolm Clarke The Law of Insurance Contracts (Informa, 2006), [15-2A]; approved Sunsport Shipping Ltd 
and others v Tryg-Baltica International (UK) Ltd and others [2003] EWCA Civ 12, [26] 
66 ibid [1803-13] All ER Rep 350, 353 
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v Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd67 confirmed settled usages should not be lightly 
disturbed by policy considerations. Serjeant Marshall’s Marine Insurances was approved; 
certainty required established judicial rules not to be set aside for policy reasons, absent 
legislative intervention a rule of law ought to remain settled, and the legislature alone “…has 
the power to decide on the policy or expedience of repealing laws, or suffering them to remain 
in force”.68 The presumption is that settled rules ought not to be overturned lightly. On 
overturning an established rule, even on good authority, the approach must be cautious: “The 
decision… has been unchallenged and presumably acted on for fifty years, and even if I did 
not agree with the view there expressed I should hesitate before overruling it”.69 
Consequently, an approach considering the history of clauses is uncontroversial,70 and this 
study aims to consider the full history of the interpretation of these clauses. 
 
Nevertheless, rules no longer reflecting commercial reality may be overturned.71 Clearly, the 
law must adapt to changing factual situations or expectations.72 Older sources of law may state 
rules contrary to contemporary judicial or market understanding. Where older laws have been 
replaced by contrary custom stare decisis is not inflexible; “… although precedent is 
respected, the court is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to respect it".73 This is 
particularly so where the law merchant was once simply custom – if that custom is changing, 
then it may be a question of balance as to when the law adapts to follow. Presumptions of loss 
on loss of possession claims engage this balance; terms may have a customary interpretation, 
but if the custom has been changed, eg by decisions such as Masefield, the extent to which 
previous inconsistent authority has relevance may be lessened.  
 
Continental Treatise Writers and Development of English literature 
 
The wording of the SG policy conformed to the French policy in ‘Guidon de La Mer’ 
published about 1600.74 The underlying principles are much older still, the courts perceiving 
the right to abandon – ie recover for total loss – originating ‘in the Rhodian law and the laws 
of Oleron’.75 In determining the relevance of a source of law, it is instructive to note the 
materials available to maritime practitioners in the Doctor’s Commons, the practitioners in 
                                                     
67 [1902] AC 484 
68 [1902] AC 484; [1900-03] All ER Rep 426, 430 
69 R v Hooley Hill Rubber and Royal Insurance Co [1920] 1 KB 257, 269 (Bankes LJ) 
70 Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Team-Up Owning Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 1340 (Comm), [28] 
71 C Czarnikow v Koufos [1966] 2 QB 695 
72 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13 
73 Malcolm Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (Informa 2006), [15-2A] 
74 Observed in Martin (1876), 41; Guidon de la Mer, Le in Pardessus, Marie J, Collections de lois maritimes 
antérieures au XVIIIme siècle (Paris 1828-1845), Vol 2, ch 13, 69ff 
75 2 Burr 693 (Mansfield LCJ) 
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the Admiralty courts.76 English insurance law from its Tudor origins borrowed heavily from 
treatise writers and Continental codes, both of which amplified Roman law principles, and 
from the lex mercatura, which was recognised as an international customary law. Renaissance 
and early modern treatises on insurance are frequently cited in earlier English authorities. 
Amongst these, le Guidon de la Mer (1556), the Us et Coutumes de la Mer by Cleirac (1656) 
and the Ordonnance de la Marine (1681) were particularly significant for the development of 
total loss tests, and remain directly relevant. Later Continental treatises were significant, 
principally Valin,77 published in 1766, Pothier from 1775,78 and Emerigon,79 published in 
1783. Arnould considered Emerigon the most important of the treatise writers, remaining 
authoritative in then contemporary English law.80 Other laws of insurance, such as fire or 
lives, were unknown before the eighteenth century, and ultimately derived their principles 
from marine insurance. The influence of those early Continental writers persists in the 
common-law to the present. These, especially Emerigon and The Guidon, were cited with 
approval as late as 1908 as the direct source for English rules.81 Their importance is all the 
greater for the fragmentary records kept of Court of Admiralty decisions, which did not go 
back beyond 1641, and were of a very poor quality before 1690.82  
 
Only in 1786 was the body of English cases sufficient for the first English text, Park,83 soon 
followed by Marshall,84 both of which, along with the Continental writers, were treated as 
principal authorities in the United States.85 Arnould, now a leading English practitioner work, 
was first published in 1848. Until a sufficient body of English works or cases had 
accumulated, in the absence of prior authority, English courts looked to French principles as 
expounded in these treatises.86 Consequently, this study looks to Emerigon and other writers 
                                                     
76 Alex Parks, ‘The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance and Average’ (Cornell Maritime Press, 1987) Vol 1, 
4-8; William Tetley, ‘Maritime Law as a Mixed Legal System, (with particular reference to the distinctive nature 
of American maritime law, which benefits from both its civil and common law heritages) (1999) 23 Tul Mar LJ 
317 
77 Valin, Nouveau Commentaire Sur L'Ordonnance de 1681 (La Rochelle, 1766) 
78 Pothier RJ, Supplement A Treatise on Maritime Contracts of letting to hire (trans Cushing C, 1821, Cummings 
and Hilliard); Traité du contrat d'assurance (editor Estrangin, 1810, Marseille) 
79 BM Emerigon, Traite des Assurances et des Contrats a la Grosse (Marselles, 1783) 
80 Arnould (1848) Vol I, viii-ix 
81 eg The Teutonia (1871) LR 3 A&E 394, 424; Polurrian v Young [1915] 1 KB 922 (CA), (1913) 84 LJKB 1025, 
[1914-15] All ER Rep 116 
82 Lindo v Rodney (1782) 2 Doug 613, 99 ER 38 (Mansfield LJ); A Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil 
Law and the Law of Admiralty, being the substance of course of lectures read in the University of Dublin by Arthur 
Browne (Butterworth 1802) 209 
83 J Park, A System of the Law of Marine Insurance (London, 1786) 
84 S Marshall, Treatise on the Law of Insurance (1st edn, 1802) 
85 Graydon Staring, ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law; Selected Topics’, Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Vol 26, No 
3 (Spring 1991) 538, 539 
86 eg Butler v Wildman (1814-23) All ER Rep 748 (Best J) 
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as the source of law applied in later English decisions. Where later decisions appear to conflict 
with the rules in these authoritative works, these must be analysed closely.  
 
ii. Utility of comparison to US law 
To a significant extent, American authorities, in particular those of the earlier nineteenth 
century, usefully explain English insurance law. The commercial background, including a 
shared legal history until 1776, meant that American brokers routinely offered British policies 
to their customers into the 1950s, and themselves used policy forms in similar terms to the SG 
form. Reinsurance across the American and British market was routine. Given the 
international unity of the industry, difficulties to insureds resulted from divergence between 
the laws applying in the two markets.87 
 
American Authorities explaining English law 
 
Until 1955 it was settled that marine insurance as part of admiralty law was subject to federal 
law. Justice Storey established Federal admiralty jurisdiction in 1815,88 and later reaffirmed 
his decision adding ‘that he had reason to believe that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice 
Washington were prepared to maintain the jurisdiction’, which decision was confirmed in 
1871.89 In the numerous nineteenth century marine insurance decisions of the American 
Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts, there is frequent citation of English cases, 
and Valin, Emerigon and early Continental treatises.90 While the draft Field Code was never 
adopted by New York, it reflected an existing incorporation of the English authorities, 
including Park and Marshall into state law.91 The earliest American authorities demonstrate 
an understanding of marine insurance as an international lex mercatoria. Ideally, decisions 
would be consistent across state and federal jurisdictions and in harmony with the English 
decisions, especially those of Lord Mansfield.92 The US Supreme Court cited English and 
early State decisions frequently, many of them founded on the Continental writers, and 
occasionally cited those writers directly.93 As recently as 1938 and 1953, the Supreme Court 
                                                     
87 ‘International Divergencies in Marine Insurance Law: The Quest for Certainty’, Harvard Law Review, Vol 64, 
No 3 (Jan, 1951) 446 
88 De Lovio v Boit 7 Fed Cas 418 no 3, 776 CCDMass 1815 
89 Insurance Company v Dunham (1871) 78 US 1, 20 L Ed 90, 1870 US Lexis 1455; 1997 AMC 2394; 11 Wall 1 
(USSC) 
90 Graydon Staring, ‘Admiralty and Maritime Law; Selected Topics, Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Vol 26, No 3 
(Spring 1991), 539 
91 Cal Civ Code, tit XI annotations (H S Crocker & Co, Sacramento, 1872) 
92 William A. Fletcher, ‘The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of 
Marine Insurance’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 97, No 7 (May, 1984), 1513, 1519, 1564-1569 
93 Graydon Staring (1991), 538-559, 540 
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freely mixed English and early state decisions in deciding marine insurance cases,94 and lower 
courts more recently.95 The English Marine Insurance Act 1906 has a persuasive status in US 
courts, as it is thought to codify laws adopted into federal law since independence.96  
 
Impliedly, insurance laws across the American states should remain in harmony; state courts 
recognised that their marine laws were part of a global law of nations. For example, in The 
Jerusalem Storey J stated, "[When admiralty jurisdiction] rightfully attaches on the subject 
matter, [the federal court] will exercise it conformably with the law of nations, or the lex loci 
contractus, as the case may require".97 Hammond v Essex Fire & Marine Insurance Co98 
confirmed American admiralty jurisdiction, exercised in conformity with the law of nations 
and reinforced links to English law.99 In recognition of the principle underlying the lex 
mercatoria, the Supreme Court declared in ‘The Supreme Courts Harmony Rubric’ of 1923, 
that "[t]here are special reasons for keeping in harmony with them marine insurance laws of 
England, the great field of this business".100 That view has been accepted as a guideline by 
lower courts101 and the Supreme Court endorsed it in 1953.102 Such harmony could not be 
encouraged practically without national uniformity in America, guided by federal decisions. 
The principle of harmony was therefore incompatible with the Supreme Court's subsequent 
decision in Wilburn Boat Co v Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co,103 which held Admiralty 
Jurisdiction – in America including marine insurance – was, absent prior authority, a matter 
of state law only.104 
 
In particular, the common-law of marine insurance in New York antedates the US general 
maritime law, and is largely based on English law as understood by American practitioners in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, including Alexander Hamilton.105 Because the US general 
                                                     
94 Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co., 302 US 556, 1938 AMC 1 (1938); Calmar SS Corp v Scott 345 US 
427, 1953 AMC 952 (1953); Graydon Staring (1991), 538, 539 
95 Nautilus Virgin Charters v Edinburgh Ins Co 510 F Supp 1092 (D Md 1981) 
96 Richard E Burke, ‘An Introduction to Marine Insurance’, The Forum (Section of Insurance, Negligence and 
Compensation Law, American Bar Association), Vol 15, No 4 (Spring 1980), 729, 730; Parks AL, Marine 
Insurance Principles: Contract Formation and Interpretations, (1978) 3 Mar L 129, 130 
97 13 FedCas 559 (CCD Mass, 1814)(No 7293) 563 
98 11 FedCas 387 (CCD Mass, 1826)(No 6001) 
99 US 310, 1955 AMC 467 (1955) 
100 Queen Insurance Co v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins Co, 263 US 487,493, 1924 AMC 107, 109 (1924); General 
Ins Co v Link, 173 F2d 955 (9th Cir 1949) 
101 Queen Insurance Co v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins Co (1923) 263 US 487; see further B Yancey, ‘State 
Regulation of Marine Insurance’ 23 Ins Counsel J 143 (1956) 
102 Calmar SS Corp v Scott, (1953) 345 US 427, 443, (1953) AMC 952, 965  
103 US 310, 1955 AMC 467 (1955) 
104 Graydon Staring ‘Wilburn Boat is a Dead Letter: R.I.P.’ 42 J Mar L & Com 465 (Oct 2011) 
105 Atlantic Ins Co v Storrow, 5 Paige 285 (NY Ch 1835); Vandenheuvel v United Ins Co 1 Johns 406 (Sup NY 
1806); Wallace v Sloop Ann (NY 1771) Charles Hough, Reports of Cases in the Vice-Admiralty of the Province 
of New York (1925, Yale University Press)  
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maritime law largely followed English law,106 conflicts between federal and state law with 
respect to marine insurance rarely arise in New York, although more frequently in other state 
jurisdictions.107 That courts aim for commercial uniformity of outcome rather than mere legal 
parallelism is illustrated by a case on the construction of a FC&S clause, where the result 
achieved differed in the construction of a term, but reached the same result.108 Nevertheless, 
significant differences emerged, which directly influence total loss claims, in particular the 
time when parties’ rights are to be determined, and in respect of causation in respect of delay.  
 
Development of American Literature 
 
The first American treatise on insurance was Phillips in 1823, published up to 1867. 
Chancellor Kent devoted 93 pages of his Commentaries to marine insurance. The authorities 
he cited to explain American law included the English cases, Park, Marshall, Valin, Emerigon 
and Boulay-Paty. Duer109 followed in 1845 and Parsons110 in 1868. These texts rested 
explicitly on the authority of their English and Continental predecessors and aspired to an 
ideal of uniformity in the Western commercial world, treating the law of insurance contracts 
as a part of the lex mercatoria, a body of commercial law conceived to be common to the 
United States and other commercial nations. Phillips, Duer and Parsons were considered by 
English judges as late as 1984 to determine their views on a question of disclosure. Probably 
in no other commercial field have the common-law courts referred so much to the authority 
of treatises or been so "richly endowed" with them.111 Reciprocally, Arnould considered 
American authorities alongside the English. The plurality of jurisdictions in the US prevent 
this study from offering a complete summary of the law in each State. Insteadit draws 
assistance from US laws in understanding English law.  
 
Despite these general requirements, marine insurance laws diverged from the English 
authorities, the best-known illustration of divergence being the difference in the value of 
damage that permits total loss in England and America, probably explained by changing trade 
                                                     
106 New England Marine Ins Co v Dunham 78 US 1 (1871) 
107 eg Wilburn Boat US 310, 1955 AMC 467 (1955) and Albany Ins Co v An Thi Khieu 927 F 2d 882 (5 Cir, 1991) 
108 United States v Standard Oil Co 178 F2d 488 (2d Cir 1949); ‘International Divergencies in Marine Insurance 
Law: The Quest for Certainty’, Harvard Law Review, Vol 64, No 3 (Jan, 1951) 446, 450 
109 J Duer, The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance (1845, New York) 
110 T Parsons, Treatise on the Law of Insurance (1868, Boston) 
111 M Mustill, ‘Fault and Marine Losses’ (1988) LMCLQ 256 
Quarterly 310, 313 n 8: "It is remarkable that marine insurance has attracted such a wealth of scholars who 
combined intellectual superiority, breadth of learning and practical acumen. In addition to other writers 
mentioned in the text [Valin, Emerigon, Park and Marshall], one has to name only Phillips, Parsons, Abbott, 
Arnould, Chalmers, Maclachlan and Cohen, among many others.”  
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custom immediately after independence.112 For issues of loss of possession, there are two 
material differences: first, the time when the parties’ rights became settled; secondly, on the 
law of causation.113 As a result of these differences, total loss claims have potentially different 
outcomes between the two legal systems.  
 
Naturally, similar considerations would arise in relation to Australian and Canadian cases. 
However, despite a search through the literature, there appear to be few decided cases on 
material points in those jurisdictions. This may be because the insurance markets in these 
countries are less well established than those of American, in particular New York, 
jurisdictions. 
   
iii. Policy Considerations 
In addition to settled principles of construction imported from general contract law that justify 
a historical approach, and a presumption of common sense,114 there are particular 
considerations that influence the court’s construction of a marine policy. Underlying the 
construction of the policy for the purposes of total loss claims, are two competing policy 
issues:  
 
 
Minimising commercial harm caused by delay 
 
On learning of an incident involving his vessel or cargo an insured will ask when and to what 
extent he may recover in respect of his loss from his insurers. Uncertainty or a long delay in 
finding out his position must be undesirable. It has long been recognised that: “[c]ommercial 
men must be entitled to act on reasonable commercial probabilities at the time they are called 
upon to make up their minds”,115 and that “[c]ommercial men must not be asked to wait till 
the end of a long delay to find out from what in fact happens whether they are bound by a 
contract or not”.116 After a vessel’s capture, the House of Lords recognised, “the assured 
                                                     
112 Herbert Barry, ‘Casual Comments on Particular Average and Constructive Total Loss’, Virginia Law Review, 
Vol 9, No 5 (Mar 1923), 344, 353 
113 On causation, US Supreme Court declined to follow Pink v Fleming and Taylor v Dunbar as being inconsistent 
with Leyland Shipping, Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co Inc v Universal Ins Co 302 US 556 (1938); 
Brandyce v US Lloyd’s 207 AppDiv 665 (1924) 
114 “The construction of a commercial contract leading to such a result seems unlikely to be correct, except in a 
community consisting of fools and knaves.” Forestal Land, Timber and Rlys Co Ltd v Rickards [1940] 4 All ER 
395, 408 (MacKinnon LJ) 
115 National Carriers Ltd v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd [1981] AC 675, 706, [1981] 1 All ER 161, 180, HL (Simon 
LJ) 
116 Embiricos v Sydney Reid & Co [1914] 3 KB 45 
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should not be obliged to wait till he had definitely ascertained whether his ship had been 
recaptured or not”.117 
 
Cargo owners are especially vulnerable to the consequences of delay: ‘to all who are engaged 
in commercial speculations, it is of the last importance to have a ready and quick command 
of their capital, so as to be enabled at once to draw it from any venture which appears likely 
to be losing, and invest it in another that promises to be lucrative’. Further, that for a merchant 
to have his funds locked up during the whole time he waited for the final consequences of the 
accident to materialise would more disastrous than the actual instant physical destruction of 
his property.118 Delay in a decision as to whether to pay for a loss following a casualty harms 
commerce.  Policy considerations require the law assist in determining parties’ rights without 
undue delay. This was recognised by Emerigon; “Commercial adventures require celerity, 
and there is nothing so fatal as the experience of delays”.119  
 
In terms of the utility and purpose of insurance, a fundamental function is to encourage trade. 
Insurance allows merchants to trade where the risks would otherwise be prohibitive, by 
mitigating losses that would potentially ruin individual traders. 120 It has long been recognised, 
from the 1770s to the Great War, that marine insurance has a vital role in sustaining trade in 
times of conflict.121 Quick resolution of issues of delay, one of the main consequences of 
conflict and terrorism, should arguably be a key policy aim of insurance. 
 
Reducing uncertainty 
 
Simple rules discourage disputes. Arnould approved Mansfield’s maxim, applicable to the 
determination of any mercantile dispute, “That the property and daily negotiations of 
merchants ought not to depend on subtelties and nicities, but on rules easily learned and easily 
retained, because they are the dictates of common sense”, and applied this to the insurance 
context.122 Rules should be clear, and allow all parties, not least the master, to act promptly. 
For example, on damage, the master should know how to act, and what effect in law his acts 
have. Accordingly, he should have clear rules to guide his actions. Where it was suggested 
that the simple rule that masters should, where possible, repair the vessel and proceed with 
                                                     
117 Moore v Evans [1918] 1 AC 185 (HL) (Atkinson LJ) 
118 Arnould (2nd edn, 1857), 1014 (Lord Ellenborough CJ) 
119 Emerigon XVII 
120 eg “By means of a policy of insurers it cometh to pass that upon the loss or perishing of any ship there followeth 
not the undoing of any man but the loss lighteth rather easily upon many than heavily upon few.” An Acte 
concerninge matters of Assurances, amongste Merchantes 1601 43 Eliz ch 12 
121 Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Insuring War: Sovereignty, Security and Risk (2012, Routledge), 42ff 
122 Arnould (3rd edn, 1866), Vol II 907 
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the charter, the reasons the court gave in declining to complicate the law, regardless of the 
justice in the individual case, was to avoid complicating the simple rule, stating “…the rule 
now sought to be laid down would place shipowners and freighters in a position of the greatest 
uncertainty and difficulty”.123 Similar concerns have been applied in the construction of a 
charterparty, in that a construction that provides clear rules to guide conduct is to be preferred 
to a construction that results in uncertainty, even where that would be just in the instant case: 
“[the law prefers] a construction which gives a certain, clear, and honest rule of conduct to act 
by in all cases, upholding a contract, over one which introduces uncertainty and difficulty as 
to conduct, and admits of reasons for defeating a contract which are to be derived from 
considerations of interest at the time”.124  
 
A literal construction may well be preferable: ‘The question seems a simple one; but, if we 
depart from the literal construction, we may be led into complications and metaphysical 
refinements from which mercantile contracts ought, as far as possible, to be free’.125 Any test 
requiring the exercise of discretion of judgment, arguably extending to judicial discretion, is 
undesirable in a commercial situation. In reference to a test of uncertainty, in the context of 
total loss by putrefaction by sea-damage to goods landed in specie at the destination port, 
Arnould recognised in 1848: 
“… as Emerigon says, with reference to this very point, to introduce such a test would 
be to make the question of the underwriter’s liability “depend on the fluctuating views 
which different men might form on the same subject, and could be of no service except 
to give rise to litigation ruinous to commerce”.126 
 
Further, as with the interpretation of any contract, the aim is to understand what the parties 
meant, which means that a business sense is given to the terms, where appropriate.127 It is well 
recognised both in the UK and in America that the parties’ relative bargaining power, in this 
commercial context, are unequal. Few merchants or brokers thoroughly understand insurance 
law, and further insurers frequently issue policies on standard terms over which brokers 
exercise little influence. Negotiations concern the few most salient terms, and the rest is left 
on standard forms, usually drafted to favour the insurer.128 Consequently the policy is often 
construed against the insurer.129  
 
                                                     
123 Jackson v The Union Marine Insurance Company Ltd (1874) LR 10 CP 125, 131 
124 ibid (1874) LR 10 CP 125, 133 
125 Cory v Burr [1881-85] All ER Rep 414, 422 (Fitzgerald LJ) 
126 Arnould (1st edn, 1848), 1036 
127 “…insurer and insured must be taken to have understood the words "total loss" in the business sense of those 
words.” Blairmore v Macredie [1898] AC 593, 599 
128 Samuel Williston, 7 Williston on Contracts (3d edn, 1963), [900] 
129 eg where lines 42-44 of the American Institute Hull War Clauses were ambiguous, construed against the 
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Marine insurance must not encourage litigation. The law should, by applying certain rules, 
prevent litigation, and the wasting of resources. The presumptions of total loss expounded in 
earlier authority, and eroded or ignored in recent, discouraged uncertainty and consequent 
litigation. Throughout all considerations of marine insurance, Mansfield’s desire for certainty 
has been confirmed as the paramount consideration.130 
 
Protecting Insureds and Insurers 
 
Courts must strike a balance between the rights of the insurer and insured. Insurance law aims 
to prevent overcompensation, often expressed by describing the policy as a contract of 
‘indemnity’, where the insurer promises to pay only on the occurrence of certain events 
causing loss in a certain way.131 The guiding principle is that a contract for indemnity will not 
over-compensate the insured. The expression ‘indemnity only’ meant an insured ‘shall be 
fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified”, so that any argument that 
either prevented an insured from being fully compensated, or conversely overcompensated 
him, would be rejected.132 The principle should be even-handed, and not be used to exclude 
properly covered compensation for losses suffered. 
 
Insurance law balances providing compensation for losses within the policy with protecting 
the insurer from excessive or disproportionate payments, or from making insurers act as 
merchant, shipowner, or broker of property abandoned to them unjustifiably.133  Insurance 
does not compensate for normal fluctuations in the market. Consequently, an insurer is not 
seen to be liable for losses proximately caused by delay where the goods arrive undamaged. 
If permitted improperly to abandon, an insured might be tempted to take advantage by 
overvaluing his interest in relation to the value at the time of a cargo’s arrival. Mansfield LCJ 
stated… “that ought not to be encouraged as it is productive of fraud, [and] contrary to the 
spirit of maritime law. Or that the market has fallen since he insured, but as the insurer can 
have no advantage by the rise he ought not to lose by the accidental fall. On a valued policy, 
a plaintiff cannot recover more than the actual loss which has happened, at the time when he 
chooses to abandon…’134 Ellenborough CJ noted ‘In almost every case of a valued policy it 
is the interest of the assured to abandon; and therefore it behoves the Court to watch every 
such case, and in no instance to enlarge that which in the nature of the thing is a partial, into 
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a total, loss’.135 Both the need to protect insurers from market forces,136 and insurers’ 
vulnerability to fraud, have been restated frequently. These policy considerations underpin 
contemporary law. Equally, insureds must also be properly protected from losses within the 
policy, or insurance serves no purpose.  
 
Consequently, a properly informed construction of a contemporary policy requires a 
consideration of cases from Tudor England onwards, when the applicable principles and 
constructions, borrowed from Continental laws, were introduced into English law. This 
history is of practical significance, not least in the continuity of documents and usage, and the 
continuing relevance of older treatises and cases domestically, but also between this 
jurisdiction and American decisions.137 The correct approach is to identify the state of the law 
as settled in the earliest authorities. This enables a narrow approach identifying the ratio in 
subsequent cases, and allows a comparison between settled rules and later commentary or 
speculation. This is necessary to identify dicta in cases and commentary which were not 
grounded in settled rules or justified by judicial authority. As will be seen, this conservative 
approach is necessary to loss of possession cases, as the intervals between major authorities 
encouraged an approach which did not fully consider older authorities. 
 
 
1.5 Time when rights to be finalised 
 
Loss of possession claims demonstrate tension between those two competing policy 
considerations. For claims where the specie survived, so that a chance of restoration invariably 
persisted, disputes frequently concerned situations where the peril had ended by the time 
proceedings reached court. Policy considerations, primarily certainty, dictated that the parties’ 
rights had to be finalised at some fixed date. As restated in 1954: 
 
“Rights ought not to be left in suspense or to hang on the chances of subsequent events. 
The contract binds or it does not bind, and the law ought to be that the parties can 
gather their fate then and there. What happens afterwards may assist in showing what 
the probabilities really were, if they had been reasonably forecasted, but when the 
causes of frustration have operated so long or under such circumstances as to raise a 
presumption of inordinate delay, the time has arrived at which the fate of the contract 
falls to be decided”.138  
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The resolution of these tensions in loss of possession cases evolved over time. The English 
courts’ approach has increasingly protected insurers.139 As observed in Ruys v Royal 
Exchange Assurance Corporation:140 
"…much might be said for the review suggested by Lord Eldon and adopted in the 
American and other systems, that the rights of the parties should be finally ascertained 
upon a proper abandonment. But, the object of litigation being to settle disputes, it is 
obvious that some date must be fixed upon when the respective rights of the parties may 
be finally ascertained, and the line of the writ may be regarded as a line of convenience 
which has been settled by uniform practice for at least seventy years ..."141 
As noted, American rules increase certainty by looking to the situation as at the time of 
abandonment (Chapter 4.1.iii, below). Accordingly, an approach aiming to consider the full 
history of the decided cases and academic commentary in England and America is taken when 
addressing the two issues central to this study: when do insureds have a right to abandon on 
loss of possession, and, if denied, when proceedings are issued, how should claims for loss of 
possession be decided?  
 
 
1.6 Issues addressed 
 
In answering when an insured may be compensated on loss of possession: 
 
Chapter 2 questions how the specified perils in the policy covering loss of possession situations 
construed, and what material facts are needed for an insured to claim a loss within the policy. 
It argues that while the perils overlapped, it was clear that simple loss of possession was a peril 
covered by the policy and/or the “FCS clause”. It identifies that the ‘wait and see’ approach 
derives from non-marine perils, and contradicts the former marine definitions.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the effect of loss of possession on the insured’s property rights and 
contractual obligations. It clarifies that the moment of loss of title, or charterparty frustration, 
should not govern the time at which an insured should be able to recover on his policy for total 
loss. It identifies that rules governing loss of title are expressly distinguished from the insurance 
test, and argues that a similar distinction should apply to contractual frustration.  
 
                                                     
139 Divergence between laws of England and in America in respect of the time of abandonment be because when 
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Chapters 4 and 5 consider the authorities pre 1906 on claims for loss of possession both in 
England and Wales and American jurisdictions. Chapter 4 argues for a presumption of total 
loss arising on capture and seizure. Chapter 5 argues that a similar presumption arises on perils 
of embargo, arrest, restraint and detention, albeit situations where the peril was never engaged 
are distinguished.  
 
Chapter 6 considers the meaning of the cover for the ‘voyage’ or ‘time’, and identifies situations 
where this the voyage is deemed totally lost by the loss of possession. It argues that these 
situations support the presumption of total loss identified in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
Chapter 7 considers causation. It explores the exclusion for delay, and argues that the general 
rule now codified by the 1906 Act evolved after the presumption of total loss documented in 
chapters 4 and 5, and therefore did not displace it. The doctrine of causation confined this 
exception to the protraction of voyage caused by weather, and was not extended to cover the 
specific perils of loss of possession. There is no applicable doctrine of relation back that acts as 
a suspensory doctrine. On loss of possession claims, the ultimate loss is usually by the peril 
causing loss of possession, and unlike on stranding, will rarely be by a failure to sue and labour.  
 
Chapter 8 considers how the established presumptions were lost after the 1906 Act. It argues 
that the presumptions of total loss remain arguable within s 60 of the Act. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes that the presumption of total loss, long recognised in English law, 
may remain arguable under s 60. It considers the merits of this presumption against policy 
considerations in England, and the desirability of uniformity of outcome with American usage. 
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2 DEFINING MARINE PERILS COVERING LOSS OF POSSESSION 
 
 
”’Deprivation of possession” as such was not an insured peril…”142 
 
If loss of possession simpliciter was not covered, what else must insureds establish? A marine 
policy names and/or excludes ‘perils’ against which an insured purchases cover. What defined 
facts must occur to allow a claim on a policy for loss of possession, and when may an insured 
make this claim? Was a deprivation of possession never an insured peril? While precedents 
before Kuwait Airways Corporation anticipated this restricted understanding, it was 
apparently surprising that deprivation of possession was not covered, given the leading 
underwriters’ willingness to pay on the initial event of deprivation of possession.143 Masefield 
largely turned on the understanding that hostage-and-ransom was an exceptional situation 
requiring a sui generis approach distinguished from ‘capture’, and that ‘loss of possession’ 
was insufficient. Generally, what defined perils might a loss of possession or control situation 
engage? What facts must an insured establish to claim successfully within these? 
Understanding when defined perils have occurred is an essential to identify when an insured 
may give notice of abandonment and consequently claim on the policy for a total loss. 
Chapters 4 and 5 consider whether, once established, the bare fact of these perils indicate that 
a total loss has occurred. 
 
These definitions remain significant for a total loss claim, despite the test of ‘total loss’ being 
separately codified. First, perils may be expressly excluded, so these definitions clarify the 
extent of cover. Less obviously, a ‘fact sensitive’ approach historically applied to each peril. 
Sanday & Co confirmed this different test of causation between the different perils: “In 
deciding within which set of authorities a given case falls it must always be borne in mind 
that much depends upon the character and description of the particular peril which has to be 
alleged and relied upon as the cause of the loss”.144 The different approach between perils 
remained significant in Sanday. Had the insured acted to avoid a capture, there would have 
been no loss, but the same action in consequence of a ‘restraint of princes’ allowed a claim: 
 
“… If on the other hand he acted in precisely the same way in order to avoid capture,… 
then Hadkinson v Robinson145 and cases of that class decide that as his vessel has not 
in fact been captured he cannot rely upon capture as the cause of loss. In my opinion 
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this case falls within the principle of Miller's Case146 and restraint of princes was the 
proximate cause of the loss”.147 
 
Although predating the subsequent shift in approach to causation in Leyland,148 the 
importance of this categorisation was stated in 1915, so following the 1906 Act. Likewise, 
American courts distinguished different types of peril when testing causation.149 Arguably, a 
‘fact-sensitive’ approach to causation applies to different categories of perils, and a universal 
approach covering all perils should not apply. Conceivably, in Masefield, had the loss been 
considered ‘capture’, the actual total loss claim might – arguably unjustifiably – have 
succeeded. Accordingly, the definitions remain significant in determining the success of a 
claim. 
 
To what extent are these perils separately and clearly defined? Difficulties of interpretation 
are well recognised. It has been doubted whether it was possible to distinguish between and 
define the perils defined in the policy, in particular that it was impossible “to distinguish 
between "arrest," "restraint," and "detention"”.150 Nevertheless, where perils’ definitions 
influence the merits of a claim, this task must be attempted. The following discussion 
questions whether there is a settled definition to these perils, whether there is a degree of 
overlap, aiming to identify the material facts an insured must establish to claim for a total loss 
within each peril. The perils are considered in three classes: 
i. capture and seizure; 
ii. arrest, restraint, detention, embargo; 
iii. loss of possession simpliciter after 1906. 
 
2.1 General approach to interpretation   
 
i. The Lloyds SG Policy 
The Lloyds SG policy was understood to have evolved from a simple wording, in which 
‘perils of the sea’ covered a wide range of perils. Arnould recorded loss by ‘pirates and rovers’ 
“…was formerly included in our maritime law amongst the general perils of the seas…,151 
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and probably would still be held to be so; though, as piracy is one of the enumerated perils, 
the point is of less importance…”152 The SG policy, the starting point for understanding 
contemporary definitions, provided more specific terms.153 Conceivably, the SG policy was 
drafted to cover the insured extensively, the wording covering every incident that could be 
anticipated,154 with the saving words ‘and all other losses’ clarifying that intention, and the 
clause construed against the insurer.155 The approach in Naylor v Palmer followed such a 
construction in that seizure of the ship, where it was taken out of the possession of the master 
and crew by the passengers, was either piracy or theft within the express words of the policy, 
or alternatively “if not of that quality, because it was not done animo furandi, it was a seizure 
ejusdem generis analogous to it, or to barratry of the crew, falling within the general 
concluding words of the perils enumerated by the policy”.156 The general words ensured the 
peril was covered, whatever the cause was. Perils falling outside the specified perils fell within 
those saving words.157  
 
The SG policy was frequently supplemented by additional clauses. Most significant was the 
‘free of capture and seizure clause’ (FCS), the form of which was familiar by the early 
eighteenth century,158 and reached a settled wording about 1883.159 This separated ‘marine’ 
and ‘war’ risks, providing: 
‘Warranted free of capture, seizure, or detention, and the consequences thereof or of 
any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from all consequences of hostilities, 
warlike operations, and all risks of riots and civil commotions, whether before or after 
declaration of war’. 
 
This excluded war risks, but left piracy covered on the marine policy. The separation of marine 
and war risks continued into modern policies. The FCS clause was held to mirror the wording 
of the SG policy, so that the missing word ‘restraint’ was implied, as the purpose of the clause 
was to “free the underwriters from liability under the words "arrests, restraints, and 
detainments" in the body of the policy”.160 A significant volume of authority defining perils 
derives from arguments concerning whether casualties were excluded by this clause. Lack of 
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clarity in contemporary definitions largely derives from judgments deciding whether the FCS 
clause as a whole excluded the perils, rather than specifying which precise peril was engaged. 
 
ii. Rewording into Contemporary Policies  
After the 1982 reforms, contemporary policies omitted the perils ‘men of war’, ‘enemies’, 
‘rovers’, ‘surprisals’, ‘letters of mart and counter-mart’, and ‘takings at sea’; consequently 
these perils are not further considered. Nevertheless, the influence of the FCS clause continues 
in the Institute Cargo Clauses, which are the current standard terms in the UK market for cargo 
cover. There are three cargo clauses, (A), (B), and (C), and the Risks Clauses in the 2009 
Clauses follows the 1982 Clauses. The effect of the B and C clauses is that no claims can be 
made for perils of loss of possession, and the law as expressed in this work applies only to the 
element of piracy on the (A) clauses. Most cargo cover is on the (A) clauses.161 The (A) clauses 
exclude the following perils taken from the SG policy:  
‘6.2 capture seizure arrest restraint or detainment (piracy excepted), and the 
consequences thereof or any attempt thereat’. 
‘Capture’, ‘seizure’ ‘arrest’ ‘restraint’ and ‘detention’ are still listed; despite the extensive re-
wording, there has been no radical shift in the way these words are construed, so that 
authorities from the older policy still inform their interpretation.162 In 1999 the House of Lords 
approved that ‘the normal and usual meaning of seizure includes forcible capture’. An 
alternative – attractively logical – approach to the construction of a modern policy without 
reference to the history of the clauses, namely that each section of a war risks policy “was 
designed to deal with one particular type of peril, exclusively of perils dealt with by other 
paragraphs”, so that ‘seizure’ and ‘capture’ had separate meanings, was not adopted.163 
Instead, the House followed stare decicis, retaining the meanings inherited from early 
authority.  
 
For hull insurance, like terms to the ICC clauses are found in the International Hull Clauses 
1/11/03, so that losses arising from capture, seizure or war, arrest and detainment are not 
covered, save by piracy or barratry. Clauses similar in effect in United Nations Marine Cargo 
Insurance, All Risks Cover (Model Clauses on Marine Cargo Insurance (Geneva, 1987). 
Cover for perils of loss of possession may be additionally purchased on the ‘Institute Marine 
Cargo Clauses, War’, or the ‘Institute Cargo Clauses, War’ which deal specifically with loss 
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of possession situations, and specifically covers in the perils clause, ‘capture seizure arrest 
restraint or detainment’ in the same words as the SG policy. These clauses may be restricted 
by the terrorism clause, which excludes from cover acts done for a political, ideological or 
religious motive. The motives of a captor may therefore be relevant to this aspect of cover, 
which is not further considered. The ICC war and strikes clauses may contain time limits 
before which claims for constructive total loss for loss of possession may be made. There are 
frequently terms in war risk insurance offering cover for lost hire after a ‘detention’ has lasted 
more than 180 days. 
 
The standard FC&S clause in American policies, the American Institute FC&S Clause (Hulls) 
(1959) excludes all claims arising from capture or seizure, including by piracy or barratry. 
Such a comprehensive clause would prevent claims for loss of possession, where 
incorporated.164 The FC&S Clause (1989) for cargo policies is equally broad, and excludes 
capture, seizure, restraint, arrest, detainment, confiscation, pre-emption, requisition or 
nationalisation, or the consequences of any attempt in both peace or war, lawful or unlawful.165 
The law of loss of possession was by these terms transferred fully to the war risks insurance, 
and this may account for why there is less recent authority on total losses for loss of possession 
arising from disputes on American policies.  
 
Finally, some clauses contain express time limits before claims for constructive total loss by 
capture seizure and detention may be made. An example is in the Atlasnavios, where the terms 
of the Institute War and Strikes Clauses, which required at line 20 12 months to elapse  before  
a detainment is treated as giving rise to a constructive loss, were amended to six months. 
Where such terms have not been agreed, or where the time limit is not incorporated, the 
common-law rules apply. For this reason, it is primarily where cover is on the ICC(A) or 
International Hulls clauses, or where the time limit for detention clause has been removed 
from the policy, that the common-law rules as expressed in this study remain applicable. 
 
iii. Perils necessarily causing total loss?  
Perils in the SG Policy fell into two categories. First were perils of “…"men-of-war," 
"enemies," "pirates," "rovers," and… "barratry of the master or mariners,"” which might not 
themselves cause any loss. However, “when by one of these the subject assured is taken out 
of the control of the owners, there is a total loss by that peril, subject to be reduced if by 
subsequent events the assured either do get or but for their own fault might get, their property 
                                                     
164 http://www.aimu.org/forms/87B-59.pdf, accessed 3 October 2016 
165 http://www.aimu.org/forms/87B-109A.pdf, accessed 3 October 2016 
30 
 
back”.166 This first category identifies the party constituting the peril, and this issue of identity 
remains relevant for whether the loss is a marine or war risk, eg ‘piracy’ remains a marine risk 
on the ICC(A) Clauses, whereas hostile capture would not. Secondly, perils “such as "takings 
at sea," "arrests, restraints, and detainments of princes,"” were assumed inherently to include 
such a taking of the specie out of the owners’ control.167 Significantly, Blackburn LJ suggested 
in The Rosslyn these second type of perils of themselves might be enough to found a total loss 
(see Chapters 4, 5).  
 
2.2 Capture and seizure 
 
What material facts establish ‘capture’; when might these allow an insured to establish total 
loss? Notwithstanding that in practice, ‘capture’ and ‘seizure’ frequently have been held to be 
synonymous,168 to what extent have they been given separate definitions, and to what extent 
might these lead to different results in insurance claims?  
 
i. Early English authorities on capture 
Marshall believed that early policies did not define ‘capture’; an insurer was liable under 
‘perils of the sea’ for captures generally, except where the insured concealed a particularly 
high risk of capture from the insurer in two ways: (i) by prosecuting a voyage near an enemy 
port; or (ii) where the vessel carried contraband, so was liable to lawful confiscation by neutral 
port authorities. This protected the insurer from increased risks of which it was unaware when 
the policy was formed.169 Where the policy was ‘warranted free of captures,’ the insurer 
escaped liability for captures where the insured was blameless of misconduct, as when crew 
without the insured’s knowledge concealed contraband risking the vessel’s confiscation.170 
Accordingly, ‘capture’ once included confiscation for infringement of customs laws as much 
as ‘enemy’ activity, combining marine and war cover.  
 
ii. Physical loss of possession 
Capture requires actual loss of possession or control.171 The peril covered is actual capture. 
Establishing factual loss of possession seldom creates evidential difficulties. Losses caused 
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by the apprehension of capture do not flow from this peril,172 even where the voyage is lost. 
Accordingly, if the master, fearing a high probability of capture, abandons a voyage this does 
not allow an insured to allege a loss by capture.173 Different considerations potentially arise 
where a voyage becomes illegal on the outbreak of war,174 but this cause of loss of the voyage 
– ‘supervening illegality’ – is distinguished from apprehension of an increased risk of capture 
on outbreak of war. American law likewise provided that fear of the peril did not justify 
abandonment.175 
 
iii. Investigating the Captor’s Intention 
English Law 
 
Must an insured additionally establish either: (i) a captor’s intention to permanently deprive 
the owner; or (ii) what subsequently happened after loss of possession? Reports before 1787 
do not assist. Lack of intention neither appears as a defence, nor was found lacking. Either 
such intention was irrelevant or routinely presumed. Insureds simply pleaded physical 
possession of the specie by the captor. The issue first arose in Mitchell v Others v Edie (the 
Lady Mansfield),176 where the insured vessel was captured by an American privateer. Her 
captors never intended to keep her, and abandoned her at sea. Part of her crew was removed. 
The voyage was abandoned due to the short crew. The court held, indeed the insurer conceded, 
that the insured would have been able to claim for a total loss had they promptly served a 
notice of abandonment. The absence of an intention to keep the vessel permanently would not 
defeat the total loss claim. The loss was expressed throughout to be by ‘capture’. Accordingly, 
the first direct authority indicated plaintiffs need not prove the captor’s intention once 
possession was lost, but merely simple loss of possession. 
 
In Powell and Others v Hyde,177 the Bedlington was sunk by shot from a Russian fort while 
navigating the Danube during the Crimean war, before Britain declared war on Russia. 
Perhaps the Russians intended to capture or seize the vessel unlawfully, and she was sunk in 
their attempt. The Russians had apparently previously detained then released a British vessel. 
The goods policy contained the FCS clause, which the insurers argued excluded an attempted 
‘unlawful’ capture. Campbell CJ stated: ‘"capture," in the warranty, is not confined to lawful 
capture, but includes any capture in consequence whereof the ship is lost to the insured. The 
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underwriters here, seeing what perils were likely to accrue in the Danube, took care to protect 
themselves’.178 Campbell’s judgment stated further that the attempted ‘detention’ amounted 
to a ‘seizure’, using the three perils interchangeably, and accordingly Powell did not clearly 
separate the definitions. Nevertheless Powell did not clearly restrict the meaning of capture 
by requiring an intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession. 
 
Contrastingly, academic discussion suggested such intention was required. Consideration of 
the issue for insurance began in The Guidon.179 Emerigon, collating this and contemporary 
authorities including Roccus, Scaccia, Valin and Pothier, concluded “The insurer is 
responsible for captures made by friends or by enemies not declared, just as they are for those 
made by open and declared enemies; for whoever commits depredation upon another is a 
pirate and becomes an enemy”.180 Emerigon distinguished capture with ‘a design to deprive 
the true owner of her’,181 from capture to take enemy effects or contraband, ie ‘arrest’. English 
textbooks from an early date followed this distinction, differentiating ‘capture’ with such 
intention to permanently deprive, from ‘arrest’ or ‘detention’ by a state with the purpose of 
searching a friendly or neutral vessel for illegal contraband or enemy cargo. These refinements 
conflict with Mitchell; no decision before the 1906 Act tested the captor’s intention. 
Notwithstanding Mitchell, Emerigon’s narrow definition of capture was adopted by Marshall 
in 1802, and appears in substantially like terms in subsequent works.182  
 
However, Emerigon elsewhere gave a wide definition, ignoring the captor’s intention: "it is 
capture, whenever by force a ship is seized in open sea, and being prevented from navigating 
to her final destination, in place of that destination is taken to another place".183 He further 
recorded the application of this definition to a case of ‘arrest of princes’. An insured Genoese 
vessel was captured by the English, and taken to New York. The French cargo was 
condemned. The insurer claimed this constituted arrest only, not a capture, as the vessel was 
released. Nevertheless, the French court held this situation was a total loss by ‘capture’.184 
Emerigon was authority for both the wide and narrow definition. 
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The significance of a narrow definition of capture – requiring intent to deprive the owner of 
the property – was limited. Both Emerigon then later Marshall provided that for every loss 
occasioned by capture, whether lawful or unlawful, or by friends or enemies, the insurer would 
be liable.185 The words of the policy were sufficiently comprehensive to include every species 
of capture to which ships at sea could ever be exposed.186 
 
Cover for ‘unlawful’ capture is significant. English courts presume courts of other countries 
will not breach their own laws.187 This must extend to matters of prize and capture. Therefore 
an unlawful capture suggests, prima facie, that there may be a return of the property once 
prize/confiscation is adjudicated or appealed, and/or the possibility of legal process to recover 
property. Nevertheless, no suggestion appears in early authorities that these avenues for 
restoration of property delayed or defeated claims for total loss.188 Nor was there any 
suggestion there would have to be a ‘wait-for-condemnation’ approach, to ‘wait-and-see’ if a 
foreign court upheld an unlawful condemnation. Additionally, Marshall provided ‘capture’ 
covered ‘arrest and detention’ as he elsewhere defined those. For Marshall, ‘capture’ included 
a taking of a ship or cargo without an intention to permanently deprive: 
“Capture may be with intent to possess both ship and cargo, or only to seize the goods 
of the enemy, or contraband… The former is a capture of the ship in the proper sense 
of the word; the latter is only an arrest and detention, without any design to dispossess 
the owner…”189 
 
Clearly, a wide definition of capture remained in Marshall. By partial quotation, citing 
Emerigon and Marshall for their definition of lawful capture only, without the above extract, 
Arnould expressed the rule190 that ‘capture’ required an intention to permanently deprive. 
Arguably, this partial quotation erroneously narrowed the definition. A complete reading of 
both Emerigon and Marshall supported the wide meaning of ‘capture’. 
  
Judicial distinction between ‘capture’ and ‘seizure’ first appeared – at a late date – in 
Rodocanachi v Elliot.191 Silks in transit insured under a marine policy were trapped in Paris 
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by a siege. Brett J expressed obiter that ‘[c]apture means the hostile seizure of goods with 
intent to deprive the owner of them’.192 Subsequently, in Johnston & Co v Hogg and Others 
(the Cypriot),193 this distinction was not applied. The insured ship was taken by “natives” in 
the Brass River, and her cargo plundered. The “natives” had no intention of keeping the ship, 
and abandoned her. Cave J repeated Brett J’s observation on the meaning of ‘capture’, 
supported by academic discussion.194 However, he noted that, ‘Marshall seems to recognise 
two meanings of the word "capture," but certainly does not assert that the more restricted 
meaning is that in which alone the word is understood in insurance law’.195 He observed 
capture and seizure had substantially the same meaning, and noted the futility of attempting 
to define each separately.196  
 
Accordingly, considering Marshall’s commentary against the proper context of judicial 
authority, before 1906, ‘capture and seizure’ in the SG policy and FCS clause arguably 
included simple loss of possession, without either party being required to establish the captors’ 
intention. The rule in the Lady Mansfield,197 approved in the Cypriot,198 that such an intention 
need not be established to claim for capture, was not clearly overruled by Rodocanachi. 
Arguably, the settled law by 1906 was that an insured did not have to establish an intention to 
permanently deprive in the minds of captors to allege a loss by ‘capture’. 
  
American law 
 
States’ laws mirrored the English academic understanding of capture, copying both the wide 
and narrow definitions, deriving ultimately from Marshall.199 Academic definitions similarly 
distinguished lawful and unlawful capture, in identical terms to the English texts.200 These 
definitions, as in English law, potentially allowed a distinction in approach to total loss. 
However, it was confirmed that the presumption of total loss on capture was broadly 
interpreted. In Mauran v Insurance Company201 where the issue was whether capture by the 
Confederates was a ‘capture’ or piracy outside the meaning of the policy, it was argued that 
any capture or seizure, rightful or wrongful, by state government or mere pirates, fell within 
the FCS clause, following academic authority, and the English cases of Powell v Hyde and 
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Kleinworth v Shephard. Nelson J held that the wide definition of capture was meant in the 
policy and FCS clause. He considered that originally ‘capture’ meant loss of possession 
together with intent to deprive. However, he held that usage and established decisions had 
widened its meaning, and it was settled as embracing the taking of a neutral ship and cargo 
by both belligerent and friendly governments, and even the home government.202 Following 
Marshall, lawful and unlawful capture were covered, “the words of the policy being broad 
enough, and intended to be broad enough, to include every species of capture to which ships 
or cargo, at sea, may be exposed”.203 Capture by a friendly power or requisition by the home 
government were insured, because:  
“Any other rule would furnish but a very imperfect indemnity to the assured if we 
regard either the character of these seizures and the irregularities attending them, or 
the trouble, expense, and delay consequent upon the duty or burden of proving in a 
court of justice the unlawfulness of the act. It is never, therefore, a question between 
the insurer and the insured whether the capture be lawful or not. The recent case of 
Powell v Hyde204 is very decisive on this point”.205  
Accordingly, English and American laws pre-1906 alike provided that claims for capture 
could be made on loss of possession. Perhaps Mauran stated the policy with greater clarity 
than any English authority; nevertheless the Cypriot arguably established that there was no 
investigation into the captor’s intention. Arguably, this lack of investigation into the captor’s 
intention is more consistent with the idea that captures were presumed fatal, than with 
speculation that in the early cases the issue of intention was relevant, but was uncontested.  
 
iv. Seizure; an intention to permanently deprive? 
Seizure is the physical act of taking possession of property. Forcible dispossession is required 
for seizure.206 It may accompany an intention to permanently deprive,207 and accordingly 
overlap with the narrow definition of capture. Nevertheless seizure has been found where this 
intention was absent. In Kleinwort v Shepard, emigrants on board seized the insured vessel 
and partly took insured provisions before escaping. It was held that their actions came within 
the meaning of the word ‘seizure’ in the FCS clause, and ‘[t]hat the loss, as alleged in the 
declaration, is a loss by seizure, according to the common meaning of that word in the English 
language, can admit of no doubt. Dr Johnson defines "seizure" to be "the act of taking forcible 
                                                     
202 ibid, 18 
203 Marshall (1802), 418 
204 (1855) 5 El&Bl 607 
205 (1867) 73 US 1, [19] 
206 Robert Merkin, Marine Insurance Legislation (4th edn, 2010); (Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd v Gibbs 
“The Salem” [1983] 2 AC 375. It is not enough that goods are put into a compound by customs authorities and 
then stolen Mitsui Marine & Fire Insurance Co v Bayview Motors Ltd [2003] Lloyd’s rep IR 117. 
207 Emerigon, Treatise on Insurances, Chap XII, s XVIII 
36 
 
possession"’.208 The court refused to investigate the mutineers’ motives, ‘The conjectural 
motives which may have influenced the parties to the policy cannot influence us’.209 The 
emigrants taking the vessel was held a loss by seizure, despite there being no intention to 
permanently deprive. While the court did not consider whether the facts could amount to total 
loss (or total loss of part), only whether the claim fell within the FCS clause, it illustrated 
clearly that simple loss of possession fell within ‘seizure’. 
 
In Powell v Hyde where the issue was whether the FCS clause protected the insurers from the 
Russian destruction of the vessel. The court resolved that on the evidence, the Russians’ object 
was to ‘detain the ship. For the purposes of insurance, once they had fired on the vessel, and 
her crew had left her, so that she was at the mercy of the Russians, and found that she was 
“seized by them: that there was, not only an attempt at seizure, but an actual seizure”.210 
Accordingly, the court found ‘seizure’ where there was no attempt to board the vessel. Further, 
this attempted ‘seizure’ was an initial step in an intended ‘detention’, suggesting that seizure 
did not require an intention to permanently deprive. In Cory v Burr, where the vessel was 
seized under foreign customs laws because of the master’s barratry in attempting to smuggle, 
Selborne LC stated that seizure had a broad meaning. The vessel was taken in every sense of 
the word ‘seized’: 
“It was taken forcible possession of, and that not for a temporary purpose, not as 
incident to a civil remedy and the enforcement of a civil right, not as security for the 
performance of some duty or obligation by the owners of the ship, but it was carried 
into effect in order to obtain a sentence of condemnation and confiscation of the ship; 
and the case states that that would have been the result of the seizure which took place 
in the present instance if money had not been paid to redeem the ship from that 
confiscation and total loss… those facts are properly described by the word 
"seizure…"”211 
 
The phrase ‘for a temporary purpose’ appeared judicially here for the first time. ‘Remained’ 
was undefined. Seizure overlapped with capture. The imprecision between ‘capture’ and 
‘seizure’ was illustrated in Cory v Burr where Selborne LC construed ‘capture’ to have a very 
broad meaning. He considered that Kleinwort v Shepard212 amounted to a case of capture, as 
did Powell v Hyde,213 and accordingly held that the FCS clause covered the seizure.214 
Construction of the policy nosciatur a sociis suggests the precise definitions were of little 
importance given the breadth of the FCS clause. The requirement that the taking be more than 
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‘temporary’ implies that courts might investigate the captors’ purpose, even on seizure. 
However, this conflicted with Blackburn LJ’s simpler test in the case, that “taking out of 
control [is sufficient] to claim a total loss”,215 excluding an assessment of whether the test 
would be ‘temporary’. The word ‘temporary’ apparently derived only from Marshall, who 
referred to a ‘small temporary inconvenience’:  
‘But a capture or arrest does not necessarily, and at all events, terminate in a total 
loss, so as to entitle the insured to abandon; for a he cannot abandon till he has 
received advice of the loss; if, at the time he receives such advice, or before he has 
elected to abandon, he receive advice that the ship or goods insured are recovered, or 
are in safety, he cannot then abandon’ because he can only abandon while it is a total 
loss, and he knows it to be so; not after he knows of the recovery. Therefore, if a 
captured ship be retaken and permitted to proceed on her voyage, so that she suffers 
but a small temporary inconvenience; this would only be a partial, and not a total 
loss’.216 
 
While correctly stating that the peril had to subsist at the time of capture, introducing a 
requirement that there must be an investigation either into the captors’ intention or whether 
the capture or seizure was intended to be, or would be, temporary was innovative. Any 
investigation would contextually have been understood as merely into whether the peril was 
in fact over at the relevant date, and never whether it was likely to continue if it still did. 
Selborne LC in Cory v Burr, therefore, went beyond the contemporary authorities in 
expressing his definition of seizure, by including the requirement that it not be temporary. It 
is not clear that he intended to change the law. Arguably, as the concurring judgments did not 
contain this addition, this innovation was obiter. It was more consistent to understand the 
sense as questioning: (i) whether the property was recovered; and if so (ii) whether the voyage 
was nevertheless lost. 
 
In Cory v Burr, Fitzgerald LJ introduced a further distinction between ‘capture’ and seizure’, 
namely whether it was only a declared enemy, rather than a pirate or thief, who could 
‘capture’. Capture meant the act of an enemy or declared belligerent. Seizure was a larger 
term including ‘every act of taking forcible possession, either by a lawful authority, or by 
overpowering force’.217 Sherman stated that a pirate could ‘capture’;218 Cory v Burr draws this 
distinction for the first time. It was, of course, perfectly possible for a pirate to commit an act 
of seizure, as the barratry in Kleinwort demonstrated, if not lawful ‘capture’. In the 
comparable context of the construction of a charterparty off-hire clause, it was recently held 
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that ‘seizure’ did not, unlike ‘capture,’ require to be made by a declared enemy, so that 
‘seizure’ could be committed by pirates – implying that ‘capture’ could not be made by 
pirates,219 and that, “…"seizure," like many other words, is sometimes used with more general 
and sometimes with more restricted meaning, and whether it is used in a particular case with 
the one meaning or the other depends not on any general rule but on the context and the 
circumstances of the case”.220 Later authorities on seizure arguably undermine the certainty, 
on which commercial law depends, by not giving effect to this pragmatically wide definition 
of the peril.  
      
Horlock v Beal introduced some confusion of the relationship between capture and seizure, 
albeit construing employment contracts. Horlock confirmed contracts of employment were 
not terminated on ‘detention’ by an enemy. After consideration of Ellenborough LJ’s 
judgment in Beale v Thompson,221 it was observed that seizure per se was an equivocal act, 
and whether it would additionally be capture depended on the intention of the captor in making 
it. That could be demonstrated by subsequent acts, such as condemnation or a government 
order for confiscation. It was suggested such clarification of intention “operates by relation 
back to the original seizure, turning it either into a capture ab initio, or into a temporary 
detention ab initio not amounting to capture”.222 This dictum supports the idea of ‘wait-and-
see’, and the doctrine of ‘relation back’, although it is not clear whether this was intended to 
undermine situations which appeared to be capture. Suggestion that a doctrine of ‘relation 
back’ to an earlier time was inconsistent with the then recent House of Lords decision in 
Anderson v Marten223 confirming that there was a total loss at once by capture (not excluding 
a concurrent total loss by seizure or other perils), although the lawfulness was not determined 
by afterwards. The rights of the parties were not suspended while the issue of the lawfulness 
was determined, though (eg per the Earl of Halsbury) an eventual condemnation would 
determine that the seizure had been ‘lawful’ from the outset. The doctrine of ‘relation back’ 
as a suspensory doctrine was not accepted in 1908. Arguably, the peril of capture was seen as 
complete from the moment of loss of possession. 
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2.3 Arrest, Restraint, Detention, Embargo 
 
i. Generally 
Arrest, restraint, detention and embargo may each involve a loss of free use and disposal, and 
conceptually these overlap. By Rule 10 of the ‘Rules for Construction of Policy’ in Sch 1 to 
the 1906 Act, cover under these perils was for ‘political or executive acts’, and not losses by 
riots or by ordinary judicial process. While the wording has changed slightly from the SG 
policy to the Institute Clauses224 there was no intention to change the meaning225 and arguably 
guidance from early authorities remains useful. The perils are usually treated together in 
textbooks, although ‘arrest’ has occasionally been closely linked to ‘capture’.  
 
Emerigon’s distinction between these and capture was that while capture was made to secure 
ownership, ‘arrest’ was made with a design ultimately either to release the vessel, or to 
compensate the insured for taking it. An arrest was temporary detention only,226 and the peril 
applied where the captors did not intend to keep the property. Marshall considered in relation 
to detention of princes that by the policy terms the insurer was answerable for all loss 
occasioned by “arrests or detainments of all “kings, princes, and people, of what nation, 
condition, or quality forever.” Those words, in uniform usage across European maritime 
jurisdictions, provided insuerers were liable “for all losses occasioned by arrests or detention 
by the authority of any prince, or public body claiming to exercise sovereign power, under 
what pretence soever”.227 
 
Contrastingly, Emerigon treated a vessel’s detention after a declaration of war in port as 
‘capture’, even absent condemnation. Where a vessel was taken at sea, and into a port, with 
the object of condemning a cargo, this was a capture even of the vessel.228 French law, 
following Pothier, granted the insured an instant right of abandonment.229 Marshall adopted 
these same definitions: “When a ship is detained in a port after a declaration of war, or the 
issuing of letters of reprisal; this more resembles a capture than a detention, and gives the 
insured an immediate right to abandon, as for a loss by capture, even though no condemnation 
be pronounced, and though the ship be afterwards restored”.230 Arnould provided likewise: 
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“In this lies the grand distinction between arrest and capture. A capture is, as we have seen, 
the forcible taking of a ship, &c., in time of war, with a view to appropriating it as prize. 
Arrest is a temporary detention of a ship, &c., with a view to ultimately releasing it, or 
repaying its value”231 and likewise documented an instant right of abandonment. He described 
that detention ‘resembles capture’232 where an insured vessel was detained in an enemy port, 
or where a neutral vessel was detained with the suspicion of containing enemy contraband. 
Both were “to be esteemed a capture than a simple arrest, and accordingly is, prima facie, a 
ground of abandonment”.233 Accordingly, detention by a hostile power appears properly to 
be akin to capture, although there might not be an overt exercise of force on the property, and 
where condemnation never takes place.  
 
ii. Embargo 
From an early date embargo was defined as “…an order of government (generally, but not 
always, issued in contemplation of hostilities) prohibiting the departure of ship or goods from 
some or all the ports within its dominions”.234 Embargo was thought the most common 
example of ‘arrest, restraint, and detention’,235 although it was not clear which one or 
combination of these perils would be engaged. Emerigon recorded the French Ordonnance 
distinguished ‘arrest of princes’ and ‘embargo’. By embargo, a port was closed and all vessels 
therein were arrested, but an arrest could be made of a specific vessel.236 An arrest of princes 
could be made by a sovereign within his territory, but not on the high seas. In practice, 
embargo has not always been treated as separate to capture, as in Livie v Janson,237 where a 
vessel condemned following breach of embargo was held lost by ‘capture’. 
 
iii. Restraints of people: 
Marshall defined ‘restraints’ as encompassing when: “the sovereign of the country to which 
a ship belongs, or any other sovereign, not at war with him, from motives of necessity, not of 
hostility, arrest the ship either singly, or together with others in the same port or harbour; 
this is a detention of princes”.238 ‘Restraints of people’ covered an act of official authority for 
“state purposes”. An arrest of a vessel for private legal proceedings fell outside the peril.239 In 
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Rodonacci v Elliot, where insured cargo had not been seized, it was prevented from being 
forwarded to its destination by the German army’s blockade of the cargo in Paris. The court 
held that the loss was not a loss by ‘capture’, and ruled that the loss – effectively a blockade 
albeit on land – constituted ‘restraint of princes’.  
 
The issue arose in Fooks v Smith where property covered by an English policy was loaded on 
an Austrian ship at the outbreak of the Great War. The Austrian shipowners obeyed orders of 
their government, and put into a port friendly to the Austrian government. Eventually, the 
cargo was unloaded and sold. In Fooks v Smith these facts constituted a restraint of princes 
from the moment the master obeyed general instructions of the Austrian government to get 
their vessels into a place of safety in anticipation of war. While no force was used “behind the 
instructions of a Government there is always the ultimate resort to force if force be 
necessary.”, and consequently, as in Sanday's Case, this amounted to restraint.240 On identical 
facts in the Minden; Wangoni; Halle at the start of the Second World War, where vessels were 
ordered by the German government to put into German ports. Rather than follow Fooks v 
Smith, it was held that: “…the master, being in possession of the goods as a carrier for the 
assured, seized them in the same that he ceased to hold them as carrier and changed the 
character of his possession by taking and controlling them as agent for the German 
government… In doing so he deprived the assured of them”.241 Concerning similar orders 
from the Italian government242 it was held that there had been a constructive total loss of both 
cargoes by ‘restraint’, despite assurances given that, as at the date of the action, the state 
authorities would respect the neutrality of the owners, and despite the presumption that foreign 
courts will not breach their own laws, which appropriation of the property would have 
constituted.  
 
Wars are not the only situations leading to loss of possession. While detention for a private 
cause falls outside the peril, Miller v Law Accident Insurance Company (the Bellevue)243 
established that the operation of the ordinary municipal law of a country affecting or 
preventing the delivery of insured goods at their port of destination is a ‘restraint of princes 
or people’ covered by the SG policy. The executive authority at Buenos Aires stopped the 
Bellevue before she reached her berth. Discharge of cattle was prohibited, and they were 
detained on board the vessel. The master was directed to leave Buenos Aires and land the 
cattle elsewhere. He obeyed; the cattle were transhipped elsewhere and sold for a loss. The 
                                                     
240 [1924] 2 KB 508, 513 
241 [1942] AC 50 (HL) [80]-[81] (Wright LJ) 
242 C Czarnikow Ltd v Java Sea and Fire Insurance Co Ltd; Leslie & Anderson Ltd v Java Sea and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd (The Oder; the Lichtenfels) [1941] 3 All ER 256 
243 [1902] 2 KB 694, [1903] 1 KB 712 
42 
 
policy contained the FCS Clause. It was held the natural inference was that if the captain had 
not left Buenos Aires, possession would have been taken of the ship by persons acting on the 
authority of the Government. Acts done under Argentine laws could be acts the Argentine 
Government. 
 
“An intervention to enforce laws relating to revenue has been decided to be a peril 
within the terms of a policy of insurance similar to those of the policy before us, and I 
can see no distinction in principle between enforcing laws relating to revenue and 
enforcing sanitary laws. The principle, so far as it relates to enforcing revenue laws, 
is recognised in Cory v Burr, where the vessel implicated was engaged in smuggling, 
and in Robinson Gold Mining Co v Alliance Insurance Co”.244  
 
The distinction must be that revenue and customs laws are within the public sphere – therefore 
covered – whereas individuals seeking a private remedy fall outside the peril. Consequently, 
the decree of the Argintine Government was a state act within the term ‘restraints of people’, 
and there was no analogy between arrest and detention to enforce the rights of a private 
individual.245  
 
Further in Miller, it was noted that ‘detention’ had a wide meaning: Parsons246 did not give an 
opinion with great certainty on the matter, but suggested that "detention" was "a taking with 
intent to return the thing taken; as where a ship is arrested by an embargo, or stopped for 
search, or detained in port by an actual blockade thereof, or, perhaps, by being lawfully 
restrained from entering her port of destination by a blockading force." Additionally, 
‘restraint’ extended to cover restrictions arising from the operation of a sanitary law. There is 
some overlap with the word ‘detention’, so that a clause excluding liability for ‘arrests, 
restraints, and detainments’ was extended to cover a sanitary law, on that basis that there was 
‘[not] much difference between a restraint by a blockading force and a restraint arising under 
the operation of a sanitary law’.247 Accordingly, a loss of free use and possession arising from 
customs or sanitary laws may constitute both ‘restraint’ and ‘detention’.248 
 
Where policies cover “arrest restraint detainment confiscation or expropriation… by reason 
of infringement of any customs or trading regulation”, cover has not been extended to every 
detention by government. While ‘customs regulations’ is a wide phrase, so that seizure of a 
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vessel by reason of its carrying prohibited imported goods is covered,249 trading regulations 
are concerned with carriage of goods and the fulfilment of international trading transactions, 
so that a seizure for infringement of environment and ecological protection measures by 
reason of illegal fishing is not covered.250 The restriction is added by the phrase ‘customs or 
trading regulation’, so where this is not excluded, cover may otherwise extend to cover that 
class of seizure. Accordingly, there does not have to be a direct application of force to claim 
under arrest, restraint or detention, and on this basis, cover is wider than that of capture and 
seizure. Importantly, wide definition permitted a greater variety of claims for loss of the 
voyage.  
 
Arnould suggested that ‘capture’ and ‘seizure’ are ‘stronger expressions’, but following Miller 
v Law Accident Ins Co251 they were not mutually exclusive, and overlapped with ‘arrest’. 
Contemporary Arnould now suggests that it is impossible to distinguish arrest from capture, 
following Panamanian Oriental SS Corp v Wright (The Anita), where Mocatta J held there 
was a loss by ‘restraint of people’ where state officials seized and condemned the vessel for 
smuggling offences. Accordingly, ‘arrest’ has been held to cover a situation where there was 
an intention permanently to deprive the insured of his property.252 Indeed, consideration of 
the precise definitions has been omitted from the latest editions of Arnould. Arguably, 
however, these definitions remain important for understanding the historical results, and 
consequently their application to more recent cases. Further, the classification of The Anita as 
‘arrest’ only is doubtful, given the condemnation and consequent transfer of title. If the 
definitions of these perils have in law been changed by Panamanian, it is difficult to find the 
authority for such change, or find express reasoning justifying this change. Further, the 
definitions are increased in importance if different rules on causation apply to certain perils.  
 
 
2.4 Loss of Possession after 1906 
 
Accordingly, to claim capture or seizure, it was arguably possible to simply allege a loss of 
possession, although capture might sometimes have a narrower definition in commentary, 
although rarely in judicial authority. Further, arrest, restraint and detention did not have to be 
accompanied by an intention to permanently deprive to amount to the insured peril. How did 
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the law evolve to suggest loss of possession simpliciter was not insured? Hostage and Ransom 
– which now appears to require the ultimate event to be demonstrated – is not defined 
separately in any policy, but recent cases treat hostage and ransom as a separate class of peril, 
to which the courts apply a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. How has ‘wait-and-see’ evolved, and is 
its application clearly distinguished from the established perils? The answer is that wait-and-
see first appeared in marine stranding, was later applied in non-marine cases where there was 
a simple loss of possession, and the intention of the captors was unknown or difficult to 
predict. From these limited situations, the approach has been extended to become the primary 
way to construe any marine loss of possession situation. 
 
i. Wait-and-See; Evolution 
‘Wait-and-see’ – first applied to marine stranding cases253 – was applied in two non-marine 
cases on policies where movement of property was hindered by occupying forces. First, in 
Moore v Evans254 jewellers consigned pearls on sale and return to customers in Frankfurt and 
Brussels before the outbreak of war; these cargoes were trapped by the German advance. 
There was no evidence that the pearls had been interfered with by the German authorities, but 
the jewellers were unable to recover them for the duration. It was held that there was no loss. 
The House of Lords stated that the jewelers had not even been dispossessed. The House of 
Lords questioned whether possession of jewels in a cellar would be lost, if the building above 
were reduced to ruins by bombardment, or occupied by government forces. They held not. 
Materially, “…at the time of action brought there was no evidence that the subject-matter of 
the insurance was not in the custody of the persons to whom it had been entrusted by the 
plaintiffs, or in the custody of the bank to which with the plaintiffs' subsequent approval a 
portion of the goods had been sent”. Accordingly, an inability to deal with non-marine 
property was no actual total loss. Secondly, Mitsui v Mumford concerned a cargo of timber 
warehoused in Antwerp, which city the Germans occupied. Continued business became 
illegal, as the goods were in enemy territory. The timber remained warehoused in the custody 
of the insured’s agents. The court held that, while the timber might be requisitioned by the 
Germans (and the insured compensated, as the goods were on land not at sea), there had been 
no ‘loss of possession’.255 Additionally, a test of ‘uncertainty’ was applied to a non-marine 
policy in Webster v General Accident. Parker J considered whether there was a loss on a policy 
covering a motor vehicle, which had been sold to a purchaser by an agent, who dishonestly 
kept the proceeds of the sale. Parker J held there was not. Every case turned on its own facts 
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An ensured was not entitled to do nothing, yet “…he is not bound to launch into legal 
proceedings or if necessary carry them to the House of Lords. The test… is whether, after all 
reasonable steps to recover a chattel have been taken by the assured, recovery is 
uncertain”.256 These decisions were made despite judicial opinion at the highest level in 
America on marine policies, principally, Olivera v Union Insurance Company,257 confirming 
English authority that such situations amounted to be ‘restraint’ justifying a total loss at once 
(Chapter 5.2 below).  
 
These authorities were developed in the Dawson’s Field arbitration concerning aircraft 
hijacked in 1970 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and later destroyed in 
sequence. At issue was whether the loss of all four aircraft arose from ‘one event’. The court 
held that the aircraft were lost when destroyed, not hijacked, since ‘wait-and-see’ was an 
essential ingredient in a ransom situation:258 
“Parker J … [held] in Webster v General Accident (1953) 1 QB 520 at pp 531/2 every 
case in which there has been a dispossession must depend on its own facts as to whether 
and at what stage a total loss has occurred. One must consider the facts concerning 
the dispossession, the apparent intention of the person or persons concerned, whether 
or not or to what extent the whereabouts of the subject-matter are known, and allow 
for the lapse of a period of time to form a view about the prospects of recovery; i.e. 
whether the loss is total or partial”.259 
 
This arbitral award distorted the meaning of Parker J’s judgment, by introducing the latter 
sentence, thereby allowing for the lapse of a period of time to form a view. Dawson’s Field 
distinguished Dean v Hornby and other capture cases because: 
 
“… the persons who deprived the owners of possession clearly intended there and then 
to deprive him of possession and ownership forever, if they could. ”Deprivation of 
possession” as such was not an insured peril… It is therefore dangerous to treat 
deprivation of possession simpliciter as a cause of total loss subject only to being 
turned into a partial loss by subsequent recovery…” 
 
Dawson’s Field imported a test of the captor’s intention into the law, to which a ‘wait-and-
see’ approach was appropriate: 
“Wait and see is therefore to some extent always an essential ingredient of a claim for 
a total loss in circumstances involving deprivation of possession, unless (perhaps) 
there is a deprivation within the terms of specifically enumerated perils such as capture 
or one can infer from the circumstances that there was a clear intention at the time of 
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the dispossession permanently to deprive the owner of possession and ownership. This 
is quite different from a ransom situation such as in the present case”.260 
 
The award implied either that ‘capture’ included the intention to permanently deprive, or that 
only loss of possession accompanied by such intention permitted a total loss. The 
crystallisation of the ‘wait-and-see’ doctrine occurred largely through Rix LJ’s judgments in 
the Kuwait Airways Corporation and another v Kuwait Insurance Company SAK and others261 
litigation. Early on 2 August 1990 the invading Iraqis took control of the Kuwait International 
Airport, and within the day, if not earlier, Kuwait itself. On the hardstanding were 15 
aeroplanes belonging to the Kuwait national airline. From 2 August, those aircraft were flown 
out of Kuwait by the Iraqis. By 8 August, 14 of the 15 aircraft had left Kuwait, along with 
aircraft spares. By a government decree of 8 August, the public character of the Iraqi invasion 
changed from turning Kuwait into an Iraqi satellite state, to a war of conquest and annexation 
of property. To avoid a cap on liability on their war risks policy,262 the claimants argued that 
the taking of their aircraft on different occasions constituted a series of separate incidents. Rix 
J found that the Iraqis intended to take aircraft from 2 August. Consequently, he held that the 
loss of the aircraft arose from one incident, unified in time, location, and intent.263 He 
distinguished Dawson’s Field on the basis that it was a ransom case where ‘wait-and-see’ was 
appropriate. However, “Mr Kerr, QC specifically distinguished cases within specifically 
enumerated perils such as 'capture' or where it can be inferred that there was a clear intention 
at the time of dispossession permanently to deprive the owner of possession and 
ownership”.264  
 
Contrastingly Scott v Copenhagen concerned one British Airways aircraft trapped alongside 
the aircraft in the Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co (KAC v KIC) proceedings, 
the issue being whether it was lost on the 2 August 1990 invasion, or on the outbreak of war 
between coalition forces and Iraq in January 1991. It was recorded that from 2 August: “the 
leading Hull War Risks Underwriter made it clear from the beginning that underwriters would 
have been prepared to pay a claim for the aircraft but BA had nonetheless decided to defer 
making a claim because the aircraft remained intact”.265 The claim was made on the policy 
after a period of about 6 months’ loss of possession, and the aircraft was destroyed by ground 
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forces while the claim was being agreed. Expert evidence differed on whether there had been 
any Iraqi policy towards the capture of BA assets, and Langley J could not be sure of the 
motivation. He found that the captor’s intention was unknown: “The BA aircraft was in no 
sense a target of the invasion nor did it become one later in any relevant acquisitive or 
retributive sense. It was in common parlance “stranded” when the invasion occurred. I think 
that had the question been asked on 2 August “is the aircraft lost?” the answer would have 
been “I don't know. Wait and see”.266 As in KAC v KIC, he considered whether the losses 
arose from one event, but avoided being bound by the same finding, by minimising the issue: 
 
“In a real sense I think the question is one of impression which does not bear too much 
analysis. It has to be considered in the context of underlying insurance which covered 
loss from war risks and “seizure, restraint, detention, appropriation.” It also has to be 
considered as a provision intended to address a situation in which a single cause may 
lead to a plurality of losses”.267  
 
He decided when the aircraft was lost. This was not as a result of the invasion and capture of 
the airport. He considered an informed observer would recognise “real difficulties” for BA in 
recovering its aircraft, but not an actual loss. He concluded, “The position was analogous to 
ransom and “wait and see” albeit it lacked the features of an offer of return if a demand was 
met and also of any expressed intention to exercise permanent dominion over the aircraft. But 
I think those factors are balanced”.268 By Scott, the ‘wait-and-see’ doctrine was extended 
beyond a ransom situation, to cover one where there was a clear loss of possession and no 
ransom demand. In Masefield this doctrine, originally from non-marine hostage-and-ransom 
situations only, was applied to the marine peril. Wait-and-see is an entrenched approach to a 
ransom situation. The precedent in Scott v Copenhagen potentially undermines certainty. Why 
should a situation that was not one of hostage-and-ransom be so treated? Was Kerr QC right 
in any event to apply wait-and-see to a marine ransom situation; if so, should this apply to a 
maritime claim? 
 
ii. Wait-and-see; Marine Ransom 
Issues of ransom arose again in Masefield, where piratical hostage and ransom was 
distinguished from ‘capture’. Underlying this was an emerging consensus in contemporary 
commentary that both 21st century Somali piracy and 1970s terrorism were somehow 
innovative. Piracy itself was unusual: privateering ended following the Crimean War. Piracy 
                                                     
266 ibid, [58] 
267 ibid, [60] 
268 ibid, [73] 
48 
 
dramatically diminished during the nineteenth century,269 and wholly ceased by the 
twentieth.270 This invited the conclusion that Somali piracy was a wholly new type of maritime 
peril distinct from historical piracy; historically, pirates sought plunder; contrastingly 
Somalis’ sole aim was ransom extortion.271 The European Union Naval Force Operation 
Commander, Major General Howes, stated: ‘This is not piracy in the classic sense that 
Emperor Augustus, Pliny and raiders off the Barbary Coast in 1753 would recognise. It is 
hostage and ransom’.272 This view underpinned the judgments in Masefield.273 
 
Problematically, the notion that ‘hostage and ransom’ differs from ‘traditional’ piracy is 
unhistorical. Piracy is recorded from an early date in, eg The Odyssey,274 the Homeric Hymns, 
Thucydides,275 and Roman historians from 509BC276 describing ‘letters of marque’ and 
routine ransom of captives.277 Ransom was never described as exceptional. Significantly, the 
earliest known individual pirate captive, Julius Caesar, was ransomed.278 It was nowhere 
suggested his captors acted outside established historical norms. Cicero considered whether 
promises to pay ransom to pirates need be kept because of the implied coercion;279 such 
transactions were therefore familiar in Roman law. It is consequently implausible to conclude 
that classical piracy established norms excluding ransom payments, since ‘hostage and 
ransom’ was well recorded. Although pirates known to Augustus, Pompey, and Pliny would 
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frequently have kept or on-sold captured property, ‘hostage and ransom’ was unexceptional, 
and demonstrably ransom was known to them. The assumption in the EU report is unjustified. 
 
Barbary piracy was contemporary to the development of insurance laws in England and 
America, and Berber ransom was commonplace. The earliest known captive of the Berber 
pirates was ransomed.280 In 1625 a Berber vessel committed the first recorded piratical attack 
on an American colonial vessel,281 an increasingly frequent event following Independence,282 
and ransom was routinely demanded. In 1784 Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin 
Franklin negotiated the release of the Betsy for a US$20,000 ‘gift’.283 A significant portion of 
American revenue,284 perhaps 20%, went on ‘tribute’ payments in the following years, 
increasing the sums demanded.285 The regular humiliation of paying ransom encouraged the 
establishment of an American navy, and Berber Wars from 1801. Ransom was demonstrably 
a mainstream element of early modern piracy. 
 
Further, Valin and Emerigon both noted ransom, either money or a portion of the cargo, was 
frequently of more use to pirates than the vessel.286 French law, by 1781, prohibited payment 
of ransoms to the Berber pirates.287 Accordingly, the contemporary view underpinning 
insurance decisions such as Masefield that ‘hostage and ransom’ is somehow innovative is at 
best inaccurate guesswork. It provides an unsafe gloss to construe early insurance authorities. 
Demonstrably, hostage-and-ransom was known to Roman law, recognised in insurance laws 
recorded by Valin and Emerigon, and the possibility of ransom payments was recognised at a 
time when insurance law was introduced to the laws of both England and later America. If 
early authorities neither: (i) investigated the possibility of ransom; and (ii) allowed such 
possibility to undermine a total loss if not negotiated, then the definition of ‘capture’ or 
‘seizure’ gains an extra dimension. Since claimants successfully established total losses 
simply on the basis of loss of possession, the grounds for distinguishing ‘hostage-and-ransom’ 
from historical piracy are doubtful. This raises the important issue that if wait and see had no 
application to capture historically, should it be applied at all?  
 
2.5 Loss of Possession as an insured peril 
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Was ‘loss of possession’ simpliciter ever an insured peril? In Dawson’s Field Michael Kerr 
QC noted that in Dean v Hornby the rule was that capture was construed to be permanent. 
However, he considered this rule could not apply to the facts before him, but should be 
distinguished: 
“First, they all occur in the context of a loss resulting from a specifically defined peril 
such as “capture” or “pirates”, and in situations in which the persons who deprived 
the owners of possession clearly intended there and then to deprive him of possession 
and ownership forever, if they could.  “Deprivation of possession” as such was not an 
insured peril, let alone a term of art to describe a case of total loss”.288 
 
Clearly, while ‘deprivation’ falls outside the narrow definition of capture, it nevertheless 
amounts to seizure. The question was never whether loss of possession was an insured peril, 
but what facts amounted to the specific peril. Emerigon considered both capture and seizure 
established a presumption of total loss; in that way, deprivation of possession simpliciter was 
once covered. The governing factual issue for capture and seizure cases had always been 
actual ouster of possession. In Mitsui, and in the warehouse cases, there was never any change 
in possession. The facts of Mitsui v Mumford described as ‘loss of possession’, were properly 
classified as potential ‘restraints of princes or peoples’ within the peril. In the events at the 
Kuwait International airport, there was clearly loss of possession, an actual change in physical 
control of the property, and arguably this fell within the seizure cases. Likewise in Masefield, 
there was a clear change of possession and control. Yet because there was still some eventual 
uncertainty, the peril of loss of possession was treated as something novel, falling within those 
cases where actual possession had not been lost. This was clearly a new way of interpreting 
the definitions of the established perils. 
 
Finally, should the courts additionally test the motives of the captors, before their ultimate 
intention has been demonstrated finally? Testing the captor’s intention creates practical 
difficulties. In Johnston & co v Hogg and others (the Cypriot),289 the ship was captured by 
“natives” in the Brass River. They intended to plunder the ship’s cargo. While they intended 
to abandon the ship, they certainly did not intend to return it to its owner. Was there a loss of 
possession? Certainly, the case would not have justified a total loss had ‘wait-and-see’ been 
applied as set out by Rix J – yet a total loss was found. Once, the courts were reluctant to even 
consider the motives of people who had deprived the owners of possession. In Naylor v 
Palmer the court considered whether there was a total loss by a mutiny of “Coolies”, 
effectively carried as cargo, who had no desire to keep the vessel.  In Naylor v Palmer, the 
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time the loss occurred was the moment the passengers had taken control of the vessel. Further, 
it was held the motives and intention of the passengers was not considered as a question of 
insurance, an approach also adopted in Kleinwort v Shephard. Further, Naylor established the 
doctrine of relation back did not apply – the loss was complete by simple loss of possession 
as soon as it occurred. There were two possibilities; first, no loss occurred until after the 
Coolies had restored the vessel to the possession and control of her crew, so their not being 
carried to the destination was referable solely and proximately to their unwillingness to be 
carried. Alternatively, the loss was complete “as soon as they had murdered the captain and 
forcibly taken possession of the vessel, and for a time put an end to the voyage”, in which case 
the loss was referable to their unlawful act. Critically, “the motive which induced them to 
commit it; their unwillingness, namely, to be carried to their original destination is immaterial 
to be considered, because remotely only the cause of what occurred”.290 In providing that 
latter view was correct, in addition to the recognition of the loss of the voyage for a time, 
Naylor neatly encapsulates the presumption of loss working in practice, because there no 
material fact was left for the insured to establish to complete the claim:  
“We think the latter is clearly the true view of the case, and that nothing can make it 
more clear than the simple statement. Nothing was then wanting to make the loss 
complete. A change of circumstances might have reduced it; this, however, never 
occurred, and therefore may be dismissed from consideration”.291  
 
Marshall had earlier rejected the doctrines of wait-and-see or relation back, because the 
‘character of any action depends on the original design with which it was done’,292 and 
therefore once the perils as defined above were met, nothing else was missing to make the 
peril complete. Where the intention was not an essential part of the definition, as in early 
definitions of capture or seizure, a ‘wait-and-see’ approach appears redundant.  
 
English authorities gradually restricted the definition of capture. How they did so, contra 
Mitchell, raises challenging issues concerning the authority of academic discussion as against 
judicial authority, against a background of potentially evolving commercial understanding. 
Prima facie, judicial statements retain overriding authority once a rule becomes settled. 
Arguably, the wide definitions of capture, that looked only to simple loss of possession, 
applied in the Lady Mansfield),293 the Bedlington, Kleinwort v Shepard, and the Cypriot, 
should be considered greater authority than then contemporary and later contrary academic 
speculation. Before the 1906 Act ‘loss of possession’ was demonstrably an insured peril. Non-
marine authorities should have been unpersuasive authority for introducing a wait-and-see 
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approach on the basis that circumstances of ransom were distinct from previous authorities. 
Scott v Cophenhagen, concerning capture of neutral property in war, fell under the wide 
definition of ‘unlawful capture’ in prior marine cases. Arguably, the insurers should there 
have been liable for simple loss of possession. Arguably, the better view is that these losses 
were covered in principle as loss of possession simpliciter was a covered peril. Accordingly, 
the only issues were whether simple loss of possession caused recoverable losses, and, if so, 
when the insured became entitled to claim compensation.    
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3 THE INSURED SUBJECT MATTER; TITLE & CONTRACTS 
 
When does removal of property from the possession and control of the insured terminate 
ownership? How does loss of possession disturb commercial relationships with other parties? 
If property law provided adequate tests identifying when property is lost, and contract law 
governing when the charterparty or sale contract was ended by a loss of possession, then 
insurance laws might follow these, absent policy reasons or established practice to do 
otherwise. If the underlying rules are uncertain or various, or inappropriate for insurance, then 
insurance laws might apply different tests.  
 
3.1 Loss of Possession and Loss of Title:  
 
i. The Hope of Recovery as a Property Law test 
Between 1756 and 1908, the spes recuperandi was excluded from consideration on capture 
and seizure, being a property law test, unsuitable for the insurance context. When in 1756 the 
issue of capture and recapture first arose on a valued policy, counsel argued property or prize 
law applied; total loss occurred on loss of title. In Goss the plaintiff held two policies, one 
covering the vessel, the other her cargo of fish, from Newfoundland to a European port. She 
was captured by a French privateer but recaptured, damaged, eight days later. The plaintiff 
heard of her capture and recapture simultaneously, and abandoned alleging total loss. Had the 
plaintiff lost his vessel on the capture?  
 
The insurer argued that title passed on enemy capture – capture became ‘complete’ – only on 
condemnation by a prize court. There was no condemnation in Goss; was there never loss? In 
England and common-law jurisdictions, and eventually most European countries, prize law 
prevented transfer of title on capture and seizure without a regular sentence of 
condemnation.294  Owners retained title, even where their property was taken then sold.  For 
example, in Wilson v Forster,295 where the vessel was seized and sold by a neutral state, no 
sentence of condemnation by any competent court was shown. The court held that title 
remained vested in the owner. Absent condemnation, even enemy capture could not transfer 
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title.296 On recapture, even after several years and/or re-sales, the owner retained title 
throughout (“postlimity”)297 and could take possession, subject to paying salvage – a 
requirement of Prize Acts, not the lex mercaturia. Absent condemnation, ‘the ius postliminii 
is perpetual’.298 As the due process of condemnation might not be observed, a ‘wait-for-
condemnation’ approach potentially caused delay,299 by suspending parties’ claims 
indefinitely. 
 
Facing that clearly unsatisfactory position, counsel and Mansfield CJ cited alternative 
doctrines from Roman law and the lex mercaturia, permitting transfer of title absent 
condemnation. Roman law provided title passed on enemy capture in war, but not where 
property was stolen. Gaius’s Institutes stated, ‘Capture from an enemy is another title of 
property by natural law’,300 and ‘…what a man had captured from the enemy was held to be 
most distinctly his own’.301 Justinian’s Institutes confirmed that belligerent capture transferred 
title; ‘Things again which we capture from the enemy at once become ours by the law of 
nations’.302 This added an element of time; property passed immediately on capture, though 
the reciprocal point as to time on recapture was not expressed. The analogy was ownership of 
captive wild animals, which ended when animals appeared to make good their escape. Roman 
law provided, contrastingly to enemy capture, that pirates gained neither legal ‘ownership’ 
nor legal ‘possession’ of goods or persons whom they captured;303 “Ea quae piratae nobis 
eripuerunt, non opus habent postliminio, quia jus gentium illis non concedit ut jus dominii 
mutari possint”.304 The same principle was applied to the case of people taken by pirates "a 
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piratis capti liberi permanent’.305 It followed that re-captured goods should be restored to their 
rightful owners – the re-captor took nothing.306  
 
Medieval municipal laws modified Roman laws, particularly those governing recapture. 
Venetian law granted the property to the recaptor if the pirate had kept it for more than 24 
hours. Some specified a set proportion of the value of the property recovered as owed to the 
recaptors as salvage, as in England by the Prize Acts. Nevertheless, the classical Roman 
doctrine of ‘postliminity’, suggesting that property should be restored to the original owner, 
excluding the recaptor endured where title had not passed.307 Grotius wrote, distinguishing 
rules on land where property passed immediately on capture, that ships were only considered 
captured when they reached harbours or ports of the enemy, because that moment was when 
recovery looked hopeless. He noted contemporary European codes providing 24 hours’ 
capture transferred property.  
 
In Goss, alternative tests amplifying the Roman law test of transfer of title on capture were 
identified by counsel. These generally tested the spes recuperandi, but differed on the timing. 
Variously, title transferred: after 24 hours;308 when no spes recuperandi remained;309 when 
prize came infra praesidia, or infra classis;310 ‘when the battle, and pursuit were over’; on 
sale by the captor; and that the Prize Acts determined transfer of title. The complication that 
re-captors might gain valid title over the property311 was overlooked. 
 
Did these rules govern insurance? It might be thought that the rules governing loss of property 
governed total losses too. The law developed differently. First, European treatise writers 
suggested situations where a presumption of total loss arose, including capture, detention and 
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embargo; this suggestion was adopted by English courts by Mansfield LCJ on capture, and 
later on embargo, arrest or detention. Accordingly, at one time, because the time property 
transferred was uncertain, insurance substituted a more certain rule. This underlying property 
law remains relevant to recognise the once inapplicable property tests when these reappear in 
the contexts from which they were expressly excluded. This matters; if the property law test, 
deciding when the hope of recovery was over, was excluded as providing no sufficiently 
certain answer to when an insured might recover, introducing a test of impossibility or 
unlikelihood as to recovery amounts to reintroducing similar tests in error.  
 
ii. Exclusion of property law test: 
 
Mansfield LCJ established that total loss on a policy differed to loss of title in Goss. Property 
law did not apply because it was ‘quite uncertain’ as to when title passed, consequently 
insufficiently certain for commercial insurance purposes.312 Title only mattered between 
owners and recaptors. Rather, ‘controversies between the insured materially differ from those 
between owners and re-captors’.313 That separation has never been overruled. In Hamilton v 
Mendez (The Selby), Mansfield LCJ repeated: ‘…arbitrary notions concerning the change of 
property by a capture, as between the former owner and a re-captor or vendee, ought never 
to be the rule of decision, as between the insurer and insured upon a contract of 
indemnity…’314 Advocates never successfully opposed this.315 The House of Lords confirmed 
in Anderson v Marten that, ‘…as in the case before Lord Mansfield, it is immaterial to 
consider when or if at all the property was changed…’316 No court until Masefield suspended 
a claim on the basis of continuing legal title after marine ‘capture’. Obiter considerations of 
property law arose later in the High Court in The Romulus (these doubted on appeal),317 and 
Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright.318 Arguably, Steel J in Masefield 
erred in treating title as a determinative consideration for constructive total loss. While 
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property law remained excluded – as arguably it still should be319 – the courts applied a 
presumption of total loss on capture.  
 
Incidents of arrest, detention or embargo do not imply an intention to take ownership of the 
property. Property is not necessarily divested by such perils. It is not possible, in relation to 
these, to identify anything more definite for insurance purposes than the fact of the 
continuation of the peril, unless followed by condemnation, sale or destruction, which later 
events may not be held a natural consequence of the original peril.  
 
3.2 Loss of Possession and Contractual Obligations 
 
i. Importance of Frustration 
From an early date insurance was understood to cover the voyage.320 Ordinarily, a voyage 
reflects numerous contractual relationships, in three main classes: sale contracts; 
charterparties; and ancillary matters such as employment. When does the law consider the 
underlying ‘voyage or venture’ of which each contract forms part frustrated by loss of 
possession? Understanding this is essential to assess the effectiveness or fairness of insurance 
law following loss of possession or free use and disposal. The defined perils engaged on 
dispossession, or loss of free use and disposal, are capture, seizure, restraint, detention and 
embargo. These may frustrate (in American idiom ‘render performance impossible’) the 
charterparty, contracts of sale, or employment contracts. The issue has been frequently 
considered on the outbreak of hostilities,321 but events of capture or seizure absent formally 
declared hostilities also engage these general principles. Unlike the English insurance position 
after abandonment, once frustration has occurred, the agreement remains frustrated regardless 
of whether it unexpectedly becomes possible again.322  
 
Examples appear in the mid-nineteenth century reports of strict rules insisting on charterparty 
performance. The doctrine of frustration appeared more lenient in early twentieth century 
authorities and contemporary guidance suggests courts may consider such contracts frustrated 
by loss of possession. Nevertheless, the underlying rule remains that delay caused by loss of 
                                                     
319 Contra Arnould (18th edn, 2013) 
320 Dapaba v Ludlow (1721) 1 Comtns 361, (1721) 92 ER 1112 (CB); Manning v Newnham, Trin 1782, report 
recorded in Wilson v Royal Exchange (1811) 2 Camp 682; Sanday v British and Foreign Marine Insurance 
Company [1916] 1 AC 650, 664 
321 Keith Michael, War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (Informa 2004), 420 
322 Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (3rd edn, 2014, Sweet and Maxwell), [9-002]-[9-003] 
58 
 
possession does not usually frustrate these contracts, and frustration applies exceptionally. 
Further, frustration, in these contexts, may be a difficult test to predict. 
 
Where parties objectively contemplated a peril being possible at the time of fixing their 
contract, nothing short of express terms would prevent frustration operating on seizure. For 
example, where charterparties were made after the start of the Great War, the courts inferred 
that the possibility of requisition was contemplated by the parties as being as much of a risk 
as hostile capture or seizure. Consequently, ‘…nothing short of an express agreement 
providing against discharge will prevent the operation of the doctrine of frustration”.323 
Frustration would be a difficult doctrine to exclude. 
 
ii. General Principles of Frustration 
English Authorities 
 
The modern formulation developed following interruption to charterparties during the First 
World War, became largely settled before the Second World War,324 and was generally 
thought by the 1940s to operate as an implied term, although an alternative conception defined 
frustration as ‘disappearance of the subject matter of the contract’, whether or not the parties 
had provided for this risk.325 Often this was because the contemplated voyage, to a port coming 
under enemy control, became impossible. Other relevant decisions326 concerned situations 
where charterparties were discharged when the vessels chartered were requisitioned by the 
Admiralty, or enemy blockade.327 The general rules governing frustration developed from 
charterparty cases on requisition during the Great War, issues directly related to circumstances 
potentially permitting insurance claims for loss of free use and disposal. 
 
Deriving from these, the leading contemporary test of frustration expresses frustration in terms 
of a radical change of circumstances, as occurring whenever the performance called for would 
be ‘radically different’ from that undertaken in the contract. A party could say “Non haec in 
foedera veni. It was not this that I promised to do”.328 Reid LJ explained that frustration, inter 
alia: (i) mitigated the rigour of the common-law’s insistence on literal performance of absolute 
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promises,329 by doing what was reasonable and fair to escape from any injustice caused by 
such insistence after a ‘significant change in circumstances’;330 (ii) was not to be lightly 
invoked, or expanded outside narrow limits;331 (iii) must follow some ‘outside event or 
extraneous change of situation’;332 and (iv) must not follow an act or omission by the party 
relying on it.333 In Edwinton Commercial Corporation & Anor v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide 
Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel)334  Rix LJ described frustration as a multi-factoral 
test requiring consideration of, inter alia: (i) contractual terms; (ii) the factual matrix and 
context; (iii) the parties' knowledge (so far as knowable) as to expectations, assumptions and 
contemplations, in particular as to risk, at the time of contract; and (iv) the nature of the 
supervening event, and the parties' reasonable and objectively ascertainable calculations as to 
the possibilities of future performance in the new circumstances.335 Its application would be 
inexact, requiring an exercise of judgment to do justice to the parties:336 The application would 
often be difficult, the ‘radically different’ test indicating the doctrine was not to be lightly 
invoked, and that the ‘mere incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; 
and that there has to be … a break in identity between the contract as provided for and 
contemplated and its performance in the new circumstances”.337 Accordingly, frustration will 
seldom provide protection for financial losses caused by delay to the voyage, without 
something more. In the charterparty context, frustration potentially reverses the burden of risk 
of delay, making frustration harder to apply. The time charter was a good example, where 
delay, absent express provision under an off-hire clause, would fall absolutely on the 
charterer, however on frustration, the risk fell on the owner. This reversal was assessed as part 
of an additional test that frustration must occur only where it was “in the interests of justice 
and not against those interests”.338  
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A doctrine of ‘wait-and-see’ may now apply to frustration by supervening illegality. In 
Andrew Millar & Co Ltd v Taylor & Co Ltd339 it was held that where a prohibition of export 
had been imposed, the plaintiff should have waited a reasonable time before repudiating the 
contract in order to see whether this prohibition was of such a nature as was likely to continue 
and to prevent the agreement being carried out within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the 
contemporary law is not only uncertain as to the amount of time which must pass to justify a 
frustration of an underlying contract, but it might not permit a party to treat an event of loss 
of possession or ultimate frustration as terminating the event at once; “it is often necessary to 
wait on events”.340 These general statements recognise that the application of frustration is 
difficult to predict. This lack of predictability is reinforced by confirmation that the question 
of whether a charter is frustrated is primarily a matter for a first-instance decision maker.341 
Importantly, it is not the nature of the ‘cause’ which governs frustration, but the effect of that 
cause on the agreement the parties have made.342 In what situations have charterparties been 
treated as frustrated by the types of perils that might lead to a total loss claim by loss of 
possession?  
 
American Authorities  
 
The discussion of general principles is weighted towards the English authorities, as American 
courts appear to take a strict approach to the application of frustration outside the marine 
context. The American profession separates conceptually ‘physical impossibility’ situations 
from ‘frustration of purpose’ situations.343 Situations of supervening illegality generally fell 
within the ‘impossibility’ doctrine. While frustration of purpose was apparently adopted in 
American states laws following the English rules, it had not by 1953 been applied in an 
appellate court. While approved by numerous obiter dicta,344 by 1960 it had only been invoked 
in 29 cases,345 despite frustration of purpose being included in the persuasive 1932 
Restatement (First) of Contracts.346 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, defines 
frustration in terms closer to the English doctrine, being where: ‘without his fault by the 
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occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made’.347 The Second Restatement goes further than the English authorities, in 
that s 272, comment c, allows courts to imply a reasonable term to deal with an event not in 
the parties’ consideration when the contract was formed, and thus allows a significant 
discretion to the courts to vary contracts. Perhaps as a result of this judicial flexibility to 
modify contractual terms, there appear comparatively few charterparty decisions on 
frustration of purpose, absent impossibility for supervening illegality in American 
jurisdictions.  
 
iii. Charterparty Frustration 
General principles expressed in charterparty context 
 
Will a charterparty be frustrated in circumstances that would amount to capture under a marine 
policy, or will a charterer remain liable to pay hire for a vessel which remains for the present 
of no use to him? General expessions of the law indicate that charterparties are seldom 
frustrated by delay, whether caused by perils of the sea, time taken during repairs, or 
detention:  
“The principle of all these cases is thus shortly and clearly expressed by Mr Benecke:- 
“the owner owes the services of the crew to the freighter and to the ship herself during 
the whole voyage, and consequently also during the time of repairs or detention, which 
forms part of the voyage, and he cannot call upon the underwriter for expenses which 
are foreign to his (the underwriter’s) contract””.348 
 
In Blane Steamships v Ministry of Transport,349 the court tested frustration where a vessel on 
demise charter stranded. The owners gave notice of abandonment on the freight policy, which 
was refused. The operative issue was whether the charterparty had been frustrated, so freight 
was no longer payable. The court held physical impossibility frustrated the charter. It was 
clear from Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co that the principle of frustration of the adventure 
applies to a time charter, so that:  
“…one must imply into the contract between the parties that the ship must remain 
capable of carrying out the purposes for which she was hired; in other words, if her 
use for the purposes of the hire became impossible during the continuance of the term 
for which she was hired, the charterparty automatically came to an end”. 
Evidently, on physical impossibility, the law diluted the strict situation of an insistence of 
performance of the contract, to a more permissive situation potentially allowing the charter to 
be frustrated. What about commercial impossibility? The doctrine of constructive total loss 
does not apply in a charterparty context. In Assicurazioni Generali v SS Bessie Morris 
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Company Limited (The Bessie Morris) where the voyage was abandoned following collision 
damage that was uncommercially expensive to repair, the court declined to hold that a 
charterparty had been frustrated, stating: the doctrine of constructive loss has no application 
to it. The shipowners' contract has been broken by them’.350 The court applied a strict test, and 
the fact that the charterer was prevented in a business sense from performing the contract 
provided no ground for frustration.  
 
Subsequently, in relation to freight policies, it has been stated that a superficially similar test 
to constructive loss applies that resembles tests of frustration, in that the business sense of the 
contract might be considered. For example, “The test is the same, under the freight policy and 
under the charterparty - namely, whether the shipowner has been prevented either in a 
physical sense or in a business sense from performing the freight contract, so that the freight 
is lost”.351 However, it is doubtful that dicta in freight policies introduced a ‘business sense’ 
test into charterparty frustration, as “the three contracts, the charterparty, the freight 
insurance and the hull insurance are completely different”.352 Notwithstanding such dicta, it 
is doubtful whether a ‘business sense’ doctrine permitting frustration ever applied in 
charterparty cases. Indeed, a significant potential injustice in the context of a charterparty is 
that while a doctrine of ‘commercial impossibility’ may be considered in testing constructive 
total loss, the unprofitability of a contract for one party is no reason to set it aside. 
“Commercial prevention” was the need to give effect to the principle of the law of contract 
that the fact that a contract proves unprofitable is not of itself prevention and is no ground 
for release from the obligations under the contract”.353 In Kulukundis v Norwich Union,354 
this was recognised in the context of commercial contracts: ‘commercial prevention is 
equivalent to physical prevention has therefore to be harmonized with this rule of holding a 
man to his contract though it be financially to his own let or hindrance. Both rules are 
fundamental and the solution must transgress neither’.355 The doctrine of frustration in the 
charterparty context was stated in a way which avoids this conflict by the implication that the 
contract depended on the continued existence of some basic condition, so that if the condition 
failed the contract would be discharged.356 For example: 
“The basic condition under the charterparty …[transhipment excluded by the 
parties]… was the continued existence and availability of the Mount Taygetus 
throughout the voyage. If the Mount Taygetus should be at any time during the contract 
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voyage rendered by sea perils incapable of completing the voyage within a reasonable 
time so as to earn the freight…”357 
It was only once perils of the sea had prevented the voyage, was any latitude given to consider 
the business aspect, such as whether it was worth the owner paying for repairs: 
“…whether the incapability was physical or commercial the basic condition of the 
contract would be broken, and the charterparty contract ipso facto discharged… if the 
ship as a merchant ship employed in a shipowner's business should be so damaged that 
as one of his fleet and an asset of his business it would not be worth his while to incur 
the cost of repair, the ship would be commercially lost and the basic condition would 
be broken; the charterer's right to insist on carriage of the cargo to destination, and 
the owner's to insist on payment of freight, would both lapse”.358 
Here, the business or commercial test is applicable only after some physical damage to the 
vessel. There is no general statement that simple delay could establish charterparty frustration. 
How were these general principles applied to cases of capture and seizure, or arrest, detention 
and requisition? 
 
Application to the marine perils 
 
Against that background, it is significant that early academic commentary indicated that 
‘…capture or hostile seizure, prima facie, dissolves the contract of affreightment, or, at all 
events, suspends it for a time’.359 Conversely, arrest or detention did not dissolve the 
charterparty: 
 
“But an embargo, detention, or arrest of princes, does not thus work a dissolution of 
the contract of affreightment, nor even suspend it, however long it may last; such a 
casualty, in fact, leaves the relative rights of all the parties wholly untouched:360 
…wages and provisions during the detention are a charge upon the freight, an ordinary 
expense of the voyage, which the shipowner, if insured, cannot recover against his 
underwriters”.361  
 
Why were these perils different in effect from capture? In Hadley v Clarke (the Pomona),362 
the earliest authority considering frustration by delay arising from embargo, the defendants 
contracted to carry the plaintiff’s goods from Liverpool to Leghorn. An embargo kept the 
vessel in Falmouth, until further Order of Council. As in the search to identify the moment 
when title transferred in Goss, the court considered whether after a certain passage of time an 
embargo would frustrate the contracts: “I expected that the defendant’s counsel would have 
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drawn the line, and would have shewn, that though an embargo of a certain duration would 
not put an end to such a contract… an embargo of some longer duration would. But no such 
line… can be drawn”.363 The comparison was drawn to delay caused by weather or deviation, 
which would not have such effect. Accordingly, it was decided that embargo does not frustrate 
the voyage, but merely suspended not dissolved the parties’ rights under the charter, even 
though the embargo lasted for two years. The defendants were liable for damages for non-
performance of the contract. The rule was adopted in both English364 and American365 texts. 
This significantly restricted the ability of an insured to claim for interruption to the voyage.  
 
Embargos, being of uncertain duration, might result in the voyage becoming impossible until 
a new season, or commercially unviable at any time. However, the rules on embargo did not 
allow for commercial considerations, as might be considered in certain contexts in testing 
constructive total loss on a policy, eg for cost of repairs to be taken into consideration. The 
starting point for this rule was the action on a charterparty in Touteng v Hubbard,366 where 
the vessel was detained at Ramsgate by English embargo on Swiss vessels in English ports 
for six months. The charterer refused to load a cargo six months late, as the fruit season was 
long over: “the season for shipping fruit had long passed, and the voyage would be useless 
and nugatory, which may be construed as having the same meaning as that the commercial 
speculation was at an end”. The commercial value in the voyage had gone. Following Hadley 
v Clarke, Lord Alvanley held that the embargo had not frustrated the voyage. In findings 
approved in Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd he held embargo did not put an end 
to any contract between the parties, but was construed as a temporary suspension of the 
contract. Consequently, the parties must submit to whatever inconvenience may arise, unless 
they have provided against it expressly:  
“The object of the voyage might equally have been defeated by the act of God as by the 
act of the State, as, if the ship had been weather bound until the fruit season was over; 
and yet in that case the merchant would have been bound to fulfil his contract. The 
principle of Hadley v. Clarke is, that an embargo is a circumstance against which it is 
equally competent to the parties to provide as against the dangers of the seas, and, 
therefore, if they do not provide against it, they must abide by the consequences of their 
contract".367 
 
That an embargo was deemed temporary detention only matched the ‘temporary purpose’ 
definition in Marshall. Nevertheless, where the English embargo prevented departure of the 
                                                     
363 Ibid; 8 TB, 288 
364 Lord Tenterden, A Treatise of the law relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen (Philadelpha 1802); Abbott on 
Shipping (5th Edn), 429 
365 Parsons (1868), Vol 1, 318, 330 
366 (1802) 3 Bos & Pul 292 
367 Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1874) LR 10 CP 125, 134-5 
65 
 
vessel, the voyage – the charter – was held lost, and the owner did not recover on his claim 
for freight. The better view of this result is to understand it as a policy decision based on the 
nationality of the claimant – at that time hostile to the government, but Handley v Clark has 
later been discussed as applying the same rules on insurance as a charter.  
 
The difficulty was noted in a dissenting judgment in Jackson, noting the commercial harm 
caused by such interruption: Kent confirmed the suspensory effect of embargo, and extended 
this to a wide variety of detentions:  
"…a temporary impediment of the voyage does not work a dissolution of the 
charterparty, and an embargo has been held to be such a temporary restraint, even 
though it be indefinite as to time… The same construction is given to the legal operation 
of a hostile blockade or investment of the port of departure, upon the contract. It merely 
suspends the performance of it, and the voyage must be broken up, or the completion 
of it become unlawful, before the contract will be dissolved. If the cargo be not of a 
perishable nature, and can endure the delay, the general principle applies that nothing 
but occurrences which prevent absolutely the performance of the contract will dissolve 
it. The parties must wait until those which merely retard its execution are removed”.368 
In Jackson, it was noted that “Such occurrences would cause unreasonable delay, and destroy 
the commercial speculation of the contract; still it would subsist”.369 The Victorian position 
was that aside from capture and seizure, the marine perils would seldom excuse contractual 
performance. Were insurance to follow this strict position, insureds would be deprived of a 
substantial benefit of cover.  
 
The 20th century charterparty cases370 classified enemy capture as ‘restraint’ or ‘detention’, 
treating it identically to requisition by the owner’s government. It was recognised, though the 
conceptual basis was less satisfactory to the American profession,371 during the Great War 
that charterparties could be frustrated by ‘effective capture by a belligerent which transfers 
the property in the ship from its owners to the captor and enables that captor to give an 
effective title to his vendee, and … capture by pirates, which transfers the possession and 
custody of the ship, though not her ownership’.372 Why ‘imperfect’ enemy capture was not 
considered likewise was not explored. First, in application it was recognised that such 
frustration could apply to a voyage charter; later, requisition by the owner’s government was 
sufficient to establish frustration in a time charter of 12 months373 but applying a fact-specific 
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test, not to a charter of 60 months.374 The Great War jurisprudence was expressed in fact-
specific terms, it is difficult to extract general rules as to whether capture or requisition 
established a frustration at once. An approach similar to ‘wait-and-see’ was adopted, 
rendering the charterer potentially liable for hire for an extended period, despite having lost 
use of the vessel.  
 
In Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd,375 a time charter for 10 months commencing 
in March 1917 was frustrated by the requisition of the vessel at the end of March 1917. It was 
stated that, ‘The facts of the present case are a fortiori to those in the Bank Line Case and no 
court of law could have held upon them that the charter had not been frustrated at latest when, 
in the latter part of 1917, it had become plain that the first expectations of a speedy release 
of the ship were unfounded’.376 The rule provided that the contract was frustrated by “Such 
delay in the prosecution of her voyage as entitled the charterer to determine the adventure”.377 
When assessing the consequences of an event such as requisition:  
“Sometimes the event is such as to speak for itself, like the outbreak of war on 4 August 
1914, in Horlock v Beal… Sometimes the frustration is evident, when the gravity and 
the circumstances of the breakdown can be known, as in Bensaude's Case; sometimes, 
as in the case of requisition, when it can be known that in all reasonable probability 
the delay will be prolonged and a fortiori when it has continued so long as to defeat 
the adventure…”.378 
In Larrinaga & Co Ltd v Societe Franco-Americaine des Phosphates de Medulla,379 the Court 
of Appeal confirmed that frustration of purpose applied: where a contract for a charterparty 
had included a voyage 7½ years after the signing of the charterparty, the outbreak of War, and 
then the Armistace, did not frustrate that charterparty, due to be performed in 1919, albeit 
previous severable charterparties under the same contract had been frustrated by the outbreak 
of war and terminated by consent.  
 
Contrastingly, short periods of requisition would not excuse future performance by the 
charterer, so the obligation to pay hire remained. In Modern Transport Co v Duneric,380 the 
vessel was requisitioned a month after the commencement of the 12 month time charter in 
1915. The fact-specific test established in F A Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd v Anglo-Mexican 
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Petroleum Products Co Ltd381 was applied, which was that a charter of five years was not 
frustrated by the requisition. It was held that there may be many months during which the ship 
might yet be available before the charter expired, and the charterer should not be deprived of 
this use.382 The test remained a fact specific one, specific to the charterparty terms, so 
conceivably “…in the case of a charter for a single voyage, the same event might be sufficient 
to destroy the very basis in the case of a voyage charter when it would not have been sufficient 
to destroy that of a time charter”.383 
 
In W J Tatem Ltd v Gamboa384 the court considered the frustration of a charterparty containing 
a frustration clause. The vessel was seized by a nationalist cruiser in the Spanish Civil War. 
Nationalists were not recognised as belligerents by the UK Government, and did not hold 
prize courts. The policy contained a 6-month constructive total loss clause, establishing a 
presumption of irretrievable total loss. The claimants successfully contended that they were 
not liable to pay further hire after the capture, as the contract was frustrated. While a time 
charter, the limits were very narrow, namely to evacuate the civilian population of Northern 
Spain to France. It was decided that the foundation of the contract was destroyed as soon as 
the insurgent war vessel had seized the ship. Nothing more could be done with the vessel. The 
owners were unable to leave it under the control of the charterer. The charterer was unable to 
make use of it. Consequently, the performance of the charter was frustrated from the time of 
the seizure. This rule provided the frustration occurred immediately on the capture or seizure. 
This appears a more certain rule than previous Great War jurisprudence, dating the frustration 
to the time of the seizure, rather than some later date, and not by ‘relation back’.  
 
The authorities generally concern single-ship companies, but the situation may be changed 
where the insured has an alternative vessel, and has contracted for its possible charter. In J 
Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two),385 the defendants agreed to carry the 
plaintiff’s oilrig using either of their two vessels. The defendants contracted with third parties 
for the use of one vessel, intending the other for the plaintiff’s contract. When the intended 
vessel sunk, the contract was held not frustrated, as another suitable vessel still existed. By 
analogy, if a charterparty were structured so that an alternative vessel were available, it would 
not be frustrated by the capture of one vessel. Most charters, however, provide for a single 
ship. 
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Frustration of Purpose 
Some charters were held frustrated where the voyage was abandoned where the master 
anticipated a high risk of capture. In Embiricos v Sydney Reid & Co the charter was held 
frustrated by the outbreak of war in 1912 between Ottoman Turkey and Greece, where the 
vessel would have been likely to be detained by the enemy Turkish government if she passed 
the Dardanelles. Scrutton held the voyage frustrated by restraint of princes, and considered 
the effect of the unknown duration of the war. The war was expected to last for such a time 
as to disturb the commerce of merchants and defeat and destroy the object of a commercial 
adventure like the one insured. Where there was such a probability, the unexpected removal 
of the restraint for a short time, did not mean the parties should have anticipated it, and be 
forced to continue the performance of an adventure which at one time seemed destroyed.386  
 
Fear of capture, not any illegality in continuing, was considered the cause of frustration. 
Contrastingly, in Watts, Watts & Company Ltd v Mitsui & Company Ltd387 the defendants 
declined on 1 September 1914 to nominate a vessel under the charterparty on the grounds that 
the British Government had prohibited vessels going into the Black Sea, albeit that the British 
government only issued the prohibition on 26 September. This was held no ‘restraint of 
princes’, as the restraint of princes that closed the Dardanelles was only imposed on 26 
September, and a reasonable apprehension of a restraint of princes did not amount to such a 
restraint. To fall within the exception, there had to be actual restraint.388 The test of whether 
this loss of the voyage was charterparty frustration appears more permissive than the insurance 
rule, but may be unpredictable in application.389 That the standard of frustration may be strict, 
is illustrated by Edwinton Commercial Corporation & Anor v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide 
Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel)390 where delay of three months near the end of a 20 
day charterparty caused by unlawful detention of the vessel by port authorities did not frustrate 
the charterparty.  
 
Accordingly, the occurance of an arrest or detention or embargo, not amounting to a capture, 
does not break up the voyage under the charter-party. Unlike on capture, freight remains 
payable on an arrest, detention or embargo, as these do not break up the voyage. The voyage 
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is supposed to continue, any period of detention being considered as a portion of it. 
Accordingly, wages are still earned during detention by embargo, as an ordinary expense of 
navigation for which the shipowner is liable to pay.391 This prima facie position is still good 
law, although a long detention might amount to a frustration of the charterparty, as suggested 
in The Bamburi. Accordingly, the categorisation of perils, although a difficult task, has a 
significant impact on whether a charter is frustrated. 
 
Charterparty Terms 
 
This common-law situation is frequently modified by charterparty terms. In The Bamburi, it 
was noted that the charterer paid hire for a year, while he received loss of hire insurance 
payments under a specific policy. After a year, he claimed that the contract was frustrated, 
and the insurer acquiesced. There was a clause in the charterparty, ‘providing for the payment 
of hire… until the date of redelivery, or, if the vessel is lost, until and including the date of 
loss… or if the vessel be a constructive total loss and including the time and date of the 
casualty giving rise to such constructive total loss’.392  
 
In response to Somali piracy, recognising that long periods of requisition without frustration 
might lead to injustice, BIMCO drafted a clause to regulate how ‘off-hire’ as a result of a 
capture is calculated. Payments of hire stop after 91 days. Interestingly, the charterers are not 
liable for late redelivery, demonstrating the shipping industry’s awareness that hostage and 
ransom scenarios frequently cause the significantly late arrival of a vessel: 
‘Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009 
… 
(e)    If the Vessel is attacked by pirates any time lost shall be for the account of the 
Charterers and the Vessel shall remain on hire. 
 (f)    If the Vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the Charterers closely 
informed of the efforts made to have the Vessel released. The Vessel shall remain on 
hire throughout the seizure and the Charterers’ obligations shall remain unaffected, 
except that hire payments shall cease as of the ninety-first … day after the seizure and 
shall resume once the Vessel is released. The Charterers shall not be liable for late 
redelivery under this Charter Party resulting from seizure of the Vessel by pirates.’ 
 
These terms were repeated in the BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 2013. 
BIMCO has drafted similar terms for voyage charters: 
 
‘Piracy Clause for Consecutive Voyage Charter Parties and COAs 
… 
(d) If the Vessel is attacked or seized as a result of Piracy any time so lost shall be 
shared equally between the Owners and the Charterers. The Charterers shall pay the 
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Owners an amount equivalent to half the demurrage rate for any time lost as a result 
of such attack or seizure. …’ 
 
Subsequently the CONWARTIME 2013 War Risks Clause for Time Chartering was drafted: 
 
‘(ii) “War Risks” shall include any actual, threatened or reported: war, act of war, 
civil war or hostilities; revolution; rebellion; civil commotion; warlike operations; 
laying of mines; acts of piracy and/or violent robbery and/or capture/seizure 
(hereinafter “Piracy”); acts of terrorists; acts of hostility or malicious damage; 
blockades (whether imposed against all vessels or imposed selectively against vessels 
of certain flags or ownership, or against certain cargoes or crews or otherwise 
howsoever), by any person, body, terrorist or political group, or the government of any 
state or territory whether recognised or not, which, in the reasonable judgement of the 
Master and/or the Owners, may be dangerous or may become dangerous to the Vessel, 
cargo, crew or other persons on board the Vessel.’ 
 
This charter further stipulates that additional payments to the owner would be payable where 
the vessel approaches an area where these risks are present, in recognition of the extra cost of 
war risks cover.  
 
Recently, it was held that ‘capture’ in an off-hire clause for ‘capture or seizure’ encompasses 
capture by pirates, rather than just a state entity.393 Accordingly, the contractual provisions in 
the charterparty may depend on whether private-ends piracy is a distinct class of peril from 
state-sanctioned official acts, where terms such as the CONWARTIME 2013 War Risks 
Clause do not apply. In the Paiwan Wisdom394 it was held that even if the charter permitted 
the passing of the Gulf of Aden with insurance authorization, owners were permitted under 
Conwartime 2004 clause to refuse instructions to proceed from to the Indian Ocean as a 
consequence of piracy, defeating the intended voyage. Interestingly, in recent decisions 
considering charterparties and piratical capture, none state the charter would be frustrated. 
The very existence of the off-hire clause reinforces the position that the charter will not be 
frustrated on the initial loss of possession. 
 
American Authorities 
 
Consideration of American authorities indicates a strict approach to frustration of 
charterparties, absent supervening illegality. While isolated examples show that embargo 
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discharged a contract,395 it was usually suspensive only,396 and following the English 
authorities, capture or outbreak of war seldom frustrated a charter. A wide number of cases 
indicate that the charter was not frustrated, and the owner entitled to full freight as per the 
charterparty terms, even though the voyage was lost.397 For example, in Allanwilde Transport 
Corp v Vacuum Oil Co398  freight was earned, although the voyage was prevented by order of 
the American government preventing vessels sailing to Europe because of German submarine 
action which was construed as permanent.399 In Pope & Talbot Inc v Blanchard Lumber Co400 
freight was earned, though the voyage was lost by torpedo damage. Similarly in De La Rama 
Steamship Co v Ellis,401 where the vessel was requisitioned by government after the attack on 
Pearl Harbour, in The Bris402 where there was an embargo after loading, and Mitsubishi Shoji 
Kaisha Ltd v Societe Purfina Maritime403 where the voyage was lost by requisition of the 
Belgian government, a restraint of princes.404 Other admiralty cases dealing with 
"frustration of the voyage," did not consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose.405 In 
these situations, the different considerations are reconciled by holding the charterparty not 
frustrated, but allowing the insured to recover for loss of the voyage on a freight policy. 
  
On the issue of whether action taken to avoid a peril was a loss for the charterparty in 
American laws, the insurance cases first established that such action was generally not a loss 
within the policy – ie blockade or embargo.406 The application was not uniform, as in some 
American state jurisdictions the opposite conclusion was reached.407 The federal courts 
distinguished failure to attempt entry to a blockaded port from failure to attempt leaving.408 
These insurance cases were first in time, preceding the charterparty cases.  Later cases 
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involving similar circumstances uniformly excused under the restraints clause non-
performance of a charter-party or bill of lading. Equally, unlike the insurance authorities, a 
formal blockade or embargo was not necessary, but the danger of seizure of a belligerent 
merchantman by enemy warships or of seizure of a neutral for carrying contraband was 
sufficient.409  
 
American academic opinion approved the charterparty cases,410 on the basis of the harm 
suffered by the insured. The way that the conflict between the authorities was explained, given 
the requirement for uniformity in different commercial contexts, was by a difference in 
causation rather than any difference in the underlying law. Thus reference was made to 
English authority in Becker v Grey & Co v London Assurance Corporation, suggesting that 
in insurance cases a stricter rule of causation must be applied. 
 
iv. Crew Employment Contracts 
Does the dissolution of mariners’ contracts of employment indicate when a voyage is deemed 
frustrated? It was commonplace until the latter 20th century for shipowners to engage crew for 
a specific voyage. Situations where the voyage was frustrated, so that the shipowner’s 
obligations to his crew were discharged, may indicate when the voyage was deemed lost, so 
may be relevant for insurance law. In earlier authorities, where freight was no longer earned, 
the employment contracts automatically terminated. That underlying position has been altered 
by statute, so that “The ancient doctrine that freight was… the mother of wages, that the crew 
and the owners of the ship were co-adventurers in the enterprise of earning freight out of 
which the seaman was to be paid, has been abolished by s 157 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 
1894…”411 Nevertheless, employment cases both pre and post the 1894 Act assist in 
determining whether a voyage is seen as impossible or terminated, though perhaps earlier 
cases more closely follow the charterparty frustration. 
 
Modern employment law in this context begins with The Olympic (Wages),412 concerning 
employment contracts for a voyage. The Olympic was involved in a collision on leaving 
Southampton Docks, and was docked for repair. The contemplated voyage to New York was 
abandoned. The owners dismissed the crew, contending that she became ‘wrecked’ within the 
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meaning of the 1894 Act, which argument was accepted. Section 158 of the 1894 Act applied 
where the service of the seaman ‘terminates’. This arose from the ‘wreck or loss of the ship’, 
and ‘loss of the ship included ‘something which renders the ship… unfit or unable to proceed 
on the voyage.’ Accordingly, this included “anything happening to the ship which renders her 
incapable of carrying out the maritime adventure”. The ship was deemed ‘wrecked’ as soon 
as it became impossible to continue the voyage contemplated. The owner was justified in 
terminating the contract of employment. Kennedy LJ’s dissenting judgment is instructive, in 
that it considered embargo, confirming that while embargo did not dissolve the employment 
contract or charterparty “…yet it may be reasonable on such an occasion to discharge the 
greater part of the mariners, who may readily find in other ships an employment equally 
beneficial to themselves, and are therefore not likely to sustain or recover special damage to 
any considerable amount by the non-performance of the contract made with them.”413… 
Accordingly, he noted that “what is true of an embargo by the Government to which the ship 
belongs is true also of seizure for a temporary purpose by a hostile power”.414 The Olympic 
concerned whether ‘repairs’ frustrated contracts of employment, but it was further observed 
obiter that that “Dr Lushington mentions in his judgment in The Florence,415 by capture: "By 
capture certainly… if there be no re-capture, the contract (ie, the contract between shipowner 
and seaman) is at once put an end to, and this, I apprehend, whether by an enemy or by 
pirates".416 Damage frustrated employment, as capture was thought to, although detention and 
embargo would not, without more, do so. 
 
Capture was recognised to have a much more significant effect on the underlying contracts 
than detention or embargo. In Horlock v Beal, Shaw LJ treated the effect of capture on a 
contract of employment as similar to that on insurance as established by Mansfield in Goss; 
charterparties terminated on a declaration of war as performance then became impossible. The 
employment contracts were similarly terminated, as these stood or fell with the adventure with 
which they were concerned. No other rule would reflect the law or would be workable. That 
indicated when the voyage might be lost. Specifically, detention by a power declaring 
hostilities dissolved the contract at once, and a wait-and-see rule would not apply:  
“When a ship is put under detention by a declaration of war, I cannot see room for a 
condition of affairs which would leave parties in suspense, feeling that they are bound 
if the war be short but free if the war be long. In the case of a vessel in an enemy port, 
the war descends upon master and crew alike, taking no regard of either contract right 
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or obligations, but putting all alike on the common footing of British citizens, and as 
such placing their liberty completely at the disposal of the enemy Power”.417  
The owners were deprived of their vessel by capture on 4 August 1914, the crew were 
removed on 2 November, and were imprisoned later that month. The effect of the outbreak of 
hostilities frustrated the adventure, thus terminating the contracts of employment: “While the 
general question as to the effect of a declaration of war should, in my opinion, be resolved as 
stated, I should also feel entirely free to hold that the circumstances of the present case leave 
no doubt as to disruption of the contract relations of parties and the loss of the adventure”.418 
Accordingly, a wait-and-see approach was rejected in the context of actual enemy capture.  
 
In The Friends, impossibility resulted from the act of a hostile State. The plaintiffs' ship, 
manned by a British crew, on a voyage from London to Newcastle and back, was captured by 
a French privateer. The plaintiff and other crewmembers were taken as prisoners of war. 
Meanwhile, the vessel was recaptured, which as far as possible restored the antecedent 
condition of things,419 but a new hand was hired to fill the plaintiff's place. The ship completed 
her homeward voyage to London. The plaintiff sued for the wages which would have been 
due to him had he served on the homeward journey. Sir William Scott held: "Nothing can be 
better settled than that the act of capture defeats all rights and interests, but it is contended 
that the former interests revive upon recapture”,420 which contention was rejected. Further, 
Blackburn LJ’s dictum in Dahl v Nelson, Donkin & Co421 was considered, noting it was: 
"…held in Geipel v Smith by the whole court, and in Jackson v Union Marine Insurance 
Co by the majority in the Common Pleas, and in the same case in error by a majority 
of the Court of Exchequer Chamber that a delay in carrying out a charterparty caused 
by something for which neither party was responsible, if so great and long as to make 
it unreasonable to require the parties to go on with the adventure, entitled either of 
them, at least while the contract was executory, to consider it at an end". 
Applying that general definition of frustration, it was held that ‘the further performance of … 
[the charterparty] within a reasonable time was prevented by an excepted cause - the 
blockade, which was a restraint of princes. Lush J, in giving judgment, put the pith of the case 
thus. He said: "If the impediment had been in its nature temporary I should have thought the 
plea bad, but a state of war must be presumed to be likely to continue so long, and so to disturb 
the commerce of merchants as to defeat and destroy the object of a commercial adventure like 
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this”’.422 It should not be necessary, therefore, in such a case to wait till the delay has occurred, 
and the presumption that a seizure or requisition will be of a long duration was supported. The 
fact the charterparty would be lost at any moment after seizure made it ‘reasonable, just and 
natural’ for the owners to conclude the adventure was ended, and to determine the rights of 
the crew to wages. It was noted that Hadley v Clarke did not establish that while an embargo 
might be intended to be temporary, if it were prolonged it could never end the contract of 
affreightment: “All that was, in fact, decided was the abstract point that a temporary 
interruption of a voyage by an embargo does not put an end to such a contract. Moreover, the 
judgments of Grove J, and Laurence J, especially that of the latter, rather indicate that they 
treated the contract to carry the goods to Leghorn as a positive and absolute contract to do 
so within a reasonable time - the dangers of the seas only excepted”.423 
 
Accordingly, it appears more likely that a fact specific approach will be applied to contracts 
of employment, to test if they have been terminated by an event of capture. This approach 
appears to be a more lenient test to the shipowner than the test of whether a charterparty has 
been frustrated by the occurrence of a similar event. While the earliest laws in New York in 
1748 suggested otherwise,424 the general rule in early authorities in New York425 and 
Massachusetts426 was that a capture dissolved the contracts of employment, and accordingly 
conformed to English law.  
 
v. Contracts of sale 
Little authority exists on the sale contract in the context of capture. In Nickoll & Knight v 
Ashton, Edridge & Co,427 the contract of sale was frustrated as a result of the vessel stranding 
and being damaged, so that she missed the specified month of arrival. The terms of this 
contract were unusually specific – the cargo should be shipped in one named ship, and that if 
the ship were unable to complete the voyage, "In case of prohibition of export, blockade, or 
hostilities preventing the shipment the contract or any unfulfilled part thereof is to be 
cancelled".  Lord Smith MR found that an implied term providing that if the vessel were 
unable to deliver the cargo in time, due to another cause, the contract would be frustrated. 
However, he noted that an unconditional contract to deliver goods – not naming a specific 
vessel – would not produce the same result. Whether a sale contract would be frustrated, 
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therefore, depends on the terms of the contract. It is sufficient to note the possibility that a 
cargo-owner may well be in breach of a contract of sale by a capture, and yet, under the law 
as expressed in Masefield, be uncompensated for the capture. Even though his cargo might be 
restored, his commercial relationships will be damaged, and the law will have provided no 
remedy. Arguably, in both jurisdictions, contracts of sale fall to be considered under general 
contract law principles of frustration, rather than by a close comparison to the charterparty 
cases.  
 
3.3 Title, Contract and delay 
 
Insurance law should and clearly did impose a different test for total loss than is provided by 
the property law issue of whether title has been lost. Equally, in relation to whether the venture 
had been frustrated, each contractual context - charterparty, sale contract, and employment 
contract - turns on different considerations. A loss of possession either causes delay to or 
permanently prevents the voyage. Frustration operates when the voyage has been defeated by 
a radical change in circumstances. However, the test of whether a charter is frustrated for hull 
and cargo policies appears higher than that of constructive total loss. Except for clear cases of 
capture in wartime, ‘restraint’ would seldom excuse non-delivery of cargo under a contract of 
carriage, and unless insurance applied a different test parties would be in a difficult position.428 
In most situations of restraint, an element of wait-and-see might be applied to determine the 
charterparty position, as in Hirji Mulji, which conflicts with the insured’s duty under his 
policy to abandon promptly. Similarly, the test of whether an employment contract has been 
frustrated involves some element of wait-and-see, although to a lesser extent than the 
approach suggested in the context of charterparties. The overall effect is one of uncertainty, 
absent express contractual provision to a loss of possession event, and it is clear that contract 
law does not provide a uniform general test that insurance laws might follow. The exception 
to this difference is that a similar test of frustration effectively applies to charterparties as to 
constructive total loss of a freight policy.  
 
That different considerations apply to each of these contracts is desirable, and a comparison 
could be made to the potential benefit of postlimity as a property right transferring to insurers 
on abandonment. The insurer has a right to property abandoned after a constructive total loss. 
Where property is abandoned to the insurer, the insurer will have an interest in saving what is 
left, and it may be that the insurer will be entitled to rely on the continuation of time charters, 
although of course underwriters should not be forced unnecessarily to take the role of broker 
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or owner. However, there is arguable potential for injustice if the law does apply the same test 
in this context as to insurance. The aim of commercial insurance must be to protect a merchant 
in his business, and it should arguably apply a lower test to constructive total loss, than is 
required to allege frustration of the contract. If a wait-and-see doctrine applies to oblige parties 
to wait for the ultimate event of any scenario, marine insurance provides little practical 
protection, especially for cargo interests. It would also leave little meaning for the doctrine 
that the insurer takes possession of whatever is lost. 
 
Delay and loss of market, absent physical damage to goods, is probably recoverable in a 
buyer’s claim against carrier or seller, given the knowledge reasonably inferred to be in the 
parties contemplation.429 Cargo delay is often excused or limited by clauses in the bill of 
lading, which are usually upheld in England,430 and accordingly a buyer will often not have a 
remedy against the carrier. In America, losses from delayed delivery are recoverable pursuant 
to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,431 whether physical deterioration or economic loss. 
Terms excluding liability for delay are likewise generally enforced.432 Accordingly, situations 
might well arise where the charterparty or sale contract are not frustrated, and the seller or 
exceptionally the carrier will be liable for losses consequent on delay; simultaneously, they 
may not be compensated by their insurer. This creates a potential gap in insurance cover, and 
reveals situations where insurance law does not allow – given the understanding of an 
exclusion for losses consequent on delay – for the insured’s loss to be compensated. 
 
Both property law governing transfer of title, and the doctrine of frustration, are equally 
unpredictable as to when the original rights are terminated by marine perils. As described in 
the following chapters, it was once thought that insurance law applied more certain principles, 
suitable for the needs of commerce. The Sea Angel433 provides a reminder of the lack of 
certainty in applying frustration. It might have been assumed from the Great War precedents 
that a period of delay that was significant in relation to the duration of the charterparty would 
allow frustration. However, given that the delay of about 60 days at the end of a 20 day charter 
did not frustrate the charter, it might have been thought that insurance would provide a more 
certain rule. Arguably, the presumptions of total loss formerly applied to the perils of loss of 
possession supplied this certainty.   
                                                     
429 Ordinary remoteness principles in Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex 341 were applied to this context in the 
Federal Court in Canada, Frasier Shipyard v Expedient (1999) 170 FTR 1, 41, 2000 AMC 586, which arguably 
would be followed in England. 
430 Gaskell, Asarotis, Baatz, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (LLP, 2000), [10.51-10.57], William Tetley, 
Marine Cargo Claims (4th edn, 2008, Thomson Carswell), 790 
431 Title 46 United States Code §§ 1300-1315 
432 Tetley (2008), 791 
433 [2007] EWCA Civ 547, [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 517 
78 
 
4 PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS ON CAPTURE AND SEIZURE 
  
“I venture to say that the test of "unlikelihood of recovery" has now been substituted 
for "uncertainty of recovery".434 
In this sentence, Pollurian v Young underpins the contemporary understanding of the test of 
constructive total loss under the 1906 Act. Was Kennedy LJ correct in stating that a test of 
‘uncertainty’ had been applied? Early cases indicate insureds recovered even for short periods 
of loss of possession. In Goss v Withers the insured had a right to abandon on the basis that 
his property was lost by capture lasting 8 days, with a strong hope of recovery. Contrastingly, 
by Masefield a loss for 41 days did not justify abandonment. In the Bamburi, a loss continuing 
a year was suggested as the minimum to recover for constructive total loss. What explains 
these increasingly strict judgments? Arguably, a presumption of constructive total loss 
governed capture claims, but came to be overlooked from Pollurian. The following considers 
evidence for how this presumption was established in the context of capture and seizure, and 
how it was applied.  
 
4.1 Presumption of total loss on capture established  
 
i. Presumption stated by Treatise writers  
A presumption of total loss on a policy for value in English law was anticipated by Continental 
treatise writers, and arose on a variety of perils. Emerigon identified those perils potentially 
causing total loss as “capture, shipwreck, bris, stranding, arrest of princes, or total loss of the 
effects insured; and all other damages shall be reputed only average”.435 Emerigon 
recognised that capture might not cause an actual total loss, as there was usually a chance of 
restoration:  
 
“Capture is the first case, which, according to the Ordonnance, gives room to 
abandonment, although it often happens that the taking is not accompanied by an 
actual total loss; as when the ship is retaken by her own crew; when she is recaptured 
within the twenty-four hours; when she is released by the captor; or she is 
ransomed”.436 
  
Nevertheless, he considered the practical effect of the loss of possession: 
 
“But as soon as the vessel is taken, the owners are deprived of the domain, or at least 
of the free disposal of their effects. As against the merchant, the property tied up and 
uncertain is considered in some manner as if it no longer existed”.437  
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This justified a right to claim for total loss as soon as the capture occurred: 
“Hence, according to the Ordonnance, its loss is presumed to be total, and it is allowed 
to make abandonment to the insurers of the effects insured”.438 
 
Interestingly, Emerigon noted that the right to give notice of abandonment was absolute 
following capture, and was not undone by subsequent events. His own opinion, following 
Roccus, was that he would consider capture (ie loss of possession) as simple stranding, and 
that if the vessel were recaptured, released or ransomed, so that the vessel was restored to the 
possession of the owners, the right of abandonment would end.439 However, he noted French 
law permitted instant abandonment: 
 
‘But our jurisprudence is to the contrary. It is established on the strict letter of Art 46 
of the Ordonnance from which it is inferred that so soon as the vessel is taken the action 
of abandonment is open to the assured and this jurisprudence conforms with the 
doctrine of Valin and Pothier’.440 
 
Emerigon summarised the state of insurance law as understood internationally, at a time when 
English authorities were first considering valued policies. Emerigon provided that capture 
granted an instant right of abandonment. Contrastingly, arrest of princes and stranding did not 
grant that instant right, but a right to claim after a set passage of time.  
 
This presumption of total loss was not universal in European laws. For example, in 1598, the 
Amsterdam Reglement provided at art 25: “And happening that a vessel by accident becomes 
useless to navigate; that goods or vessels insured be captured, plundered, or damaged by 
enemies or sea pirates, without hope of recovery it belongs to the assured, if good it seems to 
him, to make a transfer, to abandon such vessel or goods to the profit of the insurers”,441 so 
indicating that a loss of spes was required. Yet it was from the Guidon and Emerigon that 
Mansfield LCJ derived authority for his judgement in Goss, which settled an instant right to 
recover in English law. Marine insurance was not unique in forming presumptions of loss in 
respect of temporary impediments. There was a comparable presumption at common-law 
permitting an action for anticipatory breach of undertaking, notwithstanding that the breach 
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had actually been remedied,442 applying the underlying English maxim that “He that is once 
disabled is ever disabled”.443 
 
ii. Established in English law by Mansfield LCJ  
In Goss the vessel was captured in the English Channel, where ‘English cruisers sailed daily 
in the hope of (re)capturing vessels’. The insurer, relying on a strong spes recuperandi 
attempted to distinguish capture upon the open seas, where the spes was remote. The insured 
accepted the strong spes. Crucially, ‘wait-and-see’ was not adopted, and the ship was a total 
loss ‘while in the possession’ of the enemy: 
 
‘By the capture the insurers became liable, though never carried into port; and though 
there may happen a recapture afterwards, that will not …make any difference … and 
though the ship be never condemned, the contract is equally binding, ex. gr. A ship may 
be taken by a commission from a foreign State, between whom and us there is no war… 
and in that case there can be no condemnation; so in the case of pirates. Yet a capture, 
in either of these cases, is, as between the insurer and insured, the same as a taking by 
an enemy at open war, &c’.444 
 
Total loss was found, ignoring postliminity and spes recuperandi445 and justifying ‘instant 
abandonment’:   
‘…no capture is so total a loss that it is impossible any-thing can be recovered; she 
may be re-taken, and, be it at ever so great a distance, a right accrues to the owner… 
this possibility shall not suspend the right the assured had to recover on the contract, 
but he might abandon his interest in such possibility to the insurer’.446 
 
Capture was equivalent to total submersion, as the vessel lost all commercial utility to the 
insured during the capture.447 Further, ransom payments – then both lawful and commonplace 
– were dismissed as irrelevant in argument, and formed no part of his judgment. In The 
Selby,448 Mansfield LCJ confirmed that ‘while the ship was in the hands of the enemy, it was 
a total loss’.449 In Milles v Fletcher (The Hope)450 Mansfield confirmed total loss arose on 
capture, and stated the whole law on capture and recapture could be found in Goss and The 
Selby.451  Finally, in Kulen Kemp v Vigne (the Emmanuel) Mansfield CJ stated that an insured 
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on a valued policy could abandon for a ‘temporary capture’, making no reference to testing 
the spes.452 There was no suggestion of any test of ‘unlikelihood’. Academic authorities, 
English and American, repeated Mansfield’s judgments in substance: 
“therefore, as to the length of possession by an enemy, which is deemed sufficient to 
divest the property out of the original owner, or the effect of a re-capture in revesting 
it, these are now matters which can never come directly into question between insurer 
and insured. They never could have come in question, in any case of insurance upon 
real interest; because… they never could have varied the case”.453 
 
After Mansfield LCJ, courts looked only to the facts at the time of the claim. The spes 
recuperandi was not argued to undermine total loss in relation to capture cases for over 100 
years. 
 
iii. Meaning of a ‘prima facie right to abandon’; England compared to America 
The right to give a notice of abandonment was not, in the English courts, an automatic right 
to recover for a total loss in an action against insurers. A distinction existed in England 
between the facts that entitled an insured to give notice of abandonment, and those which 
allowed him to recover for a total loss, in particular where intelligence of a capture turned out 
to be false.454 Any spes recuperandi exposed tension between certain and quick resolution of 
the parties’ rights, and fairness to the insurer. Commercial considerations, primarily certainty, 
support an insured’s right to serve a notice of abandonment soon on hearing of a capture. On 
the information required to give notice, which was the same in America and France, it was 
held that insureds must act on probable information, and the effect of abandonment would be 
determined by the eventually ascertained truth or falsehood of the intelligence received. “If I 
hear of my ship’s being taken in the East or West Indies, I am not obliged to wait till I certainly 
know the event by the testimony of those who were present. Provided the event has once 
existed, what I do, believing it to have taken place, must be valid and effectual”.455  
 
An obvious issue arose on restoration of property after payment by the insurer. Did this 
unfairly over-compensate insureds? Mansfield held that restoration of property following 
judgment did not undo the total loss,456 though the insurer took the property. A grey area 
remained concerning restoration between notice of abandonment and judgment. By 1808,457 
the parties’ rights settled at the time of action: A spes recuperandi existed after any capture. 
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The notice was an offer which remained executory, and as this was a suspended stated of 
things, “considering this as a contract of indemnity the assured had a right to look to 
intervening accidents which might chance to restore them de integro to their former 
situation”. 458 Both insurers and insureds had a right to look for such accidents. 
 
Before 1906, parties looked for actual restoration before the date of the action: ‘…plaintiffs 
must stand, … in the position in which subsequent events have placed them at the time when 
they come to demand it that is when the action is brought’.459 Frequently, this is by agreement 
taken to be the date of the notice of abandonment, as in Masefield.460 There was no suggestion 
that at this time the parties would look to future restoration if it had not already occurred. 
 
Contrastingly, American law treated the date of abandonment as the date on which the parties’ 
rights became finalised: ‘… under English law the loss must continue until the date of the 
commencement of the action, although in the United States once an abandonment has been 
rightfully made, subsequent events cannot divest any rights flowing therefrom'.461 This 
resulted in certainty; "If the abandonment, when made, is good, the rights of the parties are 
definitively fixed, and do not become changed by any subsequent events”.462 This was an 
expressly considered policy: 
 
“If this doctrine be not true, but the rights of the parties are held to be uncertain and 
fluctuating, after a regular abandonment, under circumstances which by the laws of 
insurance constitute a total loss, there seems to be no reason why the commencement 
of the action should be fixed upon as the time when this uncertainty is to cease… But 
how great the inconvenience would be to the public, and to the parties to the contract, 
that the degree of responsibility of the insurer should not be known until the end of a 
law suit is attained, must be obvious to everyone who considers the importance of 
having some legal owner of the property abandoned, to prevent its waste and 
destruction”.463  
 
Later, some consideration was given to subsequent events, such as where the cost of repair 
proved to be less than anticipated, and these were put to a jury to determine whether 
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abandonment was justified when given.464 Clearly, American courts aimed to reduce the 
uncertainty suffered by the parties by crystallising their obligations at a particular date (see 
1.5, above). This intentionally prevented enquiry into future events, from that time, or from 
the time of trial. In particular, the spes recuperandi at the time of abandonment was never 
introduced into this discussion. While English courts have moved away from this degree of 
finality in other contexts (eg The Golden Victory465 on anticipatory breaches of contract) 
nothing in the pre-Act law challenged this presumption. Further, the only approval of an 
approach looking to post writ-agreement events comes from writers long after the 1906 Act.466 
There is arguably more commercial sense in the American rule on abandonment, and little 
published justification exists of the now entrenched English rule. In a passage echoed in Ruys 
v Royal Exchange,467 a New York court held the time of abandonment was the most natural 
and convenient period. The assured must make his election to abandon or not in a reasonable 
and short time after he hears of the loss. Property was transferred by the abandonment, and 
could never afterwards be claimed by the assured. Want of mutuality was want of justice. 
Consequently, there was no reason why the assured should be bound, but the insurer left free 
to take advantage of events subsequent to notice.468 
 
Authorities on total losses for delay often concerned situations where the specie had been 
released by the date of the action, and accordingly the divergence of approach on the effect of 
giving notice of abandonment creates real differences between the American and English 
cases, despite the desirability of these laws being in harmony. Notably, no recent English 
authority has considered the length of time an insured might wait before abandonment, hence 
a potential trap is set by wait-and-see.  
 
The ‘presumption’ of total loss appears a legal presumption, not a rebuttable evidential 
presumption. For example, at early date, other presumptions in insurance could be rebutted 
by surrounding circumstances. Contra the presumption of total loss on sinking, in 1868 it was 
stated: “The mere fact of submersion of the vessel does not amount to a total loss. On the high 
seas it affords strong prima facie evidence, but in the shallow waters of the Missouri it does 
not afford even a presumption”.469 Contrastingly, the fact of capture was a presumption in 
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that it allowed abandonment to be made, and claims to be successful, even where the hope of 
recovery was strong. Pre 1906, the presumption could only be rebutted where possession was 
in fact restored.  
 
4.2 Application: 
 
i. In England on Capture 
“Capture simpliciter” – where no recapture or release or restoration occurred by the date the 
action - was not contested until Masefield. Numerous dicta supported a presumption of total 
loss. In a case involving capture by a privateer, and recapture by another privateer, Mansfield 
LCJ clarified, “In effect, there was only a temporary capture, and though by construction a 
temporary capture is such a loss [as to justify abandonment, ie a total loss], as that an assured 
upon interest is warranted in abandoning at the time, if he please”.470 In Holdsworth v Wise 
it was held ‘…in order to justify an abandonment, there must have been that, in the course of 
the voyage, which at the time constituted a total loss. Thus, capture or the necessary desertion 
of the ship constitutes a total loss’.471 The period the peril might continue was not investigated. 
The insurer could only defend by shewing that the capture had already ended. In M’Iver v 
Henderson472 where recapture occurred after proceedings were instituted: 
“It has not been disputed, nor can it with any colour of argument be contended, that 
on the 4th of April 1814 there was not a sufficient ground for the abandonment of the 
ship… The ship had been captured… and possession of her was not restored till 
afterwards, i.e. on the 11th of May 1814”.473 
The presumption was articulated in Dean v Hornby.474 The vessel was insured on a one year 
time policy from April 1851. In December 1851 she was captured by pirates in the Straits of 
Magellan but recaptured by the Royal Navy in January 1852. The owners learned of both 
events simultaneously, and abandoned. The Prize Master sold her. The Admiralty Court held 
the proceeds pending the dispute between owners and insurers.475 Campbell LCJ held that the 
owners could recover for a total loss, stating that once a ship was taken by pirates: ‘then, in 
fact, a total loss has occurred.’… ‘…once there has been a total loss by capture, that is 
construed to be a permanent total loss unless something afterwards occurs by which the 
assured either has the possession restored, or has the means of obtaining such restoration’.476 
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Coleridge J held simply: ‘There was a capture by pirates; and, if that were all, there would 
unquestionably be a total loss’.477 These judgments followed Goss in ignoring any spes, and 
restated the presumption. Dean v Hornby was considered in Masefield, although the 
presumption repeated in the case was arguably overlooked, as Dean was not contextualised 
against earlier authorities, which excluded property tests and the spes recuperandi.  
 
In Ruys v Royal Exchange Corporation (the Doelwyk)478 a vessel insured on a war risks policy 
was captured by the Italian navy on 8 August 1886, during the First Italo-Abyssinian war. 
Notice was given on 14 August. It was refused. The action was brought on 21 August. On 8 
December, the Italian Prize Court held her lawful prize, but ordered her restitution as the war 
had ended.479 Subsequently, the insureds recovered for total loss. Hamilton v Mendes was 
applied by Collins J.480 Notwithstanding the restitution, a presumption of loss applied, that 
war would be of an indefinite duration.481  
 
The House of Lords applied the presumption in Andersen v Marten (the Romulus).482 The 
insured vessel was captured by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war, and wrecked 
under the captors’ control. The Japanese Prize Court subsequently condemned both vessel and 
cargo. The insured claimed loss by perils of the sea, an insured risk. The insurers alleged total 
loss by capture, a risk not insured. Loreburn LC observed that legal property had not passed 
and noted the spes recuperandi, though ‘possession’ was lost.483 He held that on the day of 
capture there was; ‘a total loss which, as things were then seen, might afterwards be reduced 
if in the end the vessel was released’.484 The Earl of Halsbury confirmed that the presumption 
had been the settled law for 150 years (since Goss), and, ‘it would be a bold thing to argue 
against a judgment of the full Court of King’s Bench presided over by Lord Mansfield’.485 
Consequently ‘… it would have been impossible in an English Court to deny that there was a 
total loss to the owner on [capture]’.486 The unfavourable spes reinforced the decision, but 
formed no part of the applicable test; there was no test of ‘uncertainty’. The House of Lords 
confirmed Goss that the spes did not undermine a claim for a total loss on subsisting capture. 
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Isolated extracts support the view that capture might not operate as a total loss. In The Hope, 
Mansfield recognised: ‘It was not contended, that a capture necessarily amounts to a total 
loss as between insurer and insured; nor, on the other hand, that on a capture and recapture, 
there may not be a total loss, though there remain some material tangible part of the ship and 
cargo’.487 In context, these dicta refer to the possibility of recapture having occurred by the 
time notice was given, never whether it might occur after that date.  
 
Stringer and Others v The English and Scottish Marine Insurance Company,488 properly 
understood, supported the presumption of total loss. The policy in Stringer covered goods 
shipped to America. The vessel was captured by the American navy in 1863 and carried to 
New Orleans where part of the cargo was expected to be condemned by the Prize Court. The 
insured, expecting a profitable market possession could be recovered, did not abandon, instead 
contesting the prize proceedings. The prize litigation took far longer than the insured expected. 
The insured could have had his goods returned at any time, on giving sufficient security to the 
New Orleans court. The Exchequer Chamber - and other uninsured cargo interests - 
considered that no sane man would have given security, due to fluctuations in the value of the 
currency. After 18 months, the goods were held an unlawful seizure and restitution ordered. 
The captors appealed. The prize court sold the goods holding the proceeds pending the further 
appeal. Subsequently, the insured claimed on his policy for total loss. Three factual situations 
arose sequentially: (i) capture simpliciter; (ii) on-going detention after no notice was given; 
and (iii) following judicial sale. On capture simpliciter, Blackburn J stated; ‘It is clear at this 
time the cargo was, by one of the perils insured against, taken entirely out of the control of 
the assured, under circumstances which rendered it doubtful whether it would ever be 
restored, or if restored, at what period. Under such circumstances, the assured has a right… 
abandon it to the underwriters and claim for a total loss’. On the insured’s appeal, Kelly CB 
agreed with that assessment of the original loss. However, the insured had not abandoned 
promptly, thereby estopping himself from claiming for a total loss in the second situation. In 
Masefield, it was overlooked that the plaintiff in Stringer could have claimed for constructive 
loss at once.  
 
Commentary supported an instant right of abandonment. A textbook endorsed by Mansfield 
LCJ stated: ‘[On policies with an interest] …in cases of capture the underwriter is 
immediately responsible to the insured. But if the ship be recovered before a demand for 
indemnity the insurer is only liable for the amount of the loss actually sustained at the time of 
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the demand …’489 Academic works recorded that an abandonment could be made instantly, 
further supporting the rule that the spes was not a requirement of a plaintiff’s case. 
 
ii. In America on capture  
This presumption was equally applied in courts in American states490. Early English and 
American authorities unanimously affirmed that capture simpliciter established a total loss 
justifying instant abandonment.491 Early American authorities followed the English 
presumption. In Mumford v Church492  the insured vessel sailed on 12 May 1798. On 16 May 
she was captured by a British vessel and carried into Mole St Nicholas. She was detained for 
three weeks, and restored to the captain on his paying charges. After her release, she remained 
there three weeks longer. Part of her cargo of flour was sold there. On 19 June a Vice-
Admiralty court decree restored the brig on the payment of charges. This decree, and the 
captain's protest, were delivered to the plaintiff who abandoned promptly, on about 1 July. 
The vessel’s condition after capture entitled the insured to abandon. He abandoned on the first 
intelligence of the capture on 12 June. However, the vessel, unknown to insured or insurer, 
was then decreed to be restored on 19 June. The insurer argued this reduced the loss to a partial 
loss, and deprived the insured of the right to abandon. As the abandonment was before the 
decree of restoration, the court upheld the abandonment. Contra the English rule that events 
between abandonment and the action can undo a total loss, it was held the insured must act 
according to the information he possessed. The abandonment would be determined by the 
correctness of the information, but it was clear that where the insured “had a right to proceed, 
and make the abandonment upon the information he then possessed; and the abandonment 
being rightfully made, [it] must be definitive”.  
 
The American court expressly preferred to satisfy the requirement of certainty. The court 
stated the contrary idea was inconsistent with a perfect right to abandon. It would render it 
precarious and uncertain, by being subject to the contingency of intermediate events, and 
liable to be defeated. To preserve consistency in the law on this subject, and to establish 
certainty in its rules, the court held it was necessary to maintain the conclusiveness of an 
abandonment when properly made, and to allow the plaintiff to recover for a total loss. 
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The American law was clear that the insured could abandon instantly, but that this 
abandonment had to be made quickly: 
“The rule laid down is, that where there is a capture, the insured may abandon at once 
and recover for a total loss, and leave the spes recuperandi to the underwriter, who 
will have the benefit of any accident by which the thing may be recovered. But he must 
make his election whether to abandon or not within a reasonable time after notice of 
the loss”.493 
 
An illustration of the speed required was illustrated where a policy covering goods from 
Philadelphia to St Sebastians was ‘warranted not to abandon if detained or captured, if the 
property is released in six months after notice to the insurers, no risk taken in port but sea-
risk’. The vessel was boarded by an armed launch close to St Sebastians, and was taken by a 
prize master to Port Passage, where after eight days’ quarantine she was ordered to St 
Sebastians. A French crew took her to Bayonnne. There the cargo was requisitioned by the 
French government. This was held a total loss by the initial capture, not the seizure in port.494 
Crucially, “…where the insured received intelligence of the capture on the 10th of July, and 
did not abandon until December; it was held to be too late, and that although the underwriters 
may be notified of the capture, they are not bound to hasten the assured in making his election, 
nor offer to pay before it is demanded”.495 Mauran v Insurance Company confirmed Goss v 
Withers, in that the insurer was liable for a loss by capture whether or not the property was 
transferred. In every case of illegal capture, title was not transferred, but the effect was “the 
same as in case of a capture by an enemy in open war”.496 
 
In Rhinelander v The Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (the Manhattan),497 The 
Manhattan, a neutral ship, was captured by a belligerent. She was carried into port, and libeled 
as prize of war, but afterwards acquitted. Marshall CJ, used the language a ‘real’ loss in 
contradistinction to a ‘legal’ or a ‘technical’ loss. He confirmed that ‘capture by one 
belligerent from another constitutes, in the technical sense of the word, a total loss, and gives 
an immediate right to the insured to abandon to the insurers, although the vessel may 
afterwards be recaptured and restored’. That was the rule, not any test of uncertainty. He 
explained that the right to abandon immediately existed ‘because the hope of recovery is too 
small and too remote to suspend the right of the insured in expectation of that event’.  
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Further, he explained that there were situations in which the delay of the voyage, and the 
deprivation of the right to conduct it, produced inconveniences to the insured for the 
calculation of which the law affords and can afford no standard, and could not properly 
compensate. In such cases there was, for the time the peril lasted, a total loss. While that lasted 
the insured might abandon to the underwriter, who stood in his place and to whom justice was 
done by abandonment, allowing him to receive all property recovered. Enemy capture and an 
embargo by a foreign power were known to fall within that rule. He held a complete arrest by 
a belligerent not an enemy seems in reason be treated the same. This confirmed the 
presumption of total loss even for an embargo. He stated further, “[i]f a neutral ship be 
captured as enemy property, the taking is unquestionably with a design to deprive the owner 
of it, and the hope of recovery is in many cases remote, since it may often depend on an 
appellate court, and though not equally improbable as in the case of capture by an enemy, is 
not so certain as is stated in argument by the counsel for the defendants”. This illustrates a 
conflict between the intention of the person taking it, and the laws that would be upheld by 
their government. The availability of a remedy in law by prize proceedings did not suspend 
the right of abandonment. The fact that capture of neutral vessels was unlawful, and ought 
always to result in restitution, did not mean that as restoration should follow, the insured 
would not recover. 
 
The American law was confirmed in Marshall v Delaware Insurance Company, where 
Marshall CJ stated a presumption of total loss on capture, detention and embargo, worth 
recalling fully:  
“…the voyage may be really broken up without the destruction of the vessel and cargo. 
A detention by a foreign prince, either by embargo or capture, may be of such long 
duration as to defeat the voyage. This is a peril insured against, and of its continuance 
no certain estimate can be made. In the case of capture it is, for the time, a total loss, 
and no person can confidently say that the loss will not finally be total. So of an 
embargo. Its duration cannot be measured, and it may destroy the object of the voyage. 
These detentions, therefore, are for the time total losses, and they furnish reasonable 
ground for the apprehension that their continuance may be of such duration as to break 
up the voyage or ruin the assured by keeping his property out of his possession. Such 
a case, therefore, upon the true principles of the contract, has been considered as 
justifying an abandonment and a recovery for a total loss”.498 
This was not stated as a test of irretrievability; any element of uncertainty justified the claim, 
but this uncertainty was presumed, and did not need to be pleaded or determined. This instant 
right of abandonment conformed to English law at the time. In Insurance Company v 
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Glosser499 Clifford J further endorsed the presumption of loss on capture. He noted that 
‘utterly lost’ was a strong expression intended to distinguish the situation where the vessel 
was ‘technically lost’ as after an abandonment. He noted a ship was not ‘utterly lost’ while in 
the hands of owners. However, a vessel taken by an enemy “would have been utterly lost to 
the owner”, unless there was recapture or restoration, and this was akin to destruction by fire 
or wreck, absent salvage of any remaining parts.500  
 
Further, authority confirmed that it was the fact of the vessel being restored at the time of 
abandonment that worked to undo the loss, and there was no test of ‘uncertainty’ applied.  
Statements such as the following were typical: ‘it is well settled that the right to abandon 
depends upon the state of facts existing at the time the offer is made and not on the information 
of the assured; and it is equally well settled in cases of capture, that if, before abandonment, 
the vessel is restored, the underwriter is not liable for a total loss, unless the voyage be lost, 
or not worth pursuing, or the salvage exceeds half the value.501 Such dicta nowhere contained 
reference to the length of time a capture or loss of possession lasted. 
 
Those rules were supported by early American academic authorities. Sherman confirmed that: 
To constitute a right to abandon, there must have existed a total loss, occasioned by one of the 
perils insured against, but this total loss may be either real or legal.502 Importantly, a capture 
gave an instant right to abandon, notwithstanding subsequent events: “A capture from one 
belligerent by another constitutes a total loss in the technical sense of the phrase, and gives 
the insured an immediate right to abandon to the insurers, although the vessel may be 
afterwards recaptured or restored”.503 The same presumption applied to a broader range of 
situations than legal capture: “A capture by a friend or the carrying a neutral vessel into port 
for the purpose of adjudication as contradistinguished from a capture by an enemy is a good 
ground for abandonment… And such a capture is prima facie evidence of a total loss and the 
insured may abandon immediately on receiving intelligence of it”.504 To circumvent this 
underlying law, in America it became standard for policies to specify the time before which 
abandonment could be made on capture, eg by the clause:  
“Warranted not to abandon in case of capture, seizure, or detention until after 
condemnation of the property insured, nor until ninety days after notice of said 
condemnation is given to this company. Also warranted not to abandon in case of 
blockade, and free from any expense in consequence of capture, seizure, detention or 
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blockade, but in the event of blockade to be at liberty to proceed to an open port and 
there end the voyage”.505 
 
Such clauses prevented insureds from refusing to use their best efforts to recover their 
property. The clause suggests the underlying law must have been that on capture, seizure or 
detention alike, the insured could regard the property as lost and abandon at once.506 This 
encouraged insurers to protect their interest by particular wording in policies, eg where ‘…the 
policy contained the usual printed clause to be free from any loss which may arise in 
consequence of a seizure or detention for or on account of any illicit or prohibited trade and 
also the following written clause warranted not to abandon if turned away nor if captured 
until condemned’.507 If the law did not make those assumptions of total loss – ie an instant 
right of abandonment – such a clause made little commercial sense. Rather, it appears that the 
law on capture was once identical in England and American States; there was a presumption 
of total loss. 
 
iii. On “seizure” 
In English decisions, did seizure likewise grant the insured a prima facie right to abandon? 
The peril was less frequently considered than capture, perhaps because the perils were not 
clearly distinguished. Nevertheless, unanimously, dicta in pre-Act cases suggest so. In Mullett 
v Shedden (the Martha) on capture, ‘No circumstance has happened since the seizure to make 
the original detention less than a total loss’.508 In Lozano v Janson,509 counsel for the insurer 
argued: ‘At all events, the seizure did not prima facie constitute a total loss’. Crompton J 
replied, ‘I think that it did; and that the onus of shewing the contrary rests upon the 
underwriters’.510 Further supporting dicta appear in Dyson v Rowcroft,511 The Friendship,512 
and Kaltenbach v MacKenzie.513 The spes remained untested, either as ‘uncertainty’ or 
‘unlikelihood’. The simple issue was factual possession at the time of abandonment.  
 
In Mellish v Andrews (The Minerva),514 where insured cargo was removed by the Swedish 
government on 7 December 1811, abandonment given on 17 January was out of time – 
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incidentally illustrating that a wait-and-see approach is unworkable for insureds. Where cargo 
was ultimately sold in April by the Swedish government, it was possible to abandon without 
notice of abandonment. Here, sale following seizure appeared to be an actual total loss, and 
there was no break in causation.   
 
In Naylor v Palmer, the mutiny of those who took the vessel but abandoned it and showed no 
desire to keep it, was ‘seizure’. It was held that the mutineers’ abandonment of the vessel did 
not amount to a restoration to the owners. The taking of the vessel was as much a cause of the 
loss as if it had been taken by strangers, and abandoned. If the cargo had consisted of wild 
animals who had escaped, or let lose, and could not be regained until after the captors 
abandoned possession.515 It is clear that this was a case of seizure, given the absence of 
intention to permanently deprive. Nevertheless, total loss was found. Confirmation of this 
presumption appeared in the Minden, Wangoni, Halle where the approach was wholly 
different to that in Fooks, in that the right to claim immediately was recognised, and similar 
facts were considered akin to capture: 
“Prima facie, when once it is accepted that there has been a seizure or capture of the 
goods, there is ‘the right of abandoning immediately’ and this right subsists so long as 
the property is detained by the captors or by their government, whether in port or at 
sea”.516 
 
In Alexander v Baltimore Insurance Company (the John and Henry),517 while prosecuting her 
voyage, the vessel was seized on 2 October 1803 by a French privateer and carried into port, 
where the cargo was taken by a French garrison. The vessel was restored to the possession of 
the master, who remained in port awaiting payment for the cargo taken. On 4 November, she 
was seized by a British vessel and condemned as prize. The policy was on the vessel only, not 
the cargo. It was held that there was no total loss “…during the existence of such a detention 
as amounts to a technical total loss, the assured may abandon, but it has also been decided 
that the state of the fact must concur with the state of information to make this abandonment 
effectual”.518  
 
The vessel’s return ended the total loss on the hull. In all situations of seizure, as in The 
Romulus, the rule was clear: ‘The ship was a total loss from the moment she passed into the 
possession of the [captors]’.519 Where captors had ‘possession’, because the free use and 
disposal was ‘suspended or rendered uncertain’, the situation was construed as total 
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deprivation,520 and there appeared no conceptual difference in approach between capture and 
seizure. The case of Fooks v Smith,521 where condemnation following Austrian seizure in 
anticipation of hostilities breaking out was found to be an event outside the ordinary 
consequences of restraint of princes, therefore stands in contrast to the earlier authorities, and 
it is difficult to see a good ground explaining the different outcome, in that the pre-Act rule 
was clear. 
  
iv. Displacing the prima facie right to abandon; recapture or release 
After recapture or release the parties reassessed whether the loss continued total. Recapture 
might not restore possession to the assured, and even after restoration of possession, the loss 
might continue to be total. 
 
Recapture by a friendly ship might not restore possession to the insured where the insured had 
no agents to receive it.522 Where perishable goods have spoiled during the capture possession 
was not restored.523 To reduce a total loss, ‘…The ship must be in esse in this kingdom under 
such circumstances, that the assured may, if they please, have possession, and may reasonably 
be expected to take it’.524 Dean was not, as suggested in Masefield, a case of capture 
simpliciter. It was deemed inevitable in Dean that recaptured property or proceeds of sale 
would be restored to the insured. This was ‘immaterial’.525 The issue was whether when the 
action was brought the assured possessed the means of obtaining possession from the 
recaptors’ agent. The court unanimously held that it had not; recapture had not restored 
possession. 
 
Restoration might be effective. In Parsons v Scott (the Little Mary),526 an insured vessel 
captured by the enemy French was liberated on payment by the master of ransom, on condition 
of his returning English prisoners to England to be exchanged for an equal number of French. 
On news of the capture - after her release - the owners abandoned her to their insurers. At 
Portsmouth, the captain refused to deliver her to the owners unless they reimbursed him. 
Refusing, the owners claimed for a total loss. On appeal, the claim was dismissed. By then, 
payment of ransom to an enemy was illegal,527 and the master could not claim the 
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reimbursement. The owners could therefore take possession without reimbursing him. 
Lawrence J stated: 
‘…wherever the voyage insured is defeated by any of the perils insured against, there 
is a total loss: …no authority … applies to the case where the ship was, or might have 
been in the hands of the owner, in the country where the owners reside’. 
 
Significantly, the ship was actually in safety at the time of abandonment, so this did not 
undermine the presumption on capture simpliciter. Not all restoration to the home country 
would be effective, as where barratriously seized property was recaptured and sold for the 
recaptor’s benefit in England.528  
 
Dean was cited in Masefield as the most apposite authority. Rather, Dean followed ‘The 
Martha’,529 where the recaptured ship was sold before the action. The judgment ought to have 
been that she was a ‘loss without abandonment’ because of that sale. The operative issue was 
the factual situation at the time of the action. More relevant authority for Masefield was Goss 
and The Romulus. Although Dean was cited in Masefield, neither judge addressed what the 
real issue had been in Dean, or considered then contemporary authorities.  
 
A loss is not adeemed merely on restoration,530 and in Goss, on restoration, Mansfield LCJ 
established different tests of loss to those applicable on capture simpliciter, namely whether: 
(i) the insured lost his voyage, (ii) repairing her was un-commercially expensive, and (iii) 
cargo had physically spoiled. In The Selby, after restoration of a lightly damaged vessel, where 
the voyage was not significantly interrupted, and the salvage costs low, the tests from Goss 
were confirmed.531 After restoration, losses only continued total where: (i) the cost of repair 
was prohibitively high (The Selby; The Hope532), and (ii) on destruction or decomposition of 
the property. In every authority where the loss was partial, the insured abandoned after 
restoration. It is only in this context, with possession actually restored, that a test of 
foreseeability, or a hope of inexpensive repair, applied to total losses. 
 
Although not discussed in English authorities, Emerigon considered that a release of a vessel 
by captors, even after 24 hours safe possession (so transfer of title) would restore possession 
to the assured. However, if abandonment had been made before that release, the vessel would 
be taken by the insurer, and the total loss would not be undone.533  
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v. Effect of condemnation or sale 
English authorities 
 
A loss by loss of possession may be actual or constructive. The House of Lords stated in the 
Minden; Wangoni; and Halle that it could not be doubted that a constructive total loss of 
goods might arise when they were taken from the possession of the insured or his bailee, for 
example by pirates, rovers or thieves. If there could be an actual total loss in such cases, there 
was no reason why the law would not recognise a constructive loss under s 60 of the Act.534 
Condemnation by a competent court, or sale, transfers the property. Arnould recorded that 
condemnation was effectively actual total loss – that is, that the claim could be made without 
giving notice of abandonment. The law appeared to be that an insured, on seizure and 
confiscation of goods, might claim a loss without a notice of abandonment, but if restoration 
of any part took place he could only recover an average loss. “in order to recover as for a 
total loss under such circumstances, in any event, he must give due notice of abandonment”.535 
This clearly recorded a presumption of total loss, and made no reference to any change of 
circumstances after the action was commenced. 
 
Concerning sale, the first case on abandonment in English law,536 in 1744, was that where the 
vessel was sold to pay salvage, the insured could recover for a total loss, ie the loss was not 
caused by any inability of the insured to pay.537 The draftsmen’s guidance notes stated that 
judicial sale following a vessel’s desertion on a sinking condition was an actual total loss, 
despite subsequent salvage:538 ‘… after the sale under the decree of the Court of Admiralty 
there was an actual total loss. …, it is as much a total loss as if it had been totally 
annihilated’.539 The pre-Act authorities indicate sale justified total loss without abandonment. 
 
American authorities 
 
It was held in America that where the policy provides that a constructive total loss claim may 
only be made after loss of possession for six months, condemnation justified a claim for an 
actual total loss at once:  
“Where a policy contained the like clause, “warranted not to abandon in case of 
capture or detention, until six months after notice thereof to the insurers,” and the 
vessel was condemned in less than one month after her capture, and the insured 
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thereupon abandoned: it was held, that the insured had a right to abandon immediately 
after the condemnation, inasmuch as the warranty was limited to the case of capture 
and detention only”.540 
The right to abandon following condemnation was something more than a continued loss of 
possession. It was a new event, justifying total loss without abandonment. In no sense was 
ultimate condemnation a clarification of the earlier loss of possession. Rather, “A Capture is 
a constructive total loss, for which the assured may lawfully abandon, and a subsequent 
condemnation is but an aggravation of the capture”.541 Other authorities simply held that 
condemnation was a total loss, without clarifying whether that was actual or constructive.542  
 
4.3 Capture and causation 
 
Where the occurrence of a peril specified in the policy is followed by capture, issues of 
causation arise. In Cory & Sons v Burr, Field J analysed the doctrine of causation in relation 
to an act of ‘barratry’ followed by an act of seizure. The policy contained the FC&S clause. 
Citing Livie v Janson543 and Green v Elmslie544 he stated: 
 
“[where] the ship, being by perils of the seas placed in such a position as to be exposed 
to capture, is captured, the loss is to be assigned to the proximate cause – the capture, 
and not the remote cause,- the perils of the seas, and so is within the exception 
[FCS]”.545  
In Green v Elmslie “the Fly”, insured against capture only, was driven by a gale onto the 
enemy French coast. Without having received any material damage by the stranding, she was 
captured. This was held to be a loss, not by perils of the sea as the insurer contended, but by 
capture. Lord Kenyon held that: “the case was too clear to admit of argument; this was a loss 
by capture, for had the ship been driven on any other coast but that of an enemy, she would 
have been in perfect safety”.546 The capture was not seen as a foreseeable consequence of 
stranding caused by weather. The capture was not part of a chain of causation beginning with 
the stranding. The capture was the proximate cause of the loss.  
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In Livie v Janson547 the American vessel “Liberty” sailed on a voyage in 1808 from New York 
to London with the aim of breaking the American embargo. She was driven onto the American 
shore by ice and damaged. Her crew deserted her. She was taken by officers of the Customs 
House, and ship and cargo were condemned for breach of the embargo.  The policy was 
warranted free from American seizure. The insured claimed for the partial sea-damage. 
Ellenborough LCJ held that the insured could not recover for the partial loss, as there was no 
right to recover for the later total loss. He followed Green v Elmslie in finding that the 
proximate cause of the loss was capture. This rule – that partial loss not made good overtaken 
by subsequent total loss restricts an insured for recovery of the later total loss – was codified 
by s 77(2) of the Act.548 
 
In Cory & Sons v Burr, the master had taken an illegal consignment of tobacco which was to 
be smuggled into Spain. The vessel and crew were arrested by the Spanish authorities, who 
took steps to condemn and confiscate her. The owners made a payment into court to prevent 
this, and claimed this sum back from their insurers. In light of Green v Elmslie and Livie v 
Janson, Field J held: “Until the seizure by the Spanish authorities, although a barratrous act 
had been committed, there had been no loss, and had he Captain not been overhauled, there 
would probably have never been any. It was the seizure that brought the loss into 
existence”.549 It followed that the seizure was the proximate cause of the loss, falling within 
the FC&S clause.  
 
Contrastingly, in Hahn v Corbett under a policy on goods containing the FC&S clause, the 
vessel stranded a few miles from the destination port. The goods, which would otherwise have 
become lost by perils of the sea, were taken out and carried off by Spanish Soldiers from a 
nearby garrison. Best CJ in Common Pleas held this to be a loss by perils of the sea, not 
capture. In Coolidge v The New-York Firemen Ins Co550 the hull policy contained a variant of 
the FCS clause, “warranted free from any loss by the British or Americans; but in case of 
capture, the usual sea-risks to continue”. She was captured by the British, and while detained 
by the captors was lost in consequence of their negligence; it was held that if the loss had been 
occasioned by a sea-risk strictly so called, the insurers would have been liable. But inasmuch 
as the immediate and proximate cause of the loss was an act of the captors, which if it had 
been done by the insured would have exonerated the insurers, the insurers were protected by 
the warranty.551 Arnould confirmed that if a ship insured under a policy with an FC&S 
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warranty be lost by the perils of the sea as a proximate cause, though also in the hands of the 
enemy, the warranty would not protect the insurer. Conversely, if a ship were already damaged 
by the seas, and thereby exposed to seizure, the capture and condemnation would be the 
proximate cause, and the warranty would be effective.552  
 
Where there was barratry, which exposed the vessel to a risk of seizure, seizure was held to 
be the proximate cause, and the barratry the remote cause. The policy on the vessel contained 
the FCS clause. The master engaged in smuggling, and consequently the vessel was seized by 
Spanish revenue authorities. The proximate cause of the loss was seizure, not the barratry of 
the master; the insurer was not liable:553 There was no loss by barratry. The barratry created a 
liability to forfeiture or condemnation, but might prove harmless. However, the seizure, an 
active step towards confiscation, was the direct and immediate cause of the loss, and not 
because of barratry, but because of a violation of the revenue laws of Spain.554 Such a rule 
made it difficult for an insured to retain cover for acts of barratry, as these would more easily 
fall within the FCS clause.  
 
 
4.3 Presumption on capture and seizure before 1906 
 
Early editions of Arnould separated the test for constructive loss into two issues; has the 
insured a prima facie right to give notice; and whether right to recover subsisted until the 
action. The first question was upon what intelligence the assured might give notice of 
abandonment. Primá facie, an insured might give notice on receiving intelligence of any such 
marine casualties as capture, seizure arrest. These perils “do not involve the absolute 
destruction or irretrievable loss of the thing insured, yet, render its destruction highly 
probable, or its ultimate recovery very doubtful; and these are…  casualties which can justify 
a notice of abandonment”. Contrastingly no amount of difficulty in regaining possession 
which did not involve an absolute temporary privation of ownership, or alienation of 
property,555 could make a case of constructive total loss,556 indicating that the perils of loss of 
possession were well understood as requiring consideration that differed from cases of 
stranding. 
 
What amounts to an absolute temporary privation of ownership, or alienation of property? 
This must be an alternative expression of the presumption of total loss on loss of possession. 
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The contemporary understanding of capture is expressed in Arnould,557 approved in 
Masefield: 
"Capture is prima facie a case of total loss which gives the assured an immediate right 
to give notice of abandonment. The loss cannot, as a rule, be said to be irretrievable at 
the moment of capture, so as to entitle the assured to treat it as an actual (as distinct 
from a constructive) total loss for there is no immediate loss of title. It has long been 
the established rule that the property does not pass, after capture, to a vendee or 
recaptor, so as to bar the original owner, until there has been a regular sentence of 
condemnation…"558 
 
Before 1906, it was possible to recover on a capture or seizure at once, and the spes 
recuperandi would not be argued. Clear authority from Goss in 1758 to the Romulus in 1908 
established a presumption of total loss arising on capture. If the ship remained captured on the 
date of the action, where abandonment was given promptly, there was a total loss. Recovery 
was allowed in situations where there was a strong hope of recovery, as in Goss. Despite the 
criticism of the approach in Arnould,559 and Michael Kerr QC’s later observation in the 
Dawson’s field arbitration, that it was “dangerous to treat deprivation of possession 
simpliciter as a cause of total loss subject only to being turned into a partial loss by 
subsequent recovery”,560 the approach of the courts including the House of Lords prior to 
1906, was exactly that. In the Friendship, the ratio was, ‘Capture operates as a total loss, 
unless it be redeemed by subsequent events’.561 It is not possible to draw a factual distinction 
between cases of ‘capture’ and ‘seizure’ in this regard. The pre-1906 cases illustrate that the 
simple issue was whether there had been an effective restoration. The idea that either the spes 
recuperandi had to be considered, or a ‘wait-and-see’ approach adopted, is fundamentally 
incompatible with the idea that an insured could abandon immediately.  
 
Although Mansfield LCJ recognised that ransom would restore possession, tellingly, not a 
single subsequent case considered the possibility of a ransom being made. This silence in the 
reported cases strongly suggests that courts, prior to Masefield, never considered ransom 
undermined a subsisting total loss on capture. Contrastingly, an insured might pay prize to a 
recaptor, which was a proper method of regaining possession. It is dangerous to confuse those 
two issues. At common-law, Masefield would have been able to claim constructive total loss: 
capture would be construed to be permanent, regardless of the spes recuperandi. This was 
constructive total loss, as there was always a requirement for a notice of abandonment, except 
where after a sale.  
                                                     
557 Arnould (17th ed, 2008), [24-17] 
558 [2011], [55] 
559 (17th edn, 2008), [28-03] 
560 Dawson’s Field (1972) 
561 (1816) 5 M&S 446 
100 
 
 
The contemporary summary in Arnould, however, applies to actual total losses. Arguably, the 
consideration is incomplete, as it should additionally be recorded that capture always 
permitted an insured to recover for constructive total losses. That, however, is not how the 
pre-1906 law is recalled in later cases, and the change was arguably due to: (i) conflating 
statements on whether a notice of abandonment was necessary with the test of whether a loss 
had occurred, (ii) from errors citing the earlier law; and (iii) pleading without reference to a 
presumption of total loss at all. Accordingly, authority from Goss in 1758 to the Romulus in 
1908 clearly applied a presumption of total loss arising on subsisting loss of possession. If the 
ship remained captured on the date of the action, where abandonment was given promptly, 
there was a total loss. The right was equally recognised in American laws.562 While never 
stated as a ‘presumption’ of total loss, it is clear this was how it, in effect, operated. In essence, 
while the capture or seizure lasted, the spes was not tested.   
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5 PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS ON ARREST, RESTRAINT AND DETENTION 
 
 
The underlying definitions of arrest, detention, and restraint of princes were settled to the 
extent these included circumstances where property was taken by state authority where it 
might be returned eventually to the insured, or alternatively the insured would be compensated 
for confiscation by the state authority (Chapter 2, ante). At the moment of loss of possession, 
such circumstances could seldom be described with certainty as irretrievable loss, and might 
not satisfy a test even of unlikelihood of recovery. During these perils, title was retained, 
though ‘free use and disposal’ would be lost. Was, as suggested in Polurrian, a test of 
‘unlikelihood’ applied to these perils before the 1906 Act? Arguably, a presumption of total 
loss arose on ‘capture’ and ‘seizure’ that was recognised by Emerigon, and applied in English 
law until the 1906 Act. Arguably, a similar presumption also operated on arrest, restraint and 
detention. This appeared in early treatises and academic commentary. However, its 
application in England became haphazard, and significantly restricted after the 1906 Act.  
 
5.1 Presumption stated by treatise writers 
 
From an early date French law recognised that an interruption by an arrest justified 
abandonment. Emerigon provided that since that commercial ventures required certainty not 
delay: 
“The Ordonnance desiring… to reconcile the public interest with that of individuals, 
allows those whose vessels are arrested by the order of a sovereign to make in certain 
cases, and after the lapse of certain periods, ruled by the distance of places, 
abandonment to their insurers”.563 
 
Emerigon provided that both ‘capture’ and ‘arrest of princes’ equally justified the insured 
giving abandonment.  No test of ‘uncertainty’ or ‘wait-and-see’ as to return of the property 
was recorded by him, or stated to be an appropriate test on either peril. The insured had only 
to show the fact of loss of ‘domain’ or free use and disposal for the fixed period to make the 
claim. The explanation for this presumption, even on simple ‘arrest’ was “that for the 
merchant the property tied up and uncertain is often considered as if it no longer existed”.564 
 
Unlike capture, where claims could be made instantly, Emerigon stated that on some perils, 
such as arrest of princes, French law permitted abandonment only after a passage of ‘a certain 
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time’ without restoration.565 This period of time was fixed, giving certainty to otherwise 
unpredictable circumstances:  
“The delays of six months or of a year, established by Art 49 in the case of arrest of 
princes, and extended to the case of innavigability by the Declaration of 1779, are a 
kind of grace accorded to the insurers, who my renounce it”.566 
 
Where English law was silent on an issue, Emerigon’s exposition of French law might provide 
persuasive authority and a ‘certain time’ rule might apply. Yet Emerigon stated that in 
England, a presumption of loss applied, allowing abandonment to be made instantly in such 
circumstances of loss of possession. Likewise, later English academic works documented that 
this prima facie right to abandon arose on arrest, detention or embargo. This was comparable 
to that presumption arising on capture or seizure; and consequently arising on any peril 
amounting to the loss of the free disposal of the specie. Marshall later endorsed Emerigon’s 
approval of this English rule over the French, by quoting Emerigon directly: 
“In England, the rule is more just… from the moment of a capture or arrest, the owners 
are considered as having lost their power over the ship and cargo and are deprived of 
the free disposal of them; because, in the opinion of the merchant, his right of disposal 
being suspended or rendered uncertain, it is equivalent to total deprivation; it is 
therefore unreasonable to oblige the insured to wait the event of a capture, detention, 
or embargo”.567 
 
In Peele, the leading case on stranding in American and English laws, Storey J noted the prima 
facie presumption of total loss applied as much to restraints or detentions, as to embargoes, 
blockades and arrests. He made no reference to the duration such a restraint had to exceed 
before a total loss claim became justified. Unlike French law: 
“The right of abandonment has been admitted to exist …where there is a moral 
restraint or detention, which deprives the owner of the free use of the ship, as in case 
of embargoes, blockades, and arrests by sovereign authority…”568 
 
Following English law, he made no reference to the degree of unlikelihood of restoration, or 
of the time loss of possession had to have lasted or be expected to last, before a claim could 
be made. Instead, the right to abandon arose at once. Arnould cited Peele to explain arrest or 
embargo, stating: 
“There is a right of abandonment in all cases where the is an apparent probability that 
the owner’s loss of the free use and disposal of his ship, once total, by the arrest or 
embargo may be of long, or, at all events, of very uncertain continuance”.569  
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Innovatively, this stated that subsisting arrest or embargo might not allow insureds to abandon 
instantly, but required an additional element to be satisfied – the apparent probability that the 
arrest might be long or unpredictable. Given that no judicial authority supported this, 
Arnould’s innovation was questionable. Further, the ‘long time’ necessary was undefined; 
ultimately permitting the ‘bidding’ between counsel in The Bamburi that one year would 
suffice. It did not introduce a requirement to ‘wait-and-see’ what the result would be, although 
such an approach is consistent with the spirit of that ‘long and unpredictable’ test, although 
such was unsupported by pre-Act authority.  
 
Rather, Arnould’s alternative consideration of embargo mirrored the settled presumption of 
total loss on capture. This did not refer to any test of uncertainty of restitution, either at all, or 
simply as to time:  
“An embargo laid by a foreign government on the ships or goods of any other than its 
own subjects, entitles the assured at once to give notice of abandonment, and, if the 
embargo continues down to the time of action brought, to recover as for a total loss”.570 
 
Arnould endorsed a presumption of loss on embargo that continued to the time the 
proceedings were issued, and a right to abandon at once. This was an identical approach to 
that on capture, notwithstanding any difference in captor’s intention. For example: 
“…where a neutral ship and stores were insured “at and from” an enemy’s port, and 
there detained, before sailing, by an embargo laid on by the enemy, in the port of 
loading, and continuing down to the time of action brought, it was held that the assured 
might recover as for a total loss, in our courts, in respect of the ship and stores of which 
he had been so deprived, under a count alleging the loss to be by “arrest and restraint 
of princes”.571 
 
Evidently, the presumption supporting an instant right of abandonment stated by Emerigon 
was repeated in academic works. Arnould explained that arrest and capture were distinguished 
by the intention of the party taking the property. Yet, importantly, notwithstanding any such 
intention being absent, there was no guarantee on arrest that property would be restored. 
Foreseeably, on arrest, the value in money, not the property, might be returned. There might 
be an eventual sale or confiscation. Why would sale and compensation after arrest differ from 
adjudication or sale by order of a prize court following capture or seizure?   
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How was this right applied in decisions on situations of embargo, arrest and detention? The 
presumption that a total loss arose on ‘arrest restraint or embargo’ is illustrated in the 
following factual classes of loss of possession: 
i. Where arrest resembled capture; 
ii. Embargoes on vessel in port; 
iii. Detention without direct application of force. 
 
The presumption did not, however, apply to: 
iv. Embargoes on destination ports; 
v. Condemnation following arrest or detention. 
 
5.2  Application 
 
i. Where arrest resembled capture 
Early authorities defined certain arrests and detentions as closely resembling capture. These 
permitted the insured to abandon at once. In Fowler and another v The English and Scottish 
Marine Insurance Company (the Ernest Jacob),572 by a valued policy on a Prussian vessel and 
cargo from Riga to London, the insurers agreed to pay for a total loss thirty days after receipt 
of official news of capture or embargo, without waiting for condemnation. The vessel was 
held under embargo from 3 February 1864 in a Danish port when war was declared between 
Prussia and Denmark, and released on 17 March after which she was restored to the assured. 
News of the embargo reached the insured on 4 February. Notice of abandonment was given 
on 5 February. Earl CJ held that the insured might recover. He noted the policy term. However, 
he noted that this was not a temporary embargo, but one in war having a permanent character. 
Byles and Montague Smith JJ concurred, finding that the term was to protect the assured. Its 
meaning would be clearer had it merely stated that the insured could recover after 30 days. 
Interestingly, here was recovery for a total loss where the property had been restored at the 
time of the action. 
 
Clarifying situations of improper arrest, while further confirming the presumption of total loss 
for capture, Marshall expanded: 
 
“…if a neutral ship be arrested at sea, and carried into a port belonging to one of the 
belligerent powers, under pretence that she belongs to the enemy, or that she is laden 
with enemy’s goods; this must be considered as a capture, because it is done as an act 
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of hostility, and the ship’s being afterwards restored, will not change that which was 
originally a capture into a detention of princes”.573 
 
An attempt to condemn property fell within the rules applying to ‘capture’. This statement 
conflicts with an understanding that attempted condemnation was ‘detention’ to which ‘wait-
and-see’ applied pending the outcome of prize adjudication. Arnould likewise provided 
situations where simple detention was treated as capture; there was a prima facie right to 
abandon, where a neutral ship was arrested by a belligerent cruiser, in order to search for and 
condemn enemy cargo, whether or not such was on board.574  
 
However, this rule was not uniform. Confusingly for insureds, some ‘captures’ were treated 
as detention only, and gave no ground for abandonment. In the underlying French exposition 
there was a distinction between hull and cargo interests. Marshall repeated a case given by 
Roccus where a Genoese ship laden with corn was seized by Venetian vessels. The cargo was 
compulsorily purchased. The insurers’ successful defence was that this was not a ‘capture’ of 
the vessel, but a detention of princes from public necessity: “Diversia facta fuit, non ad 
capiendam navium, se dob publicam utilitatem grani consequendi causa. Licuit frumenta 
accipere, soluto pretio – this was held to be a good defence”.575 Accordingly, where captors 
intended to take cargo (which would be deemed lost at once, as in Stringer), there might be 
no loss of the vessel. This rule later conflicted with the Lady Mansfield),576 and definitions 
elsewhere in Marshall, unless a fine distinction – nowhere advocated in court – existed 
separating cases where there was an intention to seize enemy cargoes without payment, and 
an intention to compulsorily purchase cargoes. Nevertheless, English authorities established 
a variety of cases where arrest appeared akin to capture, granting an instant right of 
abandonment. It is difficult to reconcile general rules in the Lady Mansfield with the 
developing distinction between ship and cargo.  
 
In Murray et alia v The United Insurance Company577 plaintiff cargo-owners abandoned to 
their insurer after learning their brig had been captured. Kent J, following Mumford v Church, 
confirmed “The general rule is that the insured has a right to abandon immediately upon 
hearing of a detention, and his claim to indemnity is not suspended by the chance of a future 
recovery, because, by the abandonment, that chance devolves upon the insurer”. This applied 
widely, to ‘all cases of foreign detention’, from ‘necessity’, ‘embargo’, or ‘for the purpose of 
a judicial inquiry’. The interruption to the voyage was the paramount consideration. He 
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confirmed that “English law does not require a delay, in imitation of some foreign rules. The 
activity of trade rather demands decision and certainty, and that the capital and business of 
the merchant should not be kept in suspense”. Accordingly, early authority indicated that 
because of the uncertainty, a right to abandon existed in a wide variety of circumstances. As 
on capture, uncertainty was unpleaded and untested; the peril itself established a prima facie 
presumption of loss. In American works, there was little 20th century commentary. A right to 
abandonment was doubted on a hull policy, the hull surviving in specie, but the right existed 
in “proper cases”, citing Rhinelander. In practice, this would be prevented by a FC&S 
clause.578 Consequently, there is little authority restricting the right to abandon supporting 
such restrictive statements in commentary.  
 
ii. Embargo on vessel in port 
English authorities 
 
Early authorities considered obiter whether embargoes caused total losses at once, but were 
indecisive. In Robertson v Ewer579 it was not doubted there could be total loss from embargo, 
but it was decided only the hull policy did not cover seamen’s wages or wastage of provisions, 
and the effect of abandonment was unresolved. In Bond v Nutt,580 it was not that the embargo 
only lasted eight days that prevented the insured from claiming on embargo, but that no 
abandonment was made during the embargo, and the total loss resulted from subsequent 
capture. Nevertheless, it strongly suggested that prompt abandonment could have justified 
total loss. In Rotch v Edie,581 where a French embargo on vessels in their loading port lasted 
perhaps three years, the insured recovered for total loss. The authority for recovery on 
embargo was held to be Goss v Withers. Although more specific situations of embargo were 
raised in argument these formed no part of the judgment.  
 
A clear application of the right to abandon during embargo as authority distinct from Goss 
emerged in Barker v Blakes582 where the policy covered an American cargo of oil laden on an 
American vessel. The vessel was detained on 17 August under British embargo. The 
Admiralty court ordered the oil to be restored on 8 October, but from 6 September the 
destination port had come under a blockade. The insured abandoned on 14 October. It was 
held the detention and embargo amounted to a total loss of the voyage. However, the insured 
could not recover as their abandonment was made out of time. It had been argued by the 
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insurer: “…where the voyage is lost, but the property is saved, the owner must abandon, if at 
all, in the first instance; and cannot wait to see whether he can prosecute the voyage to 
advantage…” This was accepted. Nevertheless, it was clear that interruption to the voyage by 
detention justified a total loss claim with timely abandonment. It was unclear however, 
whether this was put as a deemed loss of the property during the embargo, or a deemed loss 
of the voyage only. The requirement that the insured give notice at once aided certainty. 
However, fairness must require reciprocal speed by the insurer, as it appears comparatively 
unjust to allow the insurer time to let the situation develop before payment where this is denied 
to the insured. 
 
Few other early English authorities concerned circumstances where an insured vessel was 
inside a blockaded port, or a port under an embargo, and accordingly American authorities 
help clarify the law. It was noted in 1873 that: “There are few English cases to be found of 
English goods blockaded in a foreign port, but there are several cases where the question has 
arisen as to goods which were prevented by a blockade from getting in”.583 Arguably, albeit 
evidence for this situation is necessarily in the negative, much as there were few reported 
decisions on capture simpliciter, the rule that such situations justified a total loss provided a 
clear, workable rule that discouraged litigation.  
 
 
American authorities 
 
American authorities clarified that embargo justified instant abandonment, regardless of any 
existing chance of release, and when that release might occur: “If, after the voyage is 
commenced, the vessel is stopped and detained in consequence of an embargo laid by the 
government of the United States, whether for a limited or indefinite period, the insured may 
abandon for a total loss”.584 Academic texts confirmed this, Sherman stating simply that in 
American law: “An embargo or detention by a foreign friendly power constitutes a total loss, 
and warrants an immediate abandonment”.585 No test of the likely length of detention 
appeared. These rules were applied in Symonds v The Union Insurance Company,586 where 
policies covered vessel and cargoes ‘at and from New-York to Cape Francois with liberty to 
proceed to another port, should Cape Francois be blockaded, and the vessel prevented 
entering that port, from that, or any other, cause, and at and from thence back to New-York.' 
                                                     
583 (1873) LR 8 CP 649 
584 McBride v The Marine Ins Co 5 Johns Rep 299; Walde v the Phoenix Ins Co, 5 Johns Rep 310; Ogden v The 
New-York Firemen Ins Co 10 Johns Rep 177, 12 Johns Rep 25; Sherman, Marine Insurance (1841, New York), 
10 
585 Sherman (1841), 220 
586 4 US 417 (1806), 4 US 417 (Dall) 
108 
 
The policy provided further 'that the assured is not to abandon, if she cannot enter the Cape 
from blockade or other cause, but liberty is given to proceed to some other port'. The master, 
proceeding for Cape Francois, was informed by a British vessel of a blockade of St Domingo. 
The vessel was ordered to sail with an English frigate, and escorted to Kingston, where the 
cargoes were unloaded and sold at a low price. The insured claimed on his cargo policies for 
total loss, arguing that the voyage insured was destroyed by the superior force of a foreign 
power, and that, independent of the means taken to prevent a breach of the blockade, the vessel 
had been constrained, against the express desire of the captain, to proceed to a particular port, 
in exclusion of every other. The defence was that there was no direct application of force by 
an enemy or by the embargo; the only loss was an economic loss caused by the lower market 
at Kingston. The insured was permitted to recover. Arguably, a clear rule that embargo – 
without further facts - justified total loss was emerging. A test of unlikelihood of recovery 
within a reasonable time was conspicuously absent.  
 
iii. Detention without direct application of force 
Overlapping with situations of embargo, but also encompassing blockade or arrests, in some 
circumstances, detentions restricted the insureds’ free use and disposal of their property, 
without direct application of force. Where force was not used, arguments arose that such 
detention and embargo was not covered by the policy. Generally, in early authorities, a total 
loss was permitted. This was because suspension of ‘free use and disposal’ was usually 
considered a loss of property, although the authorities conflicted on whether ‘possession’ was 
additionally lost. Do such situations give a right to abandon at once? Arguably they did, 
although this test has changed significantly after the 1906 Act. 
 
Early authorities 
 
In the United States, there was some early uncertainty whether blockade was an insured peril. 
In Olivera v Union Insurance Company587 it was observed that Barker v Blakes established 
that blockade had constituted a total loss by the detention of the vessel, but that abandonment 
had not been made in a reasonable time after notice of the loss. Given that finding, it was 
doubted whether the blockade was itself an insured peril had been definitively decided. 
Decisions from New York and Massachusetts conflicted on whether blockade caused a total 
loss; therefore the matter was not then settled in America. Accordingly, reference was made 
to English authorities, which provided: “An embargo is admitted to be a peril within the 
policy. But as has been already observed, the sovereign imposing the embargo is virtually in 
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possession of the vessel, and may therefore be said to arrest and detain her”.588 Although the 
vessel remained in the actual possession of the master/owner, there was effectively a direct 
application of force on the vessel. The danger of violating an embargo and running a blockade 
were comparable. Consequently “if the word "restraint" does not necessarily imply possession 
of the thing by the restraining power, it must be construed to comprehend the forcible 
confinement of a vessel in port and the forcible prevention of her proceeding on her voyage. 
If so, the blockade is in such a case a peril within the policy”.589 Accordingly, American 
authority established at an early date that a vessel blockaded in port justified abandonment to 
insurers. 
 
Forcible confinement, alternatively ‘loss of free use and disposal’, afforded a right to abandon 
at once: 
“A vessel in a port which becomes blockaded after the commencement of her voyage, 
prevented thereby from proceeding thereon, sustains a loss by a peril within that clause 
in the policy which insures against arrests, restraints, and detainments &c., for which 
the underwriters are liable. And if the vessel so prevented is a neutral, and has on 
board a neutral cargo, which was laden before the blockade was instituted, the 
restraint is unlawful”.590 
Olivera was confirmed in England in Rodocanachi and others v Elliott, where the court 
expressly approved the US Supreme Court’s decision, and endorsed that “the inhabitants of a 
besieged town or the ships in a blockaded port may be properly said to be "restrained" from 
coming out by the action of the besieging army or the blockading force”.591 Accordingly, it 
might be thought that Olivera provided a persuasive precedent for how the ‘warehouse’ cases 
of detention should have been decided, ie contra the results in Moore v Evans592 and Mitsui v 
Mumford.593 Indeed, the principles were followed in the leading English pre-1906 example of 
loss of free use and disposal, Rodocanachi and others v Elliott.594 Although the insured cargo 
was not seised, it was prevented from being forwarded to its destination by the German army’s 
blockade of the cargo in Paris. The policy insured against ‘arrests, restraints, detainments of 
all kings, princes and people”. The policy was endorsed to provide that goods were to be 
shipped by steamers of three specified shipowner companies only. The consignment arrived 
in Paris on 13 September 1870. By that date, the Prussian army had seized sections of railway 
where transit had been contemplated, and subsequently surrounded the city. The situation 
remained unchanged at 7 October, when the insured abandoned. The court found total loss by 
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restraint, despite the lack either of actual seizure or arrest of the goods, or a specific order 
prohibiting the transport of goods from the city, because “…the city in which the goods were 
besieged and completely invested, all commerce was stopped, and the goods were as 
effectually prevented from coming out as if they were actually seized by the German army”.595  
 
This was treated as a ‘detention’ not capture. The principal reason for the distinction between 
that and ‘capture’ was that the insured’s agents remained in control of the cargo at all time (cf 
the treatment of restrained vessels in The Bamburi596). Nevertheless, a total loss was found, 
where there had been no intention on behalf of the German army to capture and take the goods. 
Further, there was no consideration given to the amount of time the loss would continue. The 
French rule that detention had to last six months was clearly considered, since it was observed 
that positive regulations in different countries fixed a precise time before the insured could 
abandon. Fixing a precise time proved the general principle that the circumstance gave a right 
to claim total loss. Further Rotch v Edie was an authority to the same effect. There was no 
fixed time in English law for the giving of notice but it must be within a reasonable time, 
regard being had to the nature and circumstances of each case. Subject to that, and there being 
a "restraint of princes," the assured had a right to abandon his goods to his underwriters.597 
 
Importantly, in distinction to French law, the right arose at once; there was no wait-and-see.  
Detentions may result in no loss to the insured, where they end and allow property to be 
restored. Marshall v Delaware Insurance Company598 further considered a situation novel to 
English law, namely what would happen if the foreign appellate prize court restored the vessel 
before the action. It was established that a final decree of restoration, from which there was 
no appeal, would undo the total loss, as further delay in restitution of property could not be 
foreseen. As on capture, the correct approach appeared to be to question whether the detention 
subsisted at the date of the action. 
 
Detentions; embargo, infringement of customs and revenue laws 
 
Governments have the power to stop and search vessels, and this would clearly be temporary 
detention only, unless there were grounds for condemnation or capture. Marshall confirmed 
that these temporary detentions justified abandonment. In Saloucci v Johnson, after the master 
refused the submit to search by the Spanish navy, a vessel was arrested and taken to Spain for 
that resistance, the insured recovered on his policy for ‘improper detention’:  
 
                                                     
595 ibid, 522 (Bramwell B) 
596 [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 312 
597 (1873) LR 8 CP 649, 667 
598 (1808) 8 US 4 Cranch 202 
111 
 
“And though it has since been determined, both in the court of King’s Bench and the 
court of admiralty, that resisting a search is a lawful cause of capture and confiscation 
yet the above case of Saloucci v Johnson, may nevertheless, I conceive, be considered 
as an authority to prove that if a neutral ship be unlawfully arrested and detained by a 
belligerence cruiser for any pretended offence against the law of nations, this would 
be a detention of princes”.599 
 
These must be total losses, for partial losses during a stop-and-search would be easily 
characterised as for ‘delay’. Actual infringement of customs regulations was an even stronger 
ground for recovery. It was considered in Roche v Thompson that: “where a vessel arriving in 
a hostile port with simulated papers had her papers immediately taken and her hatches sealed 
down by the officers of government, although she was not formally condemned until 
afterwards, it was held that she had not been moored in safety for twenty-four hours, because 
she was in effect within the twenty-four hours taken from her owners by the foreign 
government”.600 Roche would additionally have justified a total loss for seizure. In Roche, 
there was no suggestion that total loss did not occur on seizure for breach of customs 
regulations, although if the breach of customs regulations led to her seizure after 24 hours’ 
undisturbed possession, the seizure occurred after the termination of the risk.601 It was argued 
in Lidgett that in Roche602 there had been no submission that detention in port under French 
embargo (during time of war) would not allow recovery for total loss: the case was decided 
on the ground that the policy had ended after the vessel was twenty four hours in safety. 
Parsons noted Roche being an example of a total loss occurring after termination of the risk.603  
 
In Miller v Accident Insurance Company (“The Bellevue”)604 an infringement of customs laws 
resulting in a detention in a port was held a ‘restraint of princes’. This restraint justified a total 
loss. The prior authorities of Cory v Burr, Robinson Gold Mining Co v Alliance Insurance 
Co605 and Rodocanachi v Elliott were approved, in that where the master “…of his own accord, 
or in obedience to the orders of the officers of the Queen, abstains from entering a blockaded 
port, the causa proxima is not the blockade, but the voluntary act of the master”.606 However, 
ships or goods within a blockaded port fell within ‘restraint’. In the circumstances the master 
had not acted voluntarily. If, when about to enter the destination port, the master had been 
informed of the customs law restricting landing of the cattle, and decide to go to another port, 
the case would be like Hadkinson v Robertson, and there would have been a voluntarily 
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abandonment. However, in this case, the master had gone as far as he could towards the 
completion of the venture, and desisted when the Government actually intervened. That rule 
was considered to accord with charterparty frustration, where the charter became impossible 
by “blockade which rendered access to a port commercially impracticable”.607 Critically, ‘the 
Bellevue’ had entered the port, albeit she was stopped before reaching her destination birth. 
She went as far as was possible to her destination, so this could be distinguished from 
anticipatory abandonment of the voyage, before the port was entered. This distinction, 
essentially an issue of fact, appears unworkably narrow. It provides a less certain rule than a 
presumption of impossibility of continuing the voyage, and a prudent master, attempting to 
minimise losses for all concerned, may result in the insured not recovering for a total loss, 
where a less prudent master entering the port, might allow for the full recovery.. 
  
iv. Embargo on destination port; loss of the voyage 
Whether an embargo or blockade on the destination port while the vessel is at sea causes a 
total loss of the voyage is considered more fully in the following chapter. It is settled that such 
circumstances never amount to a deemed loss of the property. In Hadkinson v Robinson,608 
there was no loss where the master of the vessel, on learning that the destination port was 
closed to English shipping by an embargo, diverted to a safe port. Likewise, in Forster and 
Others against Christie,609 there was no loss within the policy where a Royal Navy vessel 
ordered the insured vessel to abandon the intended voyage, as there was a Russian embargo 
on British vessels at the destination port. In both cases, this was abandoning the voyage to 
avoid the risk, which was the remote cause of the loss. The facts necessary to constitute the 
direct application of an embargo to the specie really means entry to the embargoed port, even 
if the actual arrest of the vessel in port occurs the day after arrival.610 In Butler v Wildman,611 
the master believed the vessel’s capture was inevitable; he threw a quantity of dollars 
overboard to prevent their capture. It was held that the loss was caused by capture. Where it 
was inevitable that the vessel would be subject to an embargo, if the voyage were further 
prosecuted, there might be a total loss, but this would be a potential loss of the voyage only, 
and it would not be considered to be a loss of the specie. 
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In British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co v Sanday & Co612 it was argued that a ‘restraint 
of princes’ only operated where force was used, not where action was taken to avoid the 
physical restraint. In the House of Lords, Earl Loreburn held, in relation to whether the 
declaration of war was a ‘restraint of princes’, that he dismissed the argument that force was 
neither exerted nor present. Force was held in reserve behind every state command. It would 
be a strange law that deprived the assured of his indemnity on the ground that he had not 
resisted until force was actually used, an order which he was duty bound to obey.613 
 
In Sanday, where the issue concerned supervening illegality, it was confirmed that an insured 
could abandon where the voyage was abandoned, before there was any physical restraint. The 
court drew a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate force, which conflicts with 
general definitions of the peril, in that “If it were an order which he was not bound to obey, 
and which he might have successfully resisted either by violence or by process of law, a 
question might arise whether or not there had been in fact a restraint. But that is outside the 
present case, and I say nothing of it”.614 Nevertheless, he held that owners were bound to obey 
the orders of their own sovereign, and that the declaration of war did result in an interruption 
of the voyage by a restraint, in that the declaration created a state of war, which in turn created 
a prohibition from trading with the enemy. In applying the doctrine of proxima causa, he 
considered whether “the interruption directly come from the declaration or from the law 
which it awakened? In a sense it came from both, but we must choose which was the proximate 
cause, for one is the subject of insurance and the other is not”.615 Finally, Furness, Withy & 
Co v Rederiakt Banco616 confirmed that the threat of force need not be immediate. There, the 
Swedish government prevented a Swiss vessel from trading at certain ports. That the master 
was then outside the jurisdiction of Sweden did not matter, as the government could at some 
time have enforced the restraint on the persons having custody of the ship. While the 
distinction might seem fine to insureds, it is clearly established that illegality was 
distinguished from embargo. 
 
v. Condemnation following Arrest or Detention 
In capture cases, sale following capture arguably ought to permit a claim for an actual total 
loss (Chapter 8.1, below). Does the same principle apply to arrest or detention? Contrastingly 
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to Le Cann,617 that sale following ‘restraint’ or ‘detention’ is a novus actus interveniens;618 
authorities on ‘detention’ and ‘embargo’ appear unpersuasive guides on capture situations.  
For example, in Fooks v Smith, where the peril was ‘restraint of princes’: 
“The total loss was due, not to the fact that the voyage had been frustrated but to an 
entirely independent act of the Austrian Government, not at all sufficiently related to 
the original peril, the restraint of princes”.619  
 
Accordingly, this broke the chain of causation. The Austrian government had desired to 
protect Austrian ships from danger on the high seas of destruction or capture. However, the 
ultimate seizure and capture was held not to flow from this restraint. It was held instead that 
the seizure and sale were a nova causa superveniens, and not the necessary and direct result 
of the restraint of princes.620 This appears to contrast to Stringer, where there was a right to 
recover without a notice of abandonment, indicating an actual total loss. Fooks creates a 
potential injustice: if combined with a test of uncertainty, the claim would not be successful 
at first. If followed by sale, the consequence might be too remote from the seizure. If wait-
and-see was adopted, there might be a finding that abandonment was out of time.  
 
5.3 Express Terms 
 
A variety of terms expressly cover losses by loss of possession, partly as a result of the lack of 
clarity from the 20th century cases. For example, the Institute War and Strikes Clauses, 
Detainment Clause 3 provides: 
 
‘In the event that the vessel shall have been the subject of capture, seizure, arrest, 
restraint, detainment, confiscation or expropriation, and the Assured shall thereby 
have lost the free use and disposal of the vessel for a continuous period of 12 months, 
then for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel is a constructive total loss the 
Assured shall have been deemed to have been deprived of the possession of the vessel 
without any likelihood of recovery’. 
 
In Sunport Shipping Ltd and others v Tryg-Baltica International (UK) Ltd and others,621 the 
insured vessel was detained under Greek law following the discovery of cocaine. She was 
detained long enough to be deemed a constructive total loss under the terms of the policy (the 
decision turned on a separate point – whether there was an exclusion of cover for detention 
relating to customs laws). The relevant clause in the policy, cl 3, stated that detention beyond 
six months meant that the insured ‘shall be deemed to have been deprived of the possession 
of the vessel without any likelihood of recovery’. Although the case was pleaded and 
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considered on the basis of a constructive total loss, the presumption established by the 
detainment clause is arguably sufficient to allege an actual total loss. On first appeal, it was 
observed obiter that the detention was not avowedly of a short period, so that it would 
inevitably be released.  
 
5.4 Presumptions on Restraint, Detention and Embargo before 1906 
 
Clearly, authorities indicated total loss might accrue from the moment perils of restraint, 
detention and embargo occurred without investigation of future events. These each permitted 
a right to abandon at once, save in two situations: (i) where premature action was taken to 
avoid the peril; and (ii) where there was attempt to confiscate the cargo only, rather than the 
vessel, the hull might not be held lost.  
 
Marhsall confirmed Emerigon in that on detention, restraint or embargo, there was a right to 
recover at once for total loss, on the basis that the law merchant viewed a right of disposal 
that was suspended or rendered uncertain as equivalent to total deprivation.622 The 
presumption applied in a like manner to that on capture; English law permitted an instant right 
to abandon. The right was recognized, as forming part of the test of losses, in Peele by Storey 
J, and American laws confirmed that an insured could abandon at any time during the 
continuance of a detention, as in Livingstone v Marl Ins Co.623 Later, it was confirmed in 
Arnould.624 
 
While the word “uncertainty” was used, it would nevertheless be a mistake to treat this as 
incorporating a test of whether the return of the specie was ‘uncertain’. To do so would be to 
ignore that the right existed if free disposal was ‘suspended’. The factual tests in the cases 
considered above suggest that the ‘suspension’ was the right actually tested judicially. 
 
Frequently, ‘arrest’ was treated as ‘capture’ so that the same presumption of total loss applied 
to these circumstances,625 and this was recognised academically.626 A like rule applied in 
America.627 Abandonment made while embargo continued was good, and there was no 
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investigation into the length of any embargo in England,628 or in America.629 Blockade, 
without actual seizure, justified abandonment. This was confirmed in Olivera v Union 
Insurance Co, where property in a besieged town, where not actually confiscated, was 
properly treated as ‘restrained’ or ‘detained’ by the application of force.630 This was followed 
in Rodocanachi and others v Elliott,631 where such events established ‘detention’. Further, 
total loss arose at once for detention/seizure on infringement of customs regulations.632 
Perhaps because these losses on restraint or detention were better characterised as losses of 
the voyage, rather than deemed losses of the subject matter, the presumption was not as well 
articulated. Difficulties arose where embargo was imposed on a destination port – this might 
lead to loss of voyage, but not the physical specie. Finally, it gave greater scope for a test of 
‘uncertainty’ to evolve. “Uncertainty” was a word introduced into discussions of these 
situations, although arguably no test of ‘uncertainty’ was applied in court until after the 1906 
Act.  
 
Equally, in America, Arnould’s statement was approved in that where a vessel is detained, but 
absent any specific intention to detain the cargo on board, that detention nevertheless 
constituted a detention of the cargo. Despite the lack of intention, the effect is the same for 
the insured, so the situations should not be and were not distinguished.633 Further, Northern 
Feather International v London Underwriters subscribing to the Policy No JWP108 through 
Wigham Poland Ltd634 held that lawful detention by civil authorities constituted ‘detainment’, 
and this fell within ‘seizure’ for the meaning of the FC&S clause. There, Resin Coatings Corp 
v Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York635 was applied, where detainment by Arabian 
customs officials of goods where papers had not been forwarded was a ‘seizure’ within the 
FCS clause. There was no discussion in either case whether there was any detention to 
permanently deprive, and the issue does not appear relevant for total losses in the American 
courts. 
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5.5 Whether Generalising test undermined presumption  
 
What evidence was there for any test of ‘uncertainty’ before 1906? Tests reconsidering the 
spes evolved gradually after Goss. Ellenborough CJ innovatively suggested that the court 
assess future chances in the Confiance, ‘… there is not any case nor principle which 
authorises an abandonment, unless where the loss has been actually a total loss, or in the 
highest degree probable, at the time of abandonment’.636 The words ‘in the highest degree 
probable’ indicated that an insured might anticipate total loss. This dictum was widely copied 
in textbooks, and entered New York law in Peele v Merchants Insurance Company (the 
Argonaut)637 where Storey J formulated a general test of constructive (“technical”) total loss. 
The Argonaut stranded and her owners abandoned her. Her destruction was considered so 
inevitable – ‘9 out of 10’ and ‘certain’ – that even her rigging was removed. Unexpectedly, 
the weather eased; underwriters re-floated and repaired her, and denied total loss. Storey 
observed that stranding presented a novel situation in insurance. Consequently, he formulated 
a general test of total loss applicable to novel situations.  
 
Having considered the capture cases and restated Ellenborough’s dictum,638 he formulated 
three tests justifying a total loss where that loss is prospective; ‘the highest degree probable’, 
‘the high probability’ that the loss will be total, and ‘if the insured may’ pay too much for 
repairs after restoration.639 Applied to the novel situation of stranding, as on damage, the court 
would not presume total loss, but investigate the probability of the vessel being wrecked or 
re-floated. In his new general rule, intended to test novel situations, Storey J blurred the 
distinction between the different specific examples of total loss he had previously 
summarised: 
“If there be any general principle, …  the right to abandon exists, whenever …, the 
ship, for all the useful purposes of a ship for the voyage, is, for the present, gone from 
the control of the owner, and the time when she will be restored to him in a state to 
resume the voyage is uncertain, or unreasonably distant, or the risk and expense are 
disproportionate to the expected benefit and objects of the voyage. In such a case, the 
law deems the ship, though having a physical existence, as ceasing to exist for purposes 
of utility, and therefore subjects her to be treated as lost...”640 
Arnould adopted this as the paradigm definition of constructive total loss and it remained 
unchanged in the edition cited in Masefield.641 Storey J intended to apply existing law, not 
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change it. Applied to capture, his test conflated the established rule (immediate right of 
abandonment) with the justification for the rule (uncertainty of restitution). 
 
Peele established a rule on stranding, not capture, and policy considerations arising on these 
perils differed. No immediate right to abandon arose on stranding because master and crew 
retained possession and control. While uncertainty as to restoration in both situations existed, 
nevertheless on capture “the thing insured, and every part of it, is completely gone out of the 
power of the insured, it is just and proper that he should recover at once as for a total loss, 
and leave the spes recuperandi to the insurer who will have the benefit of a recapture, or of 
any other accident by which the thing may be recovered”.642 Despite not modifying the 
existing law, Storey’s test attracted significant academic attention during the nineteenth 
century to the exclusion, in textbooks, of the law applied in capture cases. Textbooks blurred 
the tests applicable to separate classes of factual situation. Arnould, citing Peele, explained 
the perils of arrest and/or embargo, not stranding or capture, there was a right of abandonment 
“in all cases where the is an apparent probability that the owner’s loss of the free use and 
disposal of his ship, once total, by the arrest or embargo may be of long, or, at all events, of 
very uncertain continuance”.643 Critically, in the ratio of Peele, there was nothing to dilute 
the established rule on capture. 
 
Later, Storey J’s general test for novel situations was expressed in textbooks as applicable to 
established situations. Arguably, established authorities on capture and seizure situations 
could not be changed by generalising tests stated in textbooks. By Kaltenbach v MacKenzie – 
a damage case – Brett LJ followed textbooks citing Peele rather than fact-specific judicial 
tests. His judgment suggested an assessment of the ‘chance’ of a loss being total: ‘Now, 
sometimes the information which he receives discloses at once the imminent danger of the 
subject-matter of insurance becoming and continuing a total loss; as, for instance, if he hears 
his ship is captured in time of war, it must be obvious to everybody, unless the ship is re-
captured, it would be a total loss’.644 Read in context at that date, it should not undermine the 
presumption of total loss. Nevertheless, a general test of ‘uncertainty’ in novel situations 
entered the literature in both England and America, and permitted the decision in Polurrian v 
Young. To the perils of loss of possession, no test of ‘uncertainty’ was ever applied. A final, 
overlooked, factor is that while Peele established a test of ‘uncertainty’ for novel situations, 
there was a second alternative, that recovery be ‘unreasonably distant’, and consideration of 
that test scarcely appears in subsequent discussion. Equally, it was never stated ‘unreasonably 
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distant’ displaced what appeared elsewhere to be a settled presumption, but instead provided 
an additional recognition of such a presumption where dispossession was deemed to be 
permanent.645 Consequently, as the House of Lords confirmed in 1898, the simple test for all 
perils of loss of possession was not only whether possession was lost, but also if in between 
notice of abandonment and the commencement of legal proceedings there was a change of 
circumstances reducing the loss from a total to a partial one, or, if at the time of action the 
circumstances are such that a notice of abandonment would not be justifiable, the assured 
could only recover for a partial loss.646 
 
Arguably, the test for all perils of loss of possession was identical. The first issue was whether 
there was a prima facie right to abandon. Secondly, if there was, the court looked only to the 
situation at the relevant time, being the action in England, or the notice of abandonment in 
America. From that critical time, future chances of recovery, on the specific perils of loss of 
possession, were not considered. The rules for perils of dispossession differed from the test 
applicable to standing, and over time, to shipwreck. On each peril causing loss of possession, 
while it lasted, there was a right to abandon and recover for total loss. Where free use and 
disposal was lost, but possession retained, as on stranding, there was no such right. Embargoes 
and detentions were generally treated as akin to losses of possession, and the presumption was 
stated to apply equally to them. Situations where the peril did not cause a loss of possession, 
did not engage the presumption.  
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6 LOSS OF THE VOYAGE  
 
In addition to covering the physical safety of the specie, voyage policies on hull or cargo cover 
the performance of contemplated voyages. Hull or cargo time policies ostensibly cover the 
property remaining safe for a time.647 Freight policies cover freight becoming payable either 
on the completion of a voyage, or the vessel remaining on hire. In Manning v Newnham, 
Mansfield considered issues of loss on a cargo voyage policy where the vessel was damaged 
by sea-perils and unnavigable, where no other vessels were then available to ship the cargo. 
It had been possible to ship a portion of the cargo on to the intended port and make a profit. 
Nevertheless, Mansfield held the adventure frustrated and consequently freight totally lost, 
explaining: 
 
“If the voyage in contemplation is lost, or is not worth pursuing, this is a total loss. 
Here the voyage in contemplation is of a large Dutch ship, loaded with sugar, at 
Surinam, to come from Tortola to London. … Here she is condemned as totally unfit to 
proceed; and there is no ship to be had. Must the insured wait?”648 
 
The court apparently tested the price of the goods at the time, and the court held that the 
insured should not have to wait until they were able forward the whole of the cargo: 
“We are therefore all of opinion that this is a total loss. It agrees with all the cases; 
and we are afraid much confusion will arise from too great nicety in examining what 
is a total loss of a voyage”.649 
 
Although clear definitions of what constitutes loss of the voyage are hard to identify, cover 
for the voyage remains in contemporary law. It is settled that, at least for goods policies, 
claims may be made either for ‘loss of goods or loss of adventure”.650 Contrastingly, it is no 
longer thought that insurances on hulls cover loss of the voyage in the same way, and the hull 
underwriter is ‘not liable in respect of loss of adventure”.651  
 
It was confirmed in Sanday, that where ‘the chance of arriving at the port of destination, and 
the consequent loss of the market appear to be unavoidable, there would be a constructive 
total loss of the subject-matter’.652 What extra dimension does this venture add to total loss 
claims on loss of possession? Why is the vessel treated differently? How does this cover for 
the voyage relate to the exclusion of losses for delay? In what circumstances might the loss 
of the voyage assist a claim for total loss on loss of possession? How does ‘loss of market’ 
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interact with the principle that insurance does not cover losses by delay, or by the rise and fall 
in the market? To address these issues, the following issues are considered: 
i. Loss of voyage in wagering policies; 
ii. Interruption to an ultimately completed voyage; 
iii. ‘Disappointment of arrival’; 
iv. Loss of the voyage on hull policies; 
v. Supervening Illegality; 
vi. Proximate Cause; voyage abandoned before peril engaged; 
vii. Total loss of freight. 
 
6.1 Loss of voyage in Wagering Policies 
 
The earliest reported English authorities concerned wagering policies, where the assured was 
not required to have an interest in the subject matter.653 These introduced the concept of ‘loss 
of the voyage’ in addition to the loss or destruction of the property as an integral part of marine 
insurance. In Dapaiba v Ludlow,654 the vessel was captured by a Swedish pirate. Nine days 
later she was retaken by an English vessel. Proceedings were issued while she was still at sea. 
Subsequently her recaptor took her into an English port. The court held the insurer liable for 
total loss. The interruption of the voyage was enough to allow the plaintiff to recover: 
‘…though the ship was here retaken, yet the plaintiff received a damage, for his voyage was 
interrupted ; and the question is not whether the plaintiff had his ship and did not lose his 
property, but what damage he sustained…’ Dapaba established that, for wagering policies, a 
loss occurred whenever the voyage was interrupted (surprisingly, Dapaba was later cited in 
Pole v Fitzgerald (the Goodfellow)655 for the opposite proposition). Assurances protected 
trade, not static property, and the ‘loss of the voyage’ expressed that aspect.  
 
Interruption of the voyage by detention was held a total loss of the venture. In Pond v King 
(the Salamander),656 the policy covered a cruise of three months on a privateer part owned by 
the plaintiff. She was captured by the French, subsequently recaptured, and taken to a port in 
neutral Spain. Lee CJ, in the King’s Bench, contrasting English law with civil law, said ‘the 
insurance is to be understood for the voyage for three months, and in common sense it cannot 
be otherwise; so whenever the voyage is broken or interrupted it is at an end. Safety during 
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the three months is what is meant, but it appears the ship was taken and detained within that 
time, and that the plaintiff was hindered in his cruise; and this, by our law, is a total loss…’. 
The owner did not pay salvage, which would have ensured the return of the vessel; the terms 
of the policy preventing the insured from making that payment. The Salamander confirmed 
Dapaba that the interruption of the voyage allowed the insured to recover the value stated in 
the policy, ie total loss. Similarly, in Dean v Dicker (The Dursley),657 the insured vessel was 
captured by a Spanish privateer, and kept for eight days in a Spanish port before being 
recaptured by an English vessel. Lord Lee CJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on 
the wager for a total loss.658 Likewise, in Whitehead v Bance,659 where the vessel was taken 
by a French privateer and carried into port for twelve days before being recaptured by an 
English ship and restored to the owner, who paid the salvage and sold the ship, the plaintiff 
established loss of the voyage, and recovered for total loss. Those four authorities record a 
rule on wagering policies: where the voyage was interrupted, there occurred a total loss of the 
voyage, regardless of whether property was restored. This test was separate from whether the 
property was, or might ever be, recovered or restored. 
 
The Goodfellow660 doubted that the insurance covered any aspect of the venture, and 
specifically doubted The Salamander. There, the crew’s barratry prevented the ship from 
leaving its home port to commence the voyage. Lord Willes CJ held that the loss of a voyage 
would not enable the insured to recover as for the loss of the vessel. He held that the notion 
of insurance ‘for a voyage’ was absurd, and would be a ‘double insurance’. Accordingly a 
policy insuring a voyage would be ‘illegal and unreasonable’. He had to distinguish the 
established contrary authority. He noted the policy in Pond prevented the insured from paying 
the salvage necessary to recover it – this meant that although she was back in England, the 
insured was not capable of recovering his property without forfeiting the policy. The 
Goodfellow distinguished Pond, on the basis the insured was entitled to possession. He stated 
Depaba held there was no insurance on the voyage, contra the surviving report. In the House 
of Lords, Lord Hardwick confirmed that the ‘cruze’ was not covered. The Goodfellow was 
cited in 1814661 as authority that a claim for total loss could not be established on a policy 
covering a ship where it was undamaged, though that has been doubted.662 
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Decisions on wagers conflicted over whether an interruption to an ultimately completed 
voyage by a peril depriving the insured of possession constituted loss of the wager. Dapaba, 
The Salamander, The Dursley and Whitehead supported the rule that such events constituted 
total loss. The Goodfellow provided that such interruption alone was not, and was supported 
by two authorities: (i) Spencer v Franco,663 where no report survives; and (ii) dicta in Kulen 
Kemp v Vigne.664 The Goodfellow conflicted with then established authorities providing for 
loss of voyage on a marine policy. Arguably it is too simplistic, since both lines of authority 
were later cited with approval in decisions on valued policies, to regard the House of Lords 
decision in Pole as settling the law.665 Realistically, their later treatment indicated the law was 
unsettled, and cover for the voyage survived. Marshall attempted to reconcile Dapaiba with 
Pole, suggesting Mansfield erred in treating the policy as a wager, and arguing that it was 
plain from the judgment that the court considered the plaintiff to have an interest in the ship.666 
This appears incompatible with the surviving report, and no commentary addressed 
adequately the problematic issue that the Goodfellow conflicted with the great majority of 
decisions supporting the existence of voyage cover, and in view of this must be open to doubt. 
 
Wagers remain significant for contemporary law because they introduced ‘loss of the voyage’ 
to English law. Regardless of whether loss of the voyage applied to hull policies, it was clear 
from Dapaba v Ludlow onwards that under wagering policies, if the voyage was interrupted 
by a peril of loss of possession, the voyage was deemed lost, and the insured amount was 
recoverable.  
 
6.2 Interruption to an ultimately completed voyage 
 
Statute banned wagering policies on public policy grounds667 in 1745.668 The law governing 
policies for interest diverged from that governing wagering policies. Mansfield observed 
because ‘the insured had no interest, so there could be no indemnity; and the only question 
was, whether the event had happened; and to determine this, it was necessary to set up 
something as making a total loss between third persons, though the ship was safe, in order to 
determine the question upon the wager’.669 Valued policies generally compensated insureds 
for the actual loss suffered, while wagering polices questioned whether, simply, the event had 
occurred so the premium was recoverable. Valued policies were contracts of indemnity, while 
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wagers were not, and consequently, in Goss Mansfield LCJ distinguished wagering from 
valued policies and clearly reached his decision on independent grounds. Did the law on 
valued policies follow wagering cases in finding total losses where the voyage was interrupted 
but ultimately completed? 
 
i. English authorities 
 
That there could be a loss of the voyage on a valued policy was confirmed in Goss and 
reinforced in Mitchell v Edie (the Lady Mansfield) where it was said, ‘A total loss is of two 
sorts: one, where in fact the whole of the property perishes; the other where the property 
exists, but the voyage is lost, or the expense of pursuing it exceeds the benefit arising from 
it’.670 While recognised in theory, this general statement was limited, principally by 
application of the test of proximate cause. What sort of interruptions demonstrated that the 
voyage was lost? On valued policies, blockade of the vessel inside port could frustrate the 
voyage. In Barker v Blakes (the Hannah)671 the voyage was restrained by a blockade. 
Ellenborough CJ held: 
 
“…first, that a loss of the voyage (the only description of loss which can be contended 
for in this case, as the goods themselves have been ordered to be restored, and are 
capable of being so,) was occasioned by the detention in question, which continued 
until and after the blockade took place, which rendered the prosecution of the voyage 
to Havre no longer practicable…”  
 
What consideration was there of the chance of the voyage eventually being completed? Early 
authorities considered the speed at which goods could be brought to the destination port 
relevant to the loss of the voyage on goods policies. In Goss, Mansfield LCJ noted that by the 
arrival, the ‘lent-season for the sale of fish was over’.672 In Manning v Newnham673 he said 
that an insured was not obliged to wait for a ship to carry insured cargo if the first ship was 
too damaged, so could claim for a total loss. Mansfield considered that insurance covered the 
particular voyage contemplated. Implicitly, late arrival caused by an insured peril constituted 
a loss of that voyage, justifying abandonment for a total loss. Of course, in Goss the fish had 
also rotted, but importantly, the court noted the limited season for the sale of fish at a higher 
value, which had passed. Accordingly, the particular voyage insured was understood by 
Mansfield LCJ to refer to the intended seasonal market. Missing this provided separate 
grounds for abandonment to the cargo’s deterioration.  
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The completion of the voyage had to be for the benefit of the insured. Where cargo was 
barratiously sold by the crew, and eventually was forwarded to the destination port, this was 
not a completion of the voyage for the benefit of the insured, and there was a total loss by the 
barratious act of seizure.674 Loss of possession appeared to be presumed a total loss of the 
voyage for the benefit of the insured. 
 
ii. American authorities 
 
Following English law, American authorities indicated that the voyage would be lost where 
further progression was impossible. If the voyage began, and further progression of the voyage 
by leaving an invested port would result in a capture, the assured could abandon for restraint 
of princes: “If, in the course of her voyage, a vessel puts into a port where she is permitted by 
the policy to stop, and while she is there the place is closely invested with cruisers of the 
enemy of the country to which she belongs, so that if she should attempt to escape she must 
inevitably be captured; this is a restraint of princes and of men-of-war, within the risks 
enumerated in the policy, and the insured may break up the voyage and abandon for a total 
loss, although there is no direct application of physical force to the subject. And an 
abandonment made under such circumstances, is not liable to the objection that it was made 
quia temet”.675 This confirmed situation of investiture or blockade, such as Moore v Evans 
should properly be understood as an insured peril. 
 
Interestingly, some American authorities suggested predicted profit, or regulatory capacity, 
not simply the physical possibility of the voyage continuing, to be relevant. Where after 
capture, the vessel was deprived of papers, recaptured, and restored upon payment of salvage: 
“…the insured was justified in breaking up the voyage, and that there was a total loss by 
capture, inasmuch as the ship was not in a legal capacity to perform her voyage after having 
lost her papers”.676 The voyage was not a commercial prospect to pursue in Gilfert v Hallet 
and Bowne,677 where pirates took over half the value of cargo from a vessel. In deciding 
whether the abandonment was justified, where the cargo was valued at $12,000, and pirates 
took all but $3,701, “the cargo [was] so greatly diminished by the piracy… the voyage may 
be deemed to have been broken up, and not worth pursuing. The expense of pursuing it would 
have exceeded the benefit arising from it. The remains of the cargo could not justify the re-
equipment of the vessel and a continuance of the voyage…” The material issue there was 
whether the expense of pursuing it would have exceeded the benefit arising from it. This was 
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separate from the loss of most of the cargo. This does not appear to in the English law of 
constructive total losses, where such pure financial considerations are not relevant.  
 
6.3   ‘Disappointment of arrival’ not insured 
 
This rule that interruption to the voyage established total loss had rigidly defined limits, 
usually expressed by the rule that ‘disappointment of arrival’ was not covered. Contrasting 
with the American authorities allowing a total loss of the voyage for commercial reasons, 
Anderson v Wallis (the Confiance)678 indicated that an insured could not claim for total loss 
on the basis the voyage became commercially unviable. The policy covered cargo for a 
voyage, where vessel and cargo were damaged by heavy weather.  The cargo was landed for 
the season. The vessel was repaired and completed the voyage the next year. It was argued 
that the loss of the voyage that season amounted to a loss of the voyage. Ellenborough LCJ 
held that the mere retardation of a voyage could never amount to a total loss, nor could it 
authorize an abandonment, saying; ‘disappointment of arrival was a new head of 
abandonment in insurance law’.679 This restriction of the loss of the voyage doctrine reflected 
his view of the Goodfellow, but conflicted with Goss. The distinction between this and 
Manning v Newnham was that the vessel in Manning was totally lost, and the insured was 
waiting for the arrival of another vessel, rather than in Anderson, waiting for repairs of 
unknown duration.  
 
In Falkner and Others v Ritchie (1814),680 the policy covered the ship on a voyage from Cadiz 
to ports in Africa and back. The crew seized her in an African port, and sailed her to South 
America, where they plundered the cargo. The following year, she was taken by an American 
ship, itself then captured by a British privateer. A British prize crew took control. The owners 
discovered the loss and the recapture at the same time, and issued proceedings. Ellenborough 
CJ questioned ‘what has the loss of the voyage to do with the loss of the ship?’ Applying the 
Goodfellow, he ruled that the owner could not recover for a total loss. His reasoning was that 
the vessel was a total loss while captured, but that on recapture it became a partial loss only 
(applying the Confiance,681 doubting Goss). He noted that in Anderson v Wallis, the loss of 
the voyage just as complete. That case concerned a policy on goods; the vessel had been driven 
by stress of weather into an intermediate port and the goods re-landed, and the voyage was 
lost for the season. The issue was whether the insured could abandon. It was held that a 
retardation of the voyage was not a ground of abandonment, as the goods still subsisted in 
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specie. Further, in Everth v Smith…682 the Court recognized Anderson, and applied that rule 
to a freight policy, holding that a loss of the voyage contemplated by the assured was not a 
loss of the freight, the freight having been afterwards earned. He doubted whether  Goss v 
Withers was similar to the present case suggested there was a looseness and generality in the 
expressions borrowed in argument from Goss. He asked ‘What has a loss of the voyage to do 
with the loss of the ship?’ and observed he saw good sense in the judgment of CJ Willes in 
the Goodfellow, and thought that provided the better authority. In Falkner, Bayley J referred 
to the Little Mary,683 but his judgment is not recorded.  
 
Falkner v Ritchie was later doubted in Hudson and another v Harrison, where Park J said “I 
think that some of the cases on that subject cannot be supported to their full extent. I, for one, 
have never been able to comprehend the case of Falkner v Ritchie, which I have the less 
hesitation in avowing, inasmuch as the Lord Chancellor and Lord Redesdale have expressed 
themselves to labour under the same difficulty”.684 Save for being doubted in Hudson, Falkner 
does not seem to have received significant treatment in later authorities. Later, in the 
Friendship,685 Ellenborough LCJ noted with regard to the loss of a vessel that the voyage had 
been lost while it was captured, though he did not expressly hold that to be a ground for 
abandonment of the vessel. In these examples, the voyage had been performed by the time of 
the action. 
 
If the master discovers an embargo of the destination port, and accordingly abandons the 
voyage to avoid the peril, will there be a total loss of the voyage on insurance? It appears to 
have been settled by the early nineteenth century that: (i) the abandonment of the voyage was 
seldom a loss within any insured peril; and (ii) that this usually did not amount to a loss of the 
voyage. The earliest authority on these facts was Hadkinson v Robinson.686 The policy covered 
a perishable cargo of fish on ‘the Paxaro’ from Cornwall to Naples in January 1800. During 
the voyage, it became known on 16 March that the Kingdom of Naples had signed a treaty 
with France and was closed to English vessels. The vessel and cargo would be liable to 
confiscation if it entered the port. The vessel diverted to Minorca where there would be better 
intelligence of the situation. The cargo was sold by order of the Vice-Admiralty court there. 
The cargo owners gave notice of abandonment on 23 April. The owners contended that the 
voyage was lost by detention or restraint of princes. Alvanley LCJ held that the circumstances 
did not justify total loss: 
                                                     
682 (1814) 2 M&S 279, (1814) 105 ER 385 
683 (1810) 2 Taunt 363, (1810) 127 ER 1118 
684 (1821) 3 B&B 97 
685 (1816) 5 M&S 446, (1816) 105 ER 1114 
686 (1803) 3 Bos&Pul 388 
128 
 
 
“But it has appeared to me that where underwriters have insured against capture and 
restraint of princes, and the captain, learning that if he enter the port of his destination 
the vessel will be lost by confiscation, avoids that port, whereby the object of the voyage 
is defeated, such circumstances do not amount to a peril operating to the total 
destruction of the thing insured”.687  
 
Alvanley LCJ recognised the rule in Goss v Withers that the insured could recover if the 
voyage is defeated, but held that the peril must act immediately and not circuitously. 
Accordingly, he held that sale of the property at a neutral port was not a loss within a peril in 
the policy. He suggested a separate approach to the different classes of factual cases. He noted 
that in Manning v Newharn Lord Mansfield expressly decides the case on the ground of the 
voyage being lost by one of the perils insured against, namely, by tempestuous weather, and 
that: “The words of Lord Kenyon in M'Andrews v Vaughan, in which he lays down that the 
insured may recover for a total loss if the voyage be lost, must be taken with reference to the 
case before him, in which the injury arose from capture”.688 Accordingly, the cases of loss of 
a voyage by capture, perils of the seas and restraint were considered separately. The result in 
the case was supported by sound policy: 
“…it would afford to owners insuring cargoes of the description specified in the 
memorandum the opportunity of creating imaginary dangers whenever the cargo was 
not likely to reach the port of destination in a sound state, and, by giving notice of 
abandonment, to throw a loss upon the underwriters to which they are not liable by the 
terms of the policy”.689 
 
Lubbock v Rowcroft (the Nelly)690 concerned a policy on a cargo of pepper consigned to 
Messina. When the vessel arrived, it was discovered that the port was blockaded by the 
French, or in their possession. The owner gave notice of abandonment for a total loss. The 
opinion was given by Ellenborough LCJ that this would not be any loss. He considered that 
the abandonment was from an apprehension of capture, and not from a peril within the policy. 
The claimant was non-suited for other reasons, so the case did not determine the issue.  
 
In Miller v Law Accident Insurance Company691 the policy covered cattle shipped to Buenos 
Aires, a port of destination which was the only place commercially worthwhile to sell the 
cargo. In consequence of the impossibility of landing the cattle at Buenos Aires it was argued 
that the adventure was defeated, and the underwriters were liable for total loss. The court held 
the issue of the decree by the Argentine Government, under which the landing of the cattle 
was forbidden, was an act of State, within the words ‘restraints of people’.  
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To claim for constructive total loss, the loss must be caused proximately by an insured peril. 
Disappointment of arrival by the interruption of commerce is not insured. Arnould provided 
that the English law of abandonment, meaning the doctrine of constructive total loss, only 
applied to cases that were proximately caused by an insured peril, and observed that 
disappointment of arrival by the interdiction of commerce, or being turned away from the 
destination port, were not risks insured by the SG policy, and were no ground of 
abandonment.692 
 
In Roura Forgas v Townend and others it was indicated the test for loss of the voyage would 
be similar to the test of charterparty frustration, noting that in “Russian Bank for Foreign 
Trade v Excess Insurance Co693 …the adventure or voyage upon which certain goods were to 
be despatched, and on which they were insured, was frustrated. The cause of frustration was 
not a capture or loss of the ship, as it was here, but a requisition of the ship amounting, at 
most, to a restraint. Moreover, in that case the subject-matter of insurance and the thing for 
which a loss was claimed was a quantity of goods”.694 Different rules on causation applied to 
other perils of the seas, which slowed the rate of sailing. It was said in Field SS v Burr that 
the inability to recover for loss incident to delay under a policy on ship may also be rested on 
the ground on which it was placed by Lord Denman in De Vaux v Salvador, that the sea peril 
cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of such a loss: 
"These losses," says Mr. Lowndes, "result not from the damage but from the delay 
incident to the damage". Here… the real sea damage was to the cargo; the incidental 
consequence is that the ship cannot be used again till the damaged cargo is removed, 
and is therefore, on the same reasoning, not due to a sea peril as the causa proxima”.695 
 
On a cargo policy, does requisition of the contemplated vessel cause loss of the voyage? In 
Russian Bank of Foreign Trade v Excess Insurance Company696 the plaintiffs insured with the 
defendants barley on board the Wolverton at Novorossisk for carriage to Falmouth. The policy 
covered loss from restraints of princes and consequences of hostilities, but excluded claims 
due to delay. Owing to the closing of the Dardanelles the ship could not leave Novorossisk, 
and while she was there on March 5, 1915, her owners were directed by the Admiralty to place 
her at the disposal of the Russian Government. The plaintiffs informed their insurance brokers 
on 5 March: "Wolverton requisitioned by British Government account Russian Government. 
Impossible reload barley. Consider case covered by war risk. Agreeable release underwriters 
from all risks if underwriters will pay difference between present value in Novorossisk and 
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insured value." The insured claimed constructive total loss of the barley. Bailhache J held: (i) 
the telegram of 5 March was a good notice of abandonment; (ii) that the requisition by the 
Admiralty was ultra vires, and therefore not a restraint of princes; (iii) that the closing of the 
Dardanelles was a restraint of princes; but (iv) that the claim was a claim due to delay, and 
therefore excluded by the policy. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held there was no valid 
notice of abandonment, and expressed no opinion on the other grounds. This first-instance 
judgment is doubtful, for an ultra vires act clearly could amount to restraint of princes, 
supported by the wide meaning of unlawful capture.  
 
In Becker, Grey and Company v London Assurance Corporation,697 the plaintiffs shipped 
goods on board a German ship for carriage from Calcutta to Hamburg and insured them on 
that voyage with the defendants against the usual perils, including men-of-war, enemies, and 
restraints of princes. While the goods were at sea war broke out between Great Britain and 
Germany, and the master, on being informed of that fact, put into a neutral port to avoid the 
risk of capture by hostile cruisers and with the intention of suspending the further prosecution 
of the voyage until after the termination of the war, and the voyage was thereupon abandoned. 
The plaintiffs gave notice of abandonment to the defendants and claimed as for a total loss. 
There was no evidence that the ship had been chased by any hostile cruiser, but, in the opinion 
of the Lords of the Admiralty, she would have been in peril of capture if she had proceeded 
on her voyage. It was held, distinguishing Sanday,698 that the frustration of the adventure was 
caused, not by a peril insured against, but by the voluntary act of the captain – the plaintiffs 
could not recover for loss of the voyage. 
 
It was impossible to reconcile this distinction with the underlying permissive authority of in 
Emerigon. Further, Arnould noted, in respect of both French and American laws, that in the 
maritime law of every country other than England, the compulsory abandonment of the 
voyage occasioned by the interdiction of commerce with the destination port, or by the hostile 
occupation, blockade or embargo of it, was a risk within the policy, within ‘restraint of 
princes’699 or ‘compulsory change of voyage’. or under the words “compulsory change of 
voyage”.700 However, the English position was restricted, in that: 
“…neither interdiction of trade at the port of destination after risk commenced, nor 
interception of the voyage by blockade, or by the imminent and palpable danger of 
capture or seizure, amounts to a risk for which English underwriters are answerable 
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under the common form of policy, either as an “arrest, restraint, and detention,” or in 
any other way whatever”.701 
 
English law had restricted the right to recover, but this restriction never extended, before 1906, 
to prevent recovery where possession was lost. This restriction dealt with situation where 
possession was at all times in the owner. 
 
 
6.4 Loss of the voyage on hull policies 
 
This conflict of early authority on wagers contributes to the contemporary divergence over 
whether it is possible to claim for a ‘loss of a voyage’ on a ship, or just cargo, and what that 
means in practice. Eventually, the majority view on wagering policies prevailed, following 
De Paiba v Ludlow.702 The earliest cases, e.g. Goss, and textbooks on valued policies suggest, 
in opposition to the Goodfellow,703 that there could be a loss of voyage on hull policies. 
Marshall noted the various dicta in Cazalet v St Barbe:704 
‘In … Jenkins v Mackenzie though the ship was brought into port yet the capture as 
between the insurer and the insured was a total loss. The true way of considering this 
case is that it was an insurance on the ship for the voyage and if either the ship or the 
voyage be lost it will be a total loss but here neither was lost. The case of [the Selby]705 
is decisive’.706  
There was no total loss in The Little Mary,707 where a vessel insured from England to Portugal 
and back was captured by the enemy French. It was liberated on payment by the master of 
ransom of $3,000, on condition of his returning English prisoners to England to be exchanged 
for an equal number of French. On news of the capture, but after the ship had been released, 
the owners abandoned the ship to the insurers. After her arrival at Portsmouth, the captain 
refused to deliver her to the owners, unless he were reimbursed the ransom money. The 
owners refused to pay the ransom costs, and claimed for a total loss. On appeal, the claim was 
dismissed. The payment of ransom to an enemy was by statute illegal,708 and accordingly was 
not an expense the master could claim from the owners. Therefore, the owner was entitled to 
take possession without making the payment, so suffered no recoverable loss. The ship-
owners argued that the voyage, for a cargo of salt which had a seasonal market, had been lost. 
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This was rejected; Lawrence J stated authority provided, ‘…wherever the voyage insured is 
defeated by any of the perils insured against, there is a total loss: but I find no authority which 
applies to the case where the ship was, or might have been in the hands of the owner, in the 
country where the owners reside. The passage from the Guidon, c 7, s 1, which was the 
original authority on which Lord Mansfield relied in the case of Goss v Withers, does not 
apply to the ship…’ In Goss, it had been held that the voyage had been lost both on ship and 
cargo. It was stated that the case was ‘even stronger’ as for the cargo, but Mansfield also found 
a loss of the voyage on the ship. Nevertheless, Lawrence J in The Little Mary, following the 
arguments in The Goodfellow, found that there could not be loss of the voyage on the vessel. 
In a series of cases where perils of the sea resulted in delays, the additional expenses, such as 
crew wages or provisions, were not recoverable on the policy.709 This line of authority was 
not, at first, applied to prevent total loss claims for loss of possession situations. However, by 
De Vaux v Salvador710 it was considered that as the hull underwriter was not liable for these 
expenses, the hull underwriter did not insure the voyage on the vessel. This was developed in 
Field SS v Burr711 where perils of the sea caused the cargo to spoil: Collins LJ considered the 
nature of hull insurance, by questioning “…whether the assured on hull and machinery can 
throw upon the underwriters the expense of discharging at the port of destination a cargo 
which, having become putrid by the action of the perils of the sea, has lost its identity, and in 
respect of which, therefore, no freight is payable by the consignee.” He held that the insured 
could not recover: “…How can the presence of a putrid cargo in the ship be said to be a 
damage to the hull? The fabric of the ship is not injured by it. So far as it affects the ship at 
all it is by interfering with its use until the cargo is removed.” He held that marine insurance 
did not cover a hull owner’s business interests: “This is not damage to hull which is the interest 
insured, but, as counsel for the defendant pointed out, damage to the shipowner in his business 
as carrier.” While it might be more accurate to view a vessel as a freight-carrying instrument, 
rather than an object having an intrinsic value, so that interference with its ability to carry 
freight was damage to the shipowner, English law had not adopted that view.712 Accordingly, 
“Damage by delay is clearly not damage to ship…713 That is the ground on which Fletcher v. 
Poole, Eden v. Poole, and Robertson v. Ewer were decided. "Here," says Buller J. in the latter 
case, "the ship itself was safe; and the Court only looks to the thing itself which is the subject 
of insurance; and the wages and provisions…” This conclusion appeared well entrenched, 
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but it did conflict with part of the justification for recovery given by Mansfield in Goss, 
namely that the delay caused a loss of seasonal market for the fish. 
In 1942 it was held that the law had probably ceased to apply the doctrine of the loss of the 
voyage to a vessel: 
“The primary subject of the insurance is the goods as physical things, but there is 
superimposed an interest in the safe arrival of the goods. This is very old law. Lord 
Mansfield insisted on applying the same rule to an insurance on the ship, but his view 
was rejected and it was said that the loss of the voyage has nothing to do with the loss 
of the ship. The ship is a vehicle employed in general trading, not wedded to any 
particular adventure”.714  
 
The Minden; Wangoni; Halle further indicated that that goods underwriters still insured the 
voyage, and contrastingly, the voyage continued to be protected for goods. The owner’s 
commercial interest in the voyage could be separately be insured on a freight policy:  
“Freight is regarded in ordinary practice as a separate interest capable of being 
separately insured in addition. As to goods, it is indeed true that profits can be 
separately insured by an appropriate policy, and also that the insurable value on goods 
under an open policy is their value, plus charges on shipment, not their arrived value; 
s. 16, sub-s. 3, of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. But it has long been recognized that 
in a valued policy on goods it is permissible and indeed usual to value the goods so as 
to exceed their value on shipment”.715  
In The Bamburi, where one year’s continued deprivation was held a constructive total loss, 
this distinction between ship and cargo was noted. The Minden; Wangoni; and Halle was 
quoted, ‘in the case of a policy on goods in normal form the owner can claim either for loss 
of goods or loss of adventure, while in the case of a policy on the ship the underwriters are 
liable only on loss of ship and are not liable in respect of loss of adventure (Viscount 
Maugham)’.716 The Bamburi questioned whether the distinction was logically sustainable; 
why is a ship less of a loss than the cargo? However, the arbitrator concluded that the 
distinction was too entrenched to change, and ‘[in] any case, if loss of the adventure did still 
give rise to a claim under a voyage policy on ship, it would remain doubtful whether it gave 
rise to a claim on a time policy’.717 
 
The right to recover on hull policies was recognised in American law, for example by Storey 
J in Peele. However, a contrary indication, that ‘the loss of the voyage as respects the cargo 
is not a loss of the voyage as to the ship’ was given academically by 1841,718 and it appears 
that the modern American laws similarly restrict this right in following English laws.  
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Some rationalisation for the different rules may be that the early authorities were wagers and 
not contacts of indemnity. It has been suggested that the hull policy, because it is a contract 
of indemnity, insures the vessel, not the voyage.719 The suggestion that simply because the 
loss of the voyage cases are old, they are not relevant to the modern policy, for example 
that‘The loss of voyage is a negligible and perhaps totally irrelevant factor in a constructive 
total loss claim under the modern hull policy”720 seems unsatisfactory without further 
justification. While the significantly greater value of ship compared to individual cargoes 
might justify a different approach to hulls is recognised, there exists little satisfactory 
explanation for why the law ignores loss of the voyage. Herbert Lord offered an unsatisfactory 
justification for the lapse of the rule, essentially stating that loss of the voyage was 
understandable in relation to wooden ships where there were insufficient salvage facilities and 
long anticipated journey times, factors not applicable to modern hulls.721 In fact, the right of 
abandonment for the voyage on hulls was demonstrably applied to short voyages (eg Goss), 
and the generalisation that most pre-20th century insured voyages were long is unfounded. The 
notion that the business of the shipowner was not covered, whereas cargo interests would be, 
is partly mitigated by the evolution of cover for freight, albeit that the possible existence of 
additional, separate cover is an unsatisfactory basis for understanding the rule change. Where 
there would be no loss on a freight policy, the harm may not be compensated, and the shipper 
may suffer loss without possibility of compensation from his insurer. 
 
 
6.5  Supervening Illegality 
 
In British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co v Sanday & Co the plaintiff British corn 
merchants contracted to sell to Hambourg merchants linseed and wheat, shipped in July, 1914, 
on board two British ships, the St Andrew and the Orthia, and obtained cover from the 
defendant. On 4 August 1914, a declaration was made that a state of war existed between 
Britain and Germany. That rendered illegal all trading with Germany without the Sovereign’s 
permission. On 5 August, a Government Proclamation warned all persons not to permit any 
British ship to leave for, enter, or communicate with any port or place in the German Empire 
without the Sovereign’s permission. The penalty for trading with Germany after the 
Declaration of 4 August and the Proclamation of 5 August included the imprisonment of the 
master and confiscation of goods and vessel. The master of one vessel received notice from 
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his owners by cable and consequently put into a British port. The other vessel, on arrival in 
the Channel, was signalled by a French cruiser to enter a British port. Both vessels discharged 
the insured goods at ports in the United Kingdom. There being no prospect of the war 
terminating and the goods being forwarded to their German destination within a reasonable 
time, the plaintiffs gave notice of abandonment and sued upon the policies as for a total loss. 
Bailhance J held that situations where the venture was illegal at the beginning were 
distinguished from those where it became illegal during the voyage: 
 “If the assured persists in the venture after it has so become illegal, and as a 
consequence his goods are seized, he is uninsured. The seizure is due to his violation of 
English law. If, however, in consequence of such supervening illegality he abandons 
the venture and thereby suffers loss, that loss… so far falls within the restraint of princes 
clause, and, apart from any possible question of causa proxima, the assured is covered. 
If it were not so an assured would indeed be in a sorry plight, for whether he obeyed or 
disobeyed the law he would equally be uninsured”. 
Insureds were not put in that impossible position, and policies covered situations where 
voyages were abandoned to obey government orders or prohibitions. In that case, at first 
instance, the situation fell within the restraint of princes clause. Nor did the doctrine of 
proximate cause undermine the total loss.  This was not the same as a case of avoiding a risk 
of capture or seizure. A peril-specific test applied and the two lines of authority were separate 
(see chapter 2, above). In Sanday, the restraint was by the common-law, and once it was clear 
that actual force was not necessary to constitute restraint of princes, an owner who diverts a 
vessel to a home port to obey his own government’s proclamation was not avoiding, but 
submitting to the peril.722 Further, because the law provided that while in peacetime the 
adventure was legal, and during hostilities, the adventure was illegal, Hadkinson v Robinson 
and Kacianoff v China Traders Insurance Co were distinguished. In those cases, “All that 
happened was that, in pursuit of a lawful adventure, the master did not go into a position of 
peril. He never was restrained. His own country did not restrain him, and he took care not to 
put himself in danger of being restrained by another country. Illegality according to the law 
of another country does not affect the merchant. In the present case the adventure was illegal 
according to the law of the country of the owner of the goods. And it was the declaration of 
war that made it illegal”.723  
 
A number of authorities concerned the situation where the voyage is abandoned by the master 
because of a contemplated peril. For example, it might be clear that a port has become closed 
by an embargo, and that the vessel, if the voyage continues to the intended port, would be 
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confiscated. Does the doctrine of the loss of the voyage offer any assistance to the insured, 
where the voyage is lost, although the vessel stays under his control? 
 
In Miller v The Accident Insurance Company, where the policy covered cattle shipped to 
Buenos Aires, it was held that an insured was required to go as far as was possible before 
confiscation would become inevitable. The decree of the Argentine Government prohibiting 
the landing of the cattle was an act of state within the phrase ‘restraints of people’.724 Stirling 
LJ held the master had not acted voluntarily, and Hadkinson v Robinson and similar authorities 
were distinguishable, and accordingly the voyage had not been abandoned before the peril 
was engaged.  
 
Finally, in Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v Robert Dollar Co,725 the American court 
found the voyage frustrated by the closure of the destination port to Japanese vessels. It was 
held: “the clause insuring these goods insures their safe arrival at Hamburg, and the 
destruction of that adventure was directly caused by His Majesty's declaration. It was 
therefore a loss within the clause which insures these goods at and from losses against 
restraint by kings, princes, or peoples”.726 In other cases, insurers have argued successfully 
that abandonment was premature. 
 
 
6.6 Proximate Cause: Voyage Abandoned Before Peril Engaged 
 
Claims for loss of the voyage may be met with the defence that action taken to avoid the peril 
was taken voluntarily or precipitately. Where the subject matter is abandoned prematurely, 
the loss is caused by the abandonment rather than by an insured peril and the assured cannot 
recover727. If the voyage is abandoned due to an anticipated peril, the insurer’s liability 
depends on whether the abandonment was justifiable or premature. In the latter case, the 
proximate cause of any loss is the assured’s own conduct. In the former case, there is a total 
loss and no notice of abandonment is required. The principle applies to hulls, cargo and freight 
policies alike.728 Likewise in America, fear of enemy action is not the same as the actual 
risk.729 
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In British and Foreign Marine Insurance Co v Sanday & Co730  two British vessels carrying 
goods belonging to British merchants for sale in Germany were enroute to Hamburg when 
war broke out between the United Kingdom and Germany. The further prosecution of either 
voyage became illegal under English law. The cargo owners had insured their goods on both 
vessels by identical voyage policies on the Lloyds SG form. The insured perils included 
restraints of princes. Shortly after war was declared each vessel was directed (one by a French 
cruiser, the other by the shipowners at the suggestion of the Admiralty) to proceed to British 
ports, which they did. The cargo owners warehoused their goods and served notice of 
abandonment to their underwriters, claiming a constructive total loss. The court considered 
inter alia whether the declaration of war was a restraint of princes within the meaning of the 
policies, acting directly on the insureds. Hadkinson v Robinson and Lubbock v Rowcroft were 
distinguishable. In those cases the only deterrent was the risk of ultimate capture if the ships 
proceeded to their destination. Both vessels prudently resolved not to incur that risk. In Sanday 
the deterrents were the penalties incurred by the violation of the criminal law. This was present 
and immediate, if the ship proceeded at all towards her destination with a view of trading with 
the enemy:731 
“Actual capture was in these cases the peril insured against. The apprehension of 
capture is an entirely different thing and was not insured against. Well, it is clear that 
the war is of uncertain duration. Nobody could with any confidence conjecture when it 
would terminate. A long delay appeared most probable before the voyage could be 
resumed”.732 
Also mirroring the English law, in America an insured would be justified in abandoning a 
voyage where it would be certain to be condemned: “A law of the country to which a vessel 
is bound, which subjects vessels arriving there under certain circumstances, to confiscation, 
is not a just cause for breaking up a voyage, unless it appears, with moral certainty, that the 
law applied to the case in question, and that if the ship had arrived it would have been 
enforced against her”.733 
 
Avoiding action could be taken where the peril currently existed: “He did not deviate from 
his course in order to avoid a future peril to which he might become liable, but because the 
peril was actually present and operative at the time when he turned his vessel from Hamburg 
to the home port”.734 Behind every prohibition there was the threat of force: “Every State 
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ultimately enforces obedience to its laws by force. Restraint is equally imposed when 
obedience is given by reason of the existence of force in reserve as when it is given by reason 
of force employed”.735 This confirmed the realistic assessment of the risks at first instance: 
"When once it is admitted that force is not necessary to constitute restraint of princes it is 
clear that a shipowner who keeps his vessel at home or diverts her to a home port in obedience 
to such a proclamation is not taking steps to avoid that particular peril, but is submitting to 
its operation…”736 
 
In Kacianoff and others v China Traders Insurance Company Limited737 the Russian plaintiffs 
insured a cargo of beef with the defendant underwriters from San Francisco to Vladivostok 
via Nagasaki, not excluding capture. During the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese imposed a 
blockade of Vladivostok. The defendants telegraphed to the plaintiffs that if the cargo were 
sent to Vladivostok via Nagasaki they would take up the position that the plaintiffs 
deliberately caused any loss occasioned by the perils insured against. The plaintiffs' 
representatives in San Francisco, who desired to minimise the loss to the underwriters, 
suggested the cargo should be discharged at San Francisco and sold elsewhere, which was 
done. Subsequently the notice of abandonment was given to the underwriters, who refused it. 
The plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed, as it was held that the loss was not caused by capture, 
and there was no total loss at the time of abandonment.738 The Knight of St Michael739 and 
Butler v Wildman740 were distinguished, and Hadkinson v Robinson was applied. 
Consequently, the doctrine of proximate cause meant the loss was not covered, as it was not 
a loss occasioned by capture: “The vessel never was in risk of capture, because she determined 
not to undergo the risk, the cargo never underwent the risk, because it was determined to 
discharge the cargo so as to avoid the risk. Therefore, never having come under the risk and 
the risk never having begun to operate, no claim can be made on this policy”.741 Lush J 
expressed the principle: ‘What was done in discharging the cargo was really done to prevent 
the ship ever coming into the peril; it was not done to arrest the consequences of any peril in 
which the ship actually was.’ The court, and the parties, proceeded on the basis that if the ship 
had sailed into the Japanese blockade, it would have been totally lost by capture. Whether that 
was to be a constructive or an actual total loss was not expressed.  
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6.7 Total loss of Freight 
 
Freight 
No reported authority appears to demonstrate constructive, as distinct from actual, total loss 
of freight. However, this is not necessarily impossible. In James Rankin and Others v Lewis 
Potter and Others742 Brett J indicated situations in which he considered that notice of 
abandonment should be given.  The types of losses recoverable under an ordinary freight 
policy were summarised, where he stated that a partial loss of freight might arise: (i) on a 
general average situation caused by an insured peril; (ii) by a total loss of part of the cargo; or 
(iii) where cargo was transhipped after the total loss of the insured ship; or (iv) where there is 
a total loss of the cargo, the vessel earned some freight in respect of other goods carried on 
the insured voyage.743 
 
There might be an actual total loss of freight: 
“… if there be an actual total loss of ship, or an actual total loss of the whole cargo. 
An actual total loss of ship will occasion an actual total loss of freight, unless when the 
ship is lost, cargo is on board, and the whole or a part of such cargo is saved, and 
might be sent on in a substituted ship so as to earn freight. An actual total loss of the 
whole cargo will occasion an actual total loss of freight, unless such loss should so 
happen as to leave the ship capable, as to time, place, and condition, of earning an 
equal or some freight by carrying other cargo on the voyage insured”.744 
Accordingly, where a policy covered freight payable under a charterparty or other contract of 
affreightment which had been frustrated, total loss would be recoverable under the terms of a 
policy on freight.745 So an actual total loss of freight can occur where the adventure is 
frustrated, such that the shipowner is freed from his obligations under the carriage contract, 
even though the ship, and possibly the goods, remain in existence. Where the adventure is 
frustrated by an insured peril, and freight is thereby lost, the insurer is liable.746 Where a ship 
was delayed by the operation of perils of the seas, and the charterer justifiably refused to load, 
there was a loss of freight by perils of the seas.747 Effectively, freight insures the voyage, not 
the specie. Freight is a total loss where, by perils insured, the right to freight is lost, so that 
there might be a total loss of freight where the shipowner was physically prevented from 
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performing the contract of affreightment by a total loss of ship or cargo caused by marine 
perils insured.748  
 
Because hull and the freight policies are different aspects of property, there may be a total 
loss of freight by frustration of the charterparty by perils insured against, where there is no 
total loss under the hull policies. This frustration could occur, inter alia, through delay, or by 
the vessel suffering such damage as to render it commercially impracticable to incur the 
expense of repair. In those cases the right to freight is destroyed. Likewise, there was a total 
loss under a policy on commissions or profits if the goods are totally lost by perils insured 
against.749 
 
How was capture treated in freight policies? Arnould provided that there was a presumed total 
loss of freight on capture without restoration, and this made no reference to an investigation 
into the chance of any subsequent restoration. On the contrary, a capture before loading was 
deemed to be permanent: 
“On the same principle, if the event, on which the earning of the entire freight is made 
to depend under the charterparty, be the ship’s arrival at her port of ultimate 
destination with a certain description of cargo, and the happening of this event is 
rendered hopeless by the capture of the ship (undredeemed by subsequent restoration), 
before this particular description of cargo is loaded on board, this is a clear case of 
total loss on the whole freight”.750 
 
In freight cases, issues potentially arise as to whether loss of freight is due to a maritime peril 
or to a fall in the market price for the chartering of vessels, as illustrated by Continental Grain 
Co v Twitchell751 and Cepheus Shipping Corporation v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance 
plc,752 where the loss of earnings was due to the vessel being off-hire and would have occurred 
independently of damage to the vessel. 
 
The exclusion of recoverability for losses due to delay extends to total and partial losses of 
the physical subject matter, hull and cargo, but was not at common-law extended to freight. 
In Jackson v The Union Marine Insurance Company Ltd,753 the plaintiff shipowner entered a 
charterparty in November 1871 by which the ship was to proceed with all possible dispatch 
(dangers and accidents of navigation excepted) from Liverpool to Newport, and there load a 
cargo of iron rails for San Francisco. The plaintiff effected an insurance on the freight for the 
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voyage. The ship grounded in January of 1872, and repairs could only be completed by 
August, so the vessel could only reach the loadport in mid 1872. On 15 February, the 
charterers repudiated the charter and chartered another vessel to carry the rails which were 
wanted for the construction of a railway. The plaintiff claimed on his policy of insurance on 
the chartered freight. The jury in Common Pleas found that the time necessary for repairing 
the vessel put an end, in a commercial sense, to the commercial speculation entered upon by 
the shipowner and the charterers. On appeal the Exchequer Chamber confirmed the judgment, 
finding that there was a loss of the freight by perils of the sea. It was considered that, ‘If the 
charterer be ready as for a voyage or adventure not precisely defined by time or otherwise, 
but still for a particular voyage, arrival at Newport in time for it is necessarily a condition 
precedent… Where no time is named for the doing of anything, the law attaches a reasonable 
time’.754 Clearly, the contract of carriage was understood in the context of the charterer’s 
commercial interests: 
“…the shipowner undertook to use all possible dispatch to arrive at the port of loading, 
and also agreed that the ship should arrive "there at such a time that in a commercial 
sense the commercial speculation entered into by the shipowner and charterer should 
not be at an end but in existence." That latter agreement is also a condition precedent. 
Not arriving at such a time puts an end to the contract”755 
 
This indicated that the voyage must begin within a reasonable time, in that case, perhaps about 
5 or 6 months. The judgment went on to consider the commercial realities accompanying the 
contemplated voyage: Bramwell B approved Tarrabochia v Hickie in that a voyage would be 
understood to be in a particular season, so there was a clear difference between a spring 
voyage and an autumn voyage, and that a voyage intended to carry a cargo of fruit in the fruit 
season would be required to start in time to make the seasonal market: 
“To hold that a charterer is bound to furnish a cargo of fruit at a time of year when 
there is no fruit, at a time of year different from what he and the shipowner must have 
contemplated, the change to that time being no fault of his, but the misfortune at best 
of the shipowner, is so extravagant when the consequences become apparent that it 
could not be”.756 
 
This reasoning is closely bound with issues of frustration of the charter. Bramwell’s judgment 
continued, considering the hypothetical situation where: “a charter [undertook to] fetch a 
cargo of ice from Norway, entered into at such a time that the vessel would reach its 
destination with reasonable dispatch in February, when there was ice, and bring it back in 
June when ice was wanted, and by perils of the seas it could not get to Norway till the ice was 
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melted, nor return till after ice was of no value”.757 Such a voyage would be of no use, as the 
voyage would be frustrated: 
“It was argued that the doctrine of causa proxima spectatur non remota, applied, and 
that the proximate cause of the loss of freight here was the refusal of the charterer to 
load. But, if I am right, the voyage, the adventure, was frustrated by the perils of the 
seas, both parties were discharged, and a loading of cargo in August would have been 
a new adventure, a new agreement; but, even if not, the maxim does not apply. The 
perils of the seas do not cause something which causes something else. The freight is 
lost unless the charterer chooses to go on. He does not”.758 
 
The choice is significant; charterers could decide not to elect to follow a commercially 
disadvantageous course of action, and wait for an event that remained possible. Frustration 
may take account, therefore, of commercial reality.  
 
In The Bedouin,759 it was argued that ‘although the hire was suspended by a breakdown of the 
machinery through a sea peril, yet there is no loss falling on the policy, because all that 
happened was to postpone the earning of the charterer's money to a later date, and that the 
shipowner ultimately got, under the charter, the whole freight, just as if there had been no 
delay.’ This was argument was rejected, the court holding that as a matter of fact the 
shipowner does not get the freight during a particular period. He does not get his money at the 
time he ought to get it, and his ship takes longer to earn the amount of freight which she has 
to earn for him’.760 This was a loss falling within the policy occurring ‘then and there’.761 
Freight was either earned or not earned by the date expected, and this rule for freight permits 
recovery for total loss caused by delay.  
 
Cleasby B’s dissenting judgment in Jackson exposed practical policy difficulties with 
applying different rules to commencing a late voyage as on delay in the course of the voyage. 
He recognised that, practically, an insured was interested in the arrival of cargo at the 
destination, and the distinction between a voyage being started late, or being extended would 
be immaterial to the insured. He recognised that the law reached the opposite result, in 
situations which were, from the insured’s perspective, identical. The example he gave was 
where, if after the rails were loaded at Newport, the vessel had grounded the day after leaving 
that port, whatever the length of the delay, the shipowner would be entitled to repair the vessel, 
and earn the freight. The result might be a delay of years, but the charter would continue in 
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force throughout.762 Importantly, the aspect of loss of the intended market was of no assistance 
to insureds. He noted that if the goods were intended for a particular market or a particular 
purpose, it would not be a question whether an unreasonable time had been occupied, or 
whether the commercial speculation of the charterparty was at an end. The charterers’ 
commercial speculation must have been ruined by the delay. Likewise so far as the shipowner 
was concerned, save in so far as he was indemnified by insurances, or, possibly, by means of 
valued policies, was making a profit of each disaster. The agreement would continue, because 
nothing had happened except what was provided for.763  
 
Contrastingly to cases where the voyage was lost and recovery on the freight policy, in Inman 
v Bischoff (City of Paris),764 a policy was made on “freight outstanding”. The ship was 
chartered by the Admiralty, the charterparty provided that if the ship became inefficient, the 
charterers might make such abatement out of the freight as they saw fit. The vessel stranded, 
and charterers made an abatement from the freight. The insurers were not liable, as it was held 
that the loss was caused not by perils of the seas, but by the action of the Admiralty.765 The 
line here is difficult to draw, and the market responded by special clauses, with a warranty 
preventing any claims consequent on loss of time.766 
 
The Institute clauses now in operation767 exclude freight claims “consequent on loss of time”. 
This was held in Naviera de Vanarias SA v Nacional Hispanica Asequradora SA768 to mean 
any delay – whether or not the proximate cause – excluded recovery. After this decision, it 
appeared that loss of freight as a result of delay is recoverable only where the adventure has 
been frustrated, delay being the inevitable consequence of frustration; the position is that if 
the assured has to show delay independently of frustration he will be unable to claim. The 
cases illustrating frustration here appear to be cases of physical damage caused by perils of 
the sea causing delays to the voyage.769 
 
                                                     
762 (1874) LR 10 CP 125, 129-130 
763 ibid, 129-130 
764 (1882) 7 AppCas 670; see Manchester Liners v British and Foreign Mar Ins Co (1901) 7 Com Cas 26) 
765 Chalmers and Owen, Marine Insurance Act 1906, 77 
766 Bensaude v Thames and Mersey Ins Co (1897) AC 609; Turnbull v Hull Underwriters Association (1900) 2 
QB 402; Chalmers and Owen, Marine Insurance Act 1906, 77 
767 ie Institute Time Clauses (freight), cl 14; Institute Voyage Clause (Freight), cl 12 
768 [1978] AC 873 
769 Re Jamieson and Newcastle SS Freight Insurance Association [1895] 2 QB 90; Roura & Forgas v Townend 
[1919] 1 KB 189; Carras v London and Scottish Assurance Corp Ltd [1936] 1 KB 291 (CA); Petros M Nomikos 
v Robertson  [1939] AC 371; Atlantic Maritime Co Inc v Gibbon [1954] 1 QB 88, contrastingly, Bensuade & Co 
v Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co [1897] AC 609; Turnbull, Martin & Co v Hull Underwriters 
Association  [1900] 2 QB 242; Russian Bank for Foreign Trade v Excess Insurance Co [1918] 2 KB 123; Merkin, 
Marine Insurance Legislation (4th edn, 2010), 68 
144 
 
In Bensaude & Co v The Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company a time policy of 
insurance upon freight contained a clause, "warranted free from any claim consequent on loss 
of time whether arising from a peril of the sea or otherwise." After the commencement of a 
voyage the main shaft of the steamer was broken from a peril of the sea, and she returned to 
her port of loading. Repairing the ship necessitated a delay which frustrated the object of the 
venture; and the charterers, as they were entitled to do by the law of Portugal, which was 
applicable, cancelled the charter, and the freight was lost. At first instance,770 it was held that 
the claim of the plaintiffs could not be described as a claim "consequent on loss of time," but 
was a claim consequent on the disabling of the vessel by a peril of the sea, and arose at once 
before any loss of time had taken place, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs. On appeal, 
upheld in the House of Lords, it was held that claim was consequent on loss of time: 
“That loss must arise from one of the perils insured against. What is the meaning of 
saying that the underwriter is not to be liable for any claim consequent upon loss of 
time? It must mean that although the subject-matter insured has been lost, and although 
it has been lost by a peril insured against, if the claim depends on loss of time in the 
prosecution of the voyage so that the adventure cannot be completed within the time 
contemplated, then the underwriter is to be exempt from liability”.771  
 
In Roura and Forgas v Townend, the defence that the losses arose by delay were considered. 
Here, a possible difference in approach to causation was suggested between the perils of 
‘capture’ and ‘restraint’. The defendant insurers relied on Russian Bank for Foreign Trade v 
Excess Insurance Co, a case of requisition by the British government, for the submission that 
the length of time in German hands was a delay within the exception in the policy. The case 
was distinguished from the facts in Roura, where the voyage was frustrated.  “In that case, 
the adventure or voyage upon which certain goods were to be despatched and on which they 
were insured was frustrated. The cause of frustration was not a capture or loss of the ship as 
it was here, but a requisition of the ship amounting at most to a restraint. Moreover, in that 
case the subject-matter of insurance and thing for which a loss was claimed was a quantity of 
goods.” Having distinguished the situation, the court in Roura ruled that the vessel was lost, 
though it was afterwards found and recovered, the venture was lost. The claim to recover for 
that was not a claim caused by delay, but the loss of the venture.  
 
There evolved a divergence between English and American authorities, in respect of men-of-
war, enemies, and restraints of princes, in that, “[if] the expression "men-of-war, enemies and 
restraints of princes," as used in a policy of insurance, had to be considered for the first time, 
it might not be difficult to say that the adventure in this case was frustrated by the outbreak 
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of war and, that being so, to hold that it fell within the words as above. This indeed is the 
result at which the jurists of the Continent and of America have arrived”.772 It could not be 
said, either for hull or goods policies, or freight policies, that the mere outbreak of war 
frustrated the adventure, at least in English law. For insureds, the distinction between this 
situation, and the contrary result and right to recover in Sanday must have appeared narrow. 
Incidentally, this reinforces the merits of an historical and comparative approach, as proposed 
by this study, to the interpretation of the policy, even subsequent to 1906. 
 
Phillips773 considered whether losses consequent upon the imminency of a capture, arrest, 
restraint, or detention, fell within the risk assumed by insurers. Following Emerigon, Phillips 
provided that, "Where, after the risk has begun, the voyage is inevitably defeated by blockade, 
or interdiction at the port of departure, or destination, or by a hostile fleet being in the way, 
rendering the proceeding upon it utterly impracticable, or capture or seizure so extremely 
probable that proceeding would be inexcusable, the risk continues till the vessel has arrived 
at another port of discharge adopted instead of that originally intended: and also that an 
assured on the cargo has a right to abandon”.774 The justified deviation and the right to 
abandon on the cargo policy marched together, and opened the way for a claim at least for a 
partial loss of freight in such circumstances.  
 
6.8 Loss of the Voyage 
 
Later, there was some question, whether the loss of the voyage doctrine survived the passage 
of the 1906 Act. The voyage was not mentioned in relation to constructive total loss in the 
1906 Act. In Sanday, it was noted that the pre-act law was clear that it was covered. However, 
notwithstanding that it did not appear in the Act, the court held that the law still afforded it 
cover. The court applied Rodocanachi, and accordingly found there was a constructive total 
loss of the voyage.775 This settled the law that the loss of the voyage doctrine survived into 
the modern law. The important distinction was that while a loss of profit was not covered, a 
‘loss of market’ was covered, being “a failure to transport the goods to their destination, that 
failure being established by detention of them through one of the perils insured against, so 
prolonged as to amount to a destruction of the contemplated adventure. This may be so. It is 
a rational explanation. I think none other was given”. While there was no definition of 
‘subject-matter’ in s 57, “Sect. 26, sub-s. 1, provides that the subject-matter insured must be 
designated in a marine policy with reasonable certainty, and sub-s. 4 that in the application 
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of this section regard shall be had to any usage regulating the designation of the subject-
matter. By the word "designation" is… meant identification or description.776 Accordingly, it 
was held the law was here unchanged by the Act, so that: “if the loss of the voyage, the loss 
of the chance of arriving at the port of destination, and the consequent loss of the market 
appear to be unavoidable, there would be a constructive total loss of the subject-matter… in 
the insurance of goods, the law as it stood before the Act of 1906, in reference to the subject 
of constructive total loss, remains unchanged”.777 There remains the difficulty in identifying 
what this covers in addition to the cover for constructive loss of the physical specie. The law 
is settled that hull policies do not cover for the loss of the voyage, and indeed hull interests 
are capable of effectively doing so by the separate freight policy. The interesting issue is what 
cover is added on goods policies by this doctrine. The contemporary opinion is perhaps that 
it adds little to hull insurance.  
 
Cargo interests are harmed by delay to the voyage. The authorities establish that where perils 
of the sea cause a voyage to be late in starting, there may be a loss of the voyage..778  This is 
a clear and pragmatic example of the voyage covering the commercial needs of the insured. 
However, the doctrine does not extend to cases where perils of the sea retard the voyage during 
its course. These losses fall within the exclusion for delay779 now codified in s 55 of the 1906 
Act. In respect of losses of possession, it is difficult to see the doctrine of the loss of the voyage 
contributing significantly, separate to the underlying loss of the specie. Though this well 
established, it is surprising that the doctrine does not extend to cover late arrival on cargo 
policies. It appears that late arrival, if the market has gone, might once have been held to be 
covered. The discussion of the ‘fruit season’, where there was a recognised seasonal market, 
should arguably allow the insured to recover where the commercial utility of his venture is 
lost for the season. To hold otherwise, where the insured will have to wait a year until the 
return of the season, is to deprive the doctrine of the ‘voyage’ of practical cover for cargo 
interests’ commercial needs. 
 
Further, the doctrine’s limits in respect of voyage abandoned by the venture becoming illegal 
due to outbreak of war, or danger of capture, are significant. The defence that a venture has 
been abandoned unjustifiably, or has never come into contact with the marine perils leaves a 
gap, in English law, in the cover for ‘the voyage’.  Arguably, the more complete cover 
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suggested by Emerigon, and adopted at one stage in American laws, provides a more 
consistent cover for insureds.  
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7 CAUSATION AND DELAY 
 
In the Masefield judgements, the losses were considered to flow from delay, not the marine 
peril. While, unquestionably, there exists an exclusion from cover for delay, the origins and 
extent of this exclusion are worth exploring. Where a vessel is taken but may be released by 
payment of ransom or fines which are not made, what is the proximate cause of the loss? 
Arguably, a presumption of total loss, or instant right to abandon, arose in English and 
American laws on capture (Chapter 4, ante) and restraint and detention (Chapter 5, ante), and 
on any peril of loss of possession which interrupted the voyage (Chapter 6, ante). What 
arguments concerning causation have insurers deployed countering these presumptions? 
When might losses be attributed to delay, and excluded from cover? When might the 
proximate cause of the loss be failure to pay parties taking possession of property, or any other 
wilful act or default of the insured? Does causation operate equally in respect of each of the 
separately defined maritime perils, or take a different approach to the factual classes of peril? 
These questions are answered first by considering the origin of the exclusion for delay, and 
secondly by analysing the doctrine of proximate cause as applied to capture cases. 
 
Further, as a separate issue of causation, will refusing to pay ransom demands, or court fines 
or bribes, ever be ‘unreasonable’, preventing an insured from recovering for a prima facie 
total loss?  
 
7.1 Exclusion for losses flowing from delay 
 
How and why did losses caused by delay come to be excluded from cover? Section 55(2)(b) 
of the 1906 Act aimed to codify Taylor v Dunbar (the Leopard; the Ostrich).780 ‘The Leopard’ 
carried a cargo of carcasses consigned to the claimant butcher on a voyage from Hambourg 
to London, expected to last 50 hours, and loaded on 3 November 1866. Bad weather delayed 
the voyage commencing, which was initially aborted; she eventually departed on 8 November. 
By 10 November, the cargo had become putrid, and was jettisoned. ‘The Ostrich’ carried a 
similar cargo on the same route. Her voyage started on 6 February 1867. She was detained in 
an intermediate port by storms between 6 and 10 February. By 11 February, the cargo had 
become putrid and likewise was jettisoned. Neither cargo was damaged by sea-water. Both 
naturally decayed. The claimants asserted that their losses were caused by ‘perils of the seas’, 
and issued proceedings. Keating J decided their claims on both ‘proximate cause’ and policy 
grounds: ‘no case … has held that a loss by the unexpected duration of the voyage, though 
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that be caused by perils of the sea, entitles the assured to recover upon a policy like this. I 
think we should be establishing a dangerous precedent if we were to give effect to… [the 
claimant’s] argument, seeing that there are so many cargoes which are necessarily affected 
by the voyage being delayed.’ Montague Smith J commented in argument, ‘The present case 
… resembles Tatham v. Hodgson. There, upon an insurance of slaves against perils of the 
sea, their death by failure of sufficient and suitable provisions, occasioned by extraordinary 
delay in the voyage from bad weather, was held not to be a loss within the policy’. He held, 
‘If we were to hold that a loss by delay, caused by bad weather or the prudence of the captain 
in anchoring to avoid it, was a loss by perils of the sea, we should be opening a door to claims 
for losses which never were intended to be covered by insurance, not only in the case of 
perishable goods, but in the case of goods of all other descriptions.’ He further stated that the 
case did not fall within the class of case where the goods were physically damaged by the 
physical motion or vibration of the seas.781 
 
Two early authorities considered delayed voyages, both concerning high mortality in cargoes 
of slaves. In Gregson v Gilbert,782 due to errors in navigation prolonging the voyage, there 
was insufficient water for the slaves. There had been sufficient water for the voyage 
anticipated, absent negligent navigation. The underwriter was not liable. Then, insurance law 
provided that the underwriter was not liable where the loss was immediately referable to (ie 
proximately caused by) the negligence of the crew. The example cited was that where 
insufficient length of cable – “crew’s negligence” – led to the vessel grounding as the tide 
receded, the insurers were not liable. Arguably, this ratio turned not on delay, but on the 
crew’s negligence.783 Accordingly, Gregson did not create a general rule governing delay to 
the voyage. The second, Tatham v Hodgson,784 concerned a cargo of slaves insured on a 
voyage expected to last between six and nine weeks. It lasted over six months after the vessel’s 
rudder was damaged by grounding. The ultimate cause of that damage, whether perils of the 
sea or negligent navigation, was unreported. Tatham was cited in argument in Ionides v 
Universal Marine Insurance Co, Lawrence v Aberdein,785 and Taylor v Dunbar to be a case 
on extraordinary delay by unforeseen bad weather, but the actual report suggests that there 
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had been insufficient food even for the ordinarily anticipated length of the voyage.786 The 
insured did not recover. 
 
Tatham and Gregson were difficult cases, and it is arguably wrong to consider they established 
a general rule protecting the insurer from delay to the voyage. It is unclear to what extent the 
reasoning in Tatham and, Gregson was of general application. In Lawrence v Aberdein787 it 
was stated that the losses in Tatham were caused by perils of the sea as a remote cause, and 
by mortality of the slaves as the proximate cause. Statute provided no loss should be 
recoverable on account of the mortality of slaves.788 Conceivably, the losses would have been 
recoverable had the statute not been enacted. Tatham did not establish a general applicable to 
all livestock; rather statute prevented recovery where slaves died of natural causes.789 The 
courts were keen on both occasions to punish negligent or inhumane slaveowners, and were 
guided by strong humanitarian concern in applying the statute. If owners recovered after 
taking insufficient care of their human cargoes, insurance became open to serious abuse that 
statute would be ineffective in preventing. Arnould noted that the position prior to Taylor v 
Dunbar was not as clear-cut as was later suggested, as the reasoning is inconsistent with early 
cases on loss by mortality in livestock.790 Rationally, the mortality of slaves is comparable to 
the inherent vice of perishable cargo. Without the Acts, this would have been recoverable. 
Arguably, the better view is that Taylor v Dunbar established an entirely new rule, 
independent of the earlier cases, excluding compensation for delay where the inherent vice of 
perishable cargo became manifest following delay to a voyage, even where that delay was 
caused by an insured peril. 
 
The exclusion was explained in Pink v Fleming791 where the vessel, carrying a cargo of fruit, 
was damaged by an insured peril. The cargo was discharged to allow the repair, and on arrival 
found to be partly spoiled. Pink supported the rule that the insurer on ship or goods is not 
liable for loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay is caused by a peril insured 
against.792 It was decided on the basis of ‘proximate cause’ (Lord Esher MR), then understood 
as being the cause last in time; the loss there was caused in part by handling of the cargo of 
fruit, and in part by the perishable nature – inherent vice – of the fruit. Nothing in Pink v 
Fleming explicitly stated a general rule protecting insurers from liability for all losses for 
                                                     
786 ibid (Lawrence J) 
787 (1821) 5 B&Ald 107, 111 (Abbott CJ); Robert Merkin, Johanna Hjalmarsson, Aysegul Bugra, Jennifer Lavelle, 
Marine Insurance Legislation, (2014, Informa), 96 
788 34 Geo 3, c 80, s 10 
789 Slave Trade Act 1790, 30 Geo 3, c 33 s 8; Slave Trade Act 1794, 34 Geo 3 c 80 
790 Arnould (17th edn, 2008), 954, fn 309 
791 (1890) 25 QBD 396 (CA) 
792 cf Halsbury’s Laws Vol 25 (2003) 350 
151 
 
delay howsoever caused. In both Pink v Fleming and Taylor v Dunbar the losses were 
effectively physical losses, caused by the perishable nature of the cargo – its inherent vice – 
where the length of the voyage was extended by the insured peril acting on the hull. These 
deal with inherent vice or damage evident to cargo on arrival. These authorities were on 
different facts and do not consider the situation where the cargo arrives undamaged, but later 
than anticipated, not due to perils of the seas generally, but for loss of possession claims 
arising from specified insured perils. They are far removed from situations where 
abandonment was given during any period of loss of possession. 
 
It was apparently commonplace on the SG Policy to expressly exclude delay from cover. The 
effectiveness of such an exclusion rule derived from the then prevalent ‘last in time’ doctrine 
of proximate cause, where delay would inevitably be last in time. This former approach to 
proximate cause was ended by Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance 
Society Ltd,793 following which the courts look for the ‘real and efficient’ cause of the loss. 
This leaves the effect of delay to be determined on a case-by-case basis,794 and accordingly 
reduces uniformity and predictability. The exclusion for delay in Pink and s 55(2)(b) is well-
settled; it is not suggested that it should be modified. However, since this exclusion developed 
later to and subsequently existed alongside rules governing total losses for delay, the claims 
allowing a recovery for total loss on loss of possession may be established exceptions to this 
exclusion, as they apply to different, separate classes of factual situations. 
 
Arguably, the exception should be confined to situations concerning delays caused by 
weather, not the other perils. In Magoun v New England Marine Insurance Company,795 the 
vessel was arrested and detained by authorities in New Granada, and restored. After her 
restoration, it was found that as she had been exposed to hot weather for an extended time, 
she was damaged to such an extent that she could not perform the voyage without extensive 
repairs. The cargo was likewise spoiled. The vessel was abandoned to insurers. The 
underwriters argued that the loss was due to delay, and exposure to the climate. Storey J held 
otherwise: “the argument is that the injury to the vessel, by the long delay and exposure to 
the climate, was the immediate cause of the loss, and the seizure and detainment the remote 
cause only; … and that the underwriters are not liable for injury … by delays in the voyage. 
… this is not a correct exposition of the rule. All the consequences naturally flowing from the 
peril insured against… are properly attributable to the peril itself”. This was approved in 
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Lanasa Fruit Steamship v Universal Insurance Company,796 where it was held that where the 
voyage was made protracted by a peril of the sea, in consequence of which protraction a cargo 
spoiled, the proximate cause was the peril of the sea, not delay. It was considered, noting 
English authority, that storms were an exception to this, “we lay on one side cases of 
protracted voyages caused by storms and the special questions to which their varied 
circumstance give rise”.797 
 
A survey of English and American authority together suggests that the exception for delay is 
narrower that it at first appears. Arguably, losses of possession fall outside it, just as 
‘stranding’, and ‘collision’798 cases fall outside the exclusion for losses by delay.  The 
American position appears to be the same as the English. For example, it appears that the loss 
in Intermondale Trading Co v North River Insurance Company of New York,799 where insured 
cargo on vessel detained in Gibraltar for 6 months, and sold by authorities to pay for freight, 
was a loss due to detention, and would have constituted a total loss were it not excluded by 
the FC&S clause. There, the lack of discussion of whether the loss flowed from delay indicates 
that the exception, in American law, is equally narrow. 
 
7.2 Development of the Doctrine of Proximate Cause  
 
That marine insurance ignores remote causes of loss became settled at an early date. Lord 
Bacon stated the general principle that law would be unworkable “…if it were infinite for the 
law to consider the causes of causes, and their impulsions one on another, therefore it 
contenteth itself with the immediate cause”.800 In Naylor v Palmer that generality was 
confirmed: “The proximate cause, and not the remote, cause of the loss is always considered, 
according to the well-known legal maxim expounded by Lord Bacon, causa proxima non 
remota in lege spectator”.801 Insurance law added to this, ‘The proximate cause is that which 
is proximate in efficiency’, and “Unchallenged and unchallengeable authority shows that this 
is a question to be answered applying the common sense of a business or seafaring man”.802 
Gradually, in application, it seemed that the English courts looked for the cause of the loss 
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802 T M Noten BV v Harding [1990] Lloyd’s Rep 283, 286-287 (Bingham LJ); Global Process Systems [2011] 
UKSC 5, [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 560, [19] 
153 
 
last-in-time. So, where a vessel met with sea-damage, that slowed her rate of sailing, as a 
consequence of which she was taken by an enemy which otherwise she would have escaped, 
even though she would have arrived safe but for the sea-damage, the loss was attributed to the 
capture, on the basis that causa proxima non remotur spectator.803 There, previous sea 
damage, potentially causing an excluded loss by delay, caused a covered loss by capture. The 
cause last in time was operative. A clear rule on causation was seen to reduce litigation, and 
to identify the applicable peril easily.  
Tests of causation were variously expressed, eventually inspiring judicial criticism of the 
variety of tests, and in particular, of the apparent focus on the last cause in time; “It must be 
admitted that the terminology of causation in English law is by no means ideal. It would be 
the better for a little plain English. I think "direct cause" would be a better expression than 
causa proxima. Logically, the antithesis of proximate cause is not real cause but remote 
cause”.804 Various similar phrases had been used to express the same idea as ‘proximate 
cause’, inter alia: “causa causans”;805 "immediate" cause;806 "direct and immediate" cause;807 
and "direct" cause.808 The test, however, should always have been to identify the common-
sense cause of the loss. Cause and effect were the same for underwriters as for other people. 
Proximate cause was not a device to avoid the trouble of discovering the real cause or the 
"common-sense cause." While it should be rigorously applied in insurance cases, it should 
help the one side no more often than it helps the other.809 A recent illustration of the ‘common-
sense’ approach of the court is in the Atlasnavios, where it was held on appeal that was caused 
both by the malicious act of the drug smugglers and by  the  detainment  of  the  vessel  by  
reason  of  the  infringement  of  customs regulations, which  infringement  was constituted  
by  the  concealment  of  the  drugs.810 
 
The last in time rule was criticised, as conflicting with this common-sense test of the real 
cause. The Supreme Court summarised the change deriving from Leyland Shipping Co v 
Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society:811 
“In the Victorian era, the “proximate” cause in marine insurance was readily 
associated with the last cause in point of time… The modern focus on the “real efficient 
cause” was finally established at the highest level after the enactment of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, in Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance 
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Society Ltd [1918] AC 350. From that moment, the proximate cause became a matter 
of judgment and less easy to identify with certainty”.812 
 
In holding the torpedo to be the proximate cause of the loss rather than sea perils, the House 
of Lords there confirmed and emphasised that the last cause is not necessarily the proximate 
cause, rejecting this in favour of a testing the “effective” cause. Consequently, the ‘last-in-
time’ authorities became questionable.813 The Supreme Court confirmed the ‘real efficient 
cause’ test. While some authorities before 1906 appeared to proceed on the basis that the cause 
closest in time was the relevant cause, it was now settled that that was not the test for 
proximate cause, which was rather that which was ‘proximate in efficiency’814, and that 
“Unchallenged and unchallengeable authority shows that this is a question to be answered 
applying the common sense of a business or seafaring man”.815 
 
The changing approach makes the exclusion of losses for delay resulting from perils of the 
sea, or named perils, doubtful. An early example of a real and efficient cause approach, 
although on freight, was Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd816 where it was held that 
where a vessel ran aground necessitating such lengthy repairs that the voyage was frustrated, 
the proximate cause of the lost freight had been perils of the sea.817 Arguably, since the 
collision was an ‘effective’ cause in Pink v Fleming, the two decisions appear 
irreconcilable,818 and Pink may no longer be of general application. Accordingly, applying an 
‘effective cause rule’, a loss attributable to delay consequent on another insured peril might 
be recoverable.819 Contrastingly, these arguments should be balanced against the wording of 
s 55(2)(b) of the 1906 Act, which intended to reflect decisions and not Leyland Shipping.  
 
The last-in-time rule on causation was never fully adopted in America. Sheiffelin v The New-
York Insurance Company (the Dean)820 concerned a policy on goods on a voyage from New 
York to Bremen, against “dangers of the seas only”. As a result of perils of the seas, the vessel 
sprang a leak and put into a port. There, she was detained by embargo and ordered to 
Amsterdam, where part of the cargo was taken by the government while it was being re-loaded 
for transhipment on another vessel. When released from the embargo, the vessel put to sea, 
but was run aground in a storm, and so damaged to be not worth repairing. The remaining 
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cargo was seized by the government and carried to Amsterdam. Was seizure or the stranding 
the cause of the loss? Kent CJ identified two possibilities, either the proximate cause, ending 
all enquiry into the previous loss, was stranding; or the seizure ended the power of the captain 
to forward the goods to another vessel. He held “the voyage was lost by seizure preventing 
the captain from sending on the cargo, and that the defendants are entitled to judgment”. The 
American court looked behind the last-in-time cause, to the real cause, and held that capture, 
not stranding, a later cause of delay, was the cause of the loss.  
 
American courts were never constrained by a rule equivalent to 55(2)(b) of the 1906 Act. 
Consequently, the effect of Leyland Shipping was to more fully liberate American courts from 
the last-in-time doctrine. In Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co Inc v Universal Ins Co,821 
Leyland was followed, and Pink v Fleming expressly doubted. There, the issue was “whether 
loss by natural deterioration, during a delay in the voyage caused by a sea peril, is a loss by 
sea perils, within the meaning and intent of the policy of insurance”. A fact-sensitive approach 
applied; “We lay on one side cases of protracted voyages caused by storms and the special 
questions to which their varied circumstances give rise”. Consequently, natural deterioration 
of a cargo of bananas was held to be within the policy, where the vessel was stranded and the 
voyage consequently protracted.822 Brandyce v US Lloyd’s823 confirmed that different 
approaches applied to cases of protraction of the voyage by wind and wave from delays caused 
by other perils of the seas, such as stranding or damage. Where the vessel was damaged, so 
that the cargo, because of inherent vice, would be capable of reaching the destination port, 
was consequently sold at an intermediate port, there was a total loss of the goods.824 Clearly, 
in America, Lanasa established opposite rules to those in Pink v Fleming and s 55(2)(b). The 
important point is that there is no universal rule, but rather a fact sensitive approach that 
distinguishes protraction of voyages by mere action of wind and wave. This reinforces the 
argument that separate rules should apply to each of the three classes of losses; delay by wind 
and wave, stranding and damage, and losses of possession. Following Lanasa, the American 
markets responded with the “delay clause”, intending to protect the insurer from any claim 
consequent on loss of time, ‘whether arising from an insured peril or not’.  The effectiveness 
or otherwise of such a clause confirms the underlying position, that the doctrine of causation 
was not as restrictive as s 55 indicates. 
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Accordingly, in these different ways, the courts of both England and America test the real and 
efficient cause. Arguably, following Lanasa and Leyland, the application of s 55(2)(b) should 
be confined to cases where the voyage was retarded by wind and wave. This, and The 
Leopard; The Ostrich, should be seen as applying to situations where the only cause of the 
loss has been wind and wave in retarding the voyage. Arguably, the rule should not be seen 
as wider in scope.  
  
For a time, popular clauses did not invoke the common-law rule, but contained express clauses 
different in effect. Clearly, the causa proxima rule could be modified by policy terms. Where 
a vessel insured on a policy containing the FCS clause, specifically excluding ‘the 
consequences thereof in her port of loading’, ran to sea before she was loaded to avoid these 
perils, and was wrecked, the underwriters were not liable. However, the freight on the same 
vessel was separately insured, and the policy did not contain a like warranty. The freight 
insurers were liable for the same loss. The distinction was based on the “word 
“consequences” to be found in the warranty contained in the first and not present in the 
second”.825 Excluding all ‘consequences’ implied a different approach to the causa proxima 
rule,826 and the warranty excluded the former events. In Bensaude v Thames & Mersey Marine 
Insurance Co Ltd827 a peril of the sea caused the main shaft to fail, necessitating a return to 
the load port for repairs. The delay in commencing the voyage frustrated the adventure, and 
the charterers terminated the contract. A claim for loss of freight failed on the basis of a policy 
clause excluding ‘any claim consequent upon loss of time, whether arising from a peril of the 
sea or otherwise’: 
“…if the claim depends on loss of time in the prosecution of the voyage so that the 
adventure cannot be completed within the time contemplated, then the underwriter is 
to be exempt from liability”.828  
  
This was followed in Russian Bank for Foreign Trade v Excess Insurance Co Ltd,829 but 
doubted in Atlantic Maritime Co Inc v Gibbon.830 The Modern Institute Clauses cover losses 
by arrest, restraints and detainments, and do not contain exclusions for losses “consequent 
upon” delay, so the common-law rules will apply. The significance of this discussion is to 
demonstrate that the presumption of total loss predated, and coexisted with, the rule in Pink 
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now codified in s 55(b), and accordingly the exclusion should not be retrospectively 
understood to apply to exclude the presumption.  
 
 
 
7.3 The Duty to Sue and Labour 
 
After a casualty, insureds are under a duty to ‘sue and labour’ to minimise any loss. When 
might failure to act undermine a right to claim instantly for total loss, on the basis that this 
duty has not been fulfilled? In particular, on a capture or seizure, the insured may make efforts 
himself to ensure the return of his property, most obviously by ransom, or by formal legal 
processes. Does the availability of these avenues of mitigating his loss undermine his 
entitlement to claim for a total loss?  
 
It is settled that a writ agreement as to when the parties’ rights are considered settled does not 
end the duty of the insured to sue and labour, nor is the position settled even when civil 
proceedings, have been issued. Those issues are independent of the parties’ respective rights 
as to whether a total loss has occurred, although the policy aim of the writ agreement 
protecting the insured’s position from a change in circumstances is noted. 831 Three types of 
mitigation potentially allow an insured to recover his property, but the insured was under no 
obligation to participate in any: (i) ransom; (ii) security; (iii) litigation; yet (vi) disparate 
situations nevertheless existed where the insured’s inaction defeated their claims. 
 
i. By ransom 
While the history of law of ransom was considered superficially in Masefield, a more detailed 
consideration provides arguments undermining Masefield as authority for the ‘wait and see’ 
approach on a capture. Two material issues emerge, whether: (i) for insurance purposes 
ransom implies that title has changed to the captor; and (ii) whether the payment is a ‘proper 
means’ which an insured should sue-and-labour to recover property, the availability of which 
suspends a right to claim for total loss. To answer this the following issues are considered: 
a. Ransom as a new title by purchase? 
b. How is ransom treated by criminal laws? 
c. Is ransom recoverable under sue and labour? 
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158 
 
d. Is it a general average expense? 
e. Is ransom a proper means for an insured to use to recover property? 
 
a Ransom as a New Title by Purchase 
 
Emerigion noted ransom could be offered by the insurers, and if accepted, property became 
theirs. While acknowledging postliminity in respect of the owners’ title, if ransom was offered 
by the insurer, the return of the property to them was a new title,832 distinct from a situation 
of recapture and restoration of title by postliminity. Subsequent authority in English law is 
sparse. In the separate context of whether the voyage has ended by capture, illustrated by 
situations before the 1894 Act where freight was still the ‘mother of wages’, and the voyage 
was lost, it was confirmed obiter that ransom was a new purchase. Repossession was not under 
postliminal rights of original ownership, but a new purchase: 
“The ransom,” said he, “is a new purchase of the ship, and it will deserve great 
consideration before it is determined, that after a ransom the owners shall be liable to 
pay wages for the time which elapsed before the capture”.833 
 
Further support for ransom being a simple contract which recognises possession and control, 
ie de facto ownership, in the captor derives from Anthon v Fisher & Another, where it was 
argued:  
“Dr. Wynne answered, that, though the contract of ransom happens to be connected, 
in point of time, with the capture as prize, it does not necessarily arise out of it, but is, 
in truth, a mere simple contract of sale, between individuals, who, at the time, and for 
the purpose of the contract, are considered as not being the subjects of hostile 
States”.834 
 
This contention was not disputed. Accordingly, general dicta before Masefield recognise that 
ransom payments treat the property as having passed on the capture. This understanding is 
more consistent with a presumption of total loss and less consistent with recognising 
continuing postiliminity, and arguably reflects a settled proposition that ransom was a new 
purchase. The single contrary authority, Parsons v Scott,835 described the release of the vessel 
on payment of ransom as a ‘liberation’. Nevertheless, new title remains the better 
understanding, and no recent express rule contradicts this. It is apparent from American 
authority that paying sums to secure the release of the vessel indicates recognition of de facto 
ownership, and supports idea of new title in the captor.836   
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b Ransom in criminal law 
 
In Masefield the claimant’s comparison to criminal laws was quickly rejected at first 
instance837 and on appeal.838 Nevertheless, this remains worthwhile as consistency across 
different areas is desirable. The word ‘theft’ is to be construed in a business sense, rather than 
a criminal meaning, should there be inconsistency.839 Nevertheless, Lord Denning MR 
considered the criminal law in a similar context to capture in Shell International Petroleum 
Ltd v Gibbs (the Salem), on a conspiracy to steal a cargo of oil in a port, before the insured 
voyage: 
 
“It was larceny by a trick: see all the authorities such as Rex v Aickles (1794) 1 Leach 
294… I make no apology for referring to the old criminal law in this context”. 840 
 
The comparison with criminal cases and the Larceny Act 1916 informed his understanding of 
the thief’s intention for insurance purposes:  
 
“Larceny was always spoken of as a "taking."… The concept of "takings" in this policy 
is the same as the concept of "taking" in the old law of larceny. It involves a change of 
possession. As Atkin LJ in Lake v Simmons [1926] 2 KB 51, 71 said: "This is not a 
technicality of the criminal law, but a principle as old as the common law, and governs 
civil rights and procedure as much as obligations and procedure in matters of 
crime"".841 
 
Arguably, where insurance matters were informed by criminal law in appellate jurisdictions 
in 1980, it remains useful. No detailed reason for the refusal to adopt such considerations in 
Masefield was given. 
 
Does criminal law provided a presumption of irretrievable deprivation, where the thief intends 
to sell back or ransom the property to its owner. The starting point is the Larceny Act 1916, 
which used the phrase ‘permanently to deprive’, a comparable phrase to ‘permanently 
deprive’ in s 60 of the 1906 Act, stating: 
‘(1) A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a 
claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being 
stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof’. 
 
So the Larceny Act contained a test of intention to permanently deprive the owner of property. 
That section was explained in the codifying Theft Act 1968. Section 6(1) provides: 
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‘A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other 
permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the 
intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as 
his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights…’ 
Section 6(1) reflects the common-law, and was intended to explain earlier authority. Recently, 
in R v Raphael and Another,842 it was observed that ‘the section itself demonstrates that the 
necessary intention may sometimes be established when the person appropriating property 
belonging to another does not in fact intend that its true owner should be deprived of it 
permanently. It is properly described as a deeming provision. As Lord Lane CJ observed in 
Lloyd…“…It must mean, if nothing else, that there are circumstances in which a Defendant 
may be deemed to have the intention permanently to deprive, even though he may intend the 
owner eventually to get back the object which has been taken843.” Applying s 6(1) in R v 
Raphael and Another,844 the Court of Appeal held that where defendants had taken a motor 
car and demanded £500 for its return, the mens rea of theft was established, namely an 
intention to irretrievably deprive the owner under s 6(1) of the 1968 Act. 
 
As noted in Raphael, the common-law was explained in R v Hall,845 where an employee of a 
tallow-maker stole candle-fat, offering it for sale back to the maker at full value. His defence 
was that there had been no larceny, as he had never intended to permanently deprive his 
employer of the fat. He submitted: ‘It is almost a contradiction in terms to say, that there was 
an intent to deprive the owner of his goods in specie, the intent being to deprive him of the 
value of them in money’. That argument was rejected. Lord Denman CJ held ‘The question 
here is, whether there was an intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. How 
could that be done more effectually than by selling it? It is no matter to whom it is sold’. 
Concurring, Parke B stated: ‘The intent of the party here was not only to deprive the owner of 
his goods, but to commit the impudent fraud of making him buy his own goods, and pay for 
them’. The other judge concurred. Although in R v Hall, the fat had been offered for sale at 
full value, the judgments of Denman CJ and Parke were expressed more widely so that they 
embraced a sale, without reference to the price requested. In Raphael it was also noted that it 
had been said in Lloyd: 
“…The first part of section 6(1) seems to us to be aimed at the sort of case where a 
Defendant takes things and then offers them back to the owner for the owner to buy if 
he wishes. If the taker intends to return them to the owner only upon such payment, 
then, on the wording of section 6(1) that is deemed to amount to the necessary intention 
permanently to deprive…”846  
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That reinforced that there was no difference between a demand for ‘full’ value and any 
demand for payment; no mention of a requirement of full value was implied from the test. 
The judgment continued to note that there were other cases of ‘similar intent’. The following 
example was expressed of showing the necessary criminal intention, “I have taken your 
valuable painting. You can have it back on payment to me of £X000. If you are not prepared 
to make that payment, then you are not going to get your painting back”. This is clearly a 
situation where a criminal gang would not normally ask for a full open market price for a 
painting, where such a price would be a difficult and subjective task to assess.  
 
Finally, in R v Raphael a smaller sum was demanded than the value of the car. That is much 
more comparable to Masefield than the earlier cases. The court did not distinguish earlier 
cases on the basis that a conceptual difference distinguished a demand for a full payment from 
one for a token payment. It had been noted in Raphael that asking for a small sum in relation 
to the total worth of an item would be an assumption of only part of the rights of the owner – 
a ransomer could easily ask for more. However, Chan Man-sin v Attorney General of Hong 
Kong,847 was approved, where it was said concerning fraud: 
 
“Ownership, of course, consists of a bundle of rights and it may well be that there are 
other rights which an owner could exert over the chose in action in question which are 
not trespassed on by the particular dealing which the thief chooses to assume. In R v 
Morris [1983] 3 All ER 288, [1984] AC 320, however, the House of Lords decisively 
rejected a submission that it was necessary, in order to constitute an appropriation as 
defined by s 3(1) of the 1968 Act, to demonstrate an assumption by the accused of all 
the rights of an owner”. 
 
 
Accordingly, although Hall can be distinguished from the situation in Raphael and Masefield 
by the essential difference that the employee intended to demand a full value for the property 
from the owner, the criminal law never distinguished between these scenarios. An intention 
to permanently deprive was implied into both. Therefore, the criminal law took the conceptual 
approach rejected by Steel J in Masefield,848 that where a person offers the owner the chance 
to pay a ransom, he treats the property as his own, and is deemed to intend permanently to 
deprive the owner of his property, even where he offers the true owner the property back for 
a small ransom. Finally, In Masefield, the submission was not made that ‘piracy’ as defined 
in both domestic laws and customary international law included ‘robbery’.849 In both a 
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domestic and international context, where a ransom was demanded nothing was left undone 
by the pirates to ‘complete’ their act as constituting the crime.  
 
Although the criminal law is supportive of the insured’s interests, it is conceded that it is not 
decisive. Insurance law, since Goss, has been separate from property law. Criminal law must 
be a separate branch of law again. However, consistency across the different branches of law 
is desirable.  Property law must apply separate principles from the criminal law: if title never 
transferred on a theft, how could a suspect ever be prosecuted if criminal law did not treat the 
deprivation as irretrievable theft. It is arguably desirable that criminal law and insurance law 
should be consistent on theft or capture.  
 
c Ransom and the sue-and-labour clause 
 
Difficulties potentially arise where ransom payments are prohibited. The Ransom Act 1782850 
prohibited ransom payments to an enemy. Unsurprisingly, English courts subsequently 
considered few ransom situations. Potentially, the Act prohibited ransom payments to pirates, 
as pirates were deemed to be hostium gentibus, which definition ultimately from Cicero was 
adopted by the court in Goss, and by the criminal law relating to the universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute pirates. However, this was never argued; it appears that the academic opinion of the 
Victorian profession was that ransom was permitted to pirates. Arnould considered that while 
ransom to an enemy was prohibited by statute, this extended only to enemies, and not to pirates 
or other plunderers, and as a consequence monies paid by the master to them to liberate the 
ship and cargo would be a general average expense.851 The adoption of this view settled the 
position that ransom payments are recoverable expenses under the sue-and-labour clause.  
 
In Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain, Stuart-Smith and Phillips LJJ cited with 
approval,852 the summary of the law as stated by Arnould that ‘payment to recover property 
from pirates or hijackers must, it is submitted, in general be recoverable. Similarly, where 
payment is made to the authorities in a country to obtain the release of property detained by 
them it can generally make no difference whether or not the laws there in force have been 
properly applied’.853 Stuart-Smith LJ considered difficulties arising from Aitchison v Lohre 
that suggested ransom, which could not be valued on a quantum meruit basis, and is paid by 
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the shipowner, not to his agent for his exertions in saving the ship but to a stranger who is 
detaining it, cannot be recovered under the sue and labour clause:854 
“…I have found some difficulty in fitting this proposition into the notion of recovering 
reasonable expenses for the exertions in saving the vessel, since the ransom payment 
obviously bears no relation to the exertions involved. It might merely consist in the 
transfer of a sum of money … But Mr Aikens has persuaded me that unless the payment 
of a ransom is illegal, it is recoverable from underwriters and although the precise 
basis for the recovery is not altogether clear, it does seem to be accepted that it can be 
under the sue and labour clause. This, at any rate, appears to be the view of the editors 
of Arnould”.855 
 
Further, Goss and Berens v Rucker,856 both predating the Ransom Acts, indicated that insurers 
would be liable to reimburse ransom payment. The Ransom Acts prohibited otherwise lawful 
payments. Accordingly, while the precise rationale remains uncertain, longstanding custom 
provided that ransom payments were recoverable under the sue-and-labour clause.  
 
Section 15(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 would prevent payments where the payments might 
be used for terrorism, but this factual issue has not yet been argued, and ransom payments 
made in the context of ‘private ends’ piracy, with no political aspect, would not be prevented 
by the Act.857 
 
American laws likewise provided that ransom was recoverable, but added the refinement that 
what is a reasonable ransom was relevant to the insurer’s assessment of whether compensation 
should be paid for the ransom sum; there being compensation if it is reasonable.858 Further, 
where property is captured, condemned and sold, if the master repurchases it without prior 
authority, the underwriters are liable for a total loss, supporting the idea of sale and ransom 
being new title.859 
 
d Ransom and general average contributions 
 
The cost of a ransom payment made by the hull interest may be recoverable as a general 
average contribution from cargo interests. This was hinted at in Masefield, and subsequent 
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practice appears to indicate that this is the view of the market.860 However, merely because it 
could be a general average expense is a different issue from whether an insured is bound to 
pay ransom, or forfeit recovery. There is little general guidance. Arnould stated that certain 
expenses in addition to repair might be recoverable from the underwriter, including the wages, 
provisions and expenses paid in ransom, or expenses to liberate cargo from detention. These 
would be contemplated as being within the ordinary services of the voyage which were 
payable out of freight, and gave insureds a claim against the underwriters of ship or cargo, 
whichever was responsible for the detention. Further, where “the services of the master and 
crew are thus given for the joint benefit of both ship and cargo, as they are when both are the 
subject of detention, the expense incurred gives a claim to average contribution, and only falls 
indirectly on the underwriters”.861  
 
In circumstances such as in Masefield, the cost of negotiating ransom to Somali pirates, and 
incidental expenses thereto, might constitute general average events. A general average act 
must be an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure. Rule A of the York-Antwerp Rules 1974 
provided that “there is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary 
sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred”. If part of the cargo 
is voluntarily, without fraud or cowardice given to a pirate by way of composition or ransom, 
to induce him to spare the vessel and the residue of the goods, or if a sum of money be agreed 
to be paid to a pirate or enemy by way of ransom, then it appeared settled that such a loss 
would be general average.862 
 
Payment of ransom might therefore be a general average expense. If properly so treated, the 
payment may not be treated as a sue and labour expense.863 If correctly characterised as an 
extraordinary cost incurred so as to ensure the continuation of the common venture, the 
ransom payment and related costs would appear recoverable in General Average for cargo’s 
proportion, assuming an absence of actionable fault on the part of the shipowner. So far as 
enforcement of the right to general average is concerned provided that a successful release of 
the ship and cargo is secured, general average security should be collected in the usual way 
prior to the discharge of the cargo at destination.864 It has been noted that ransom for the 
purpose of releasing crew – the primary motive justifying the morality of such payments in 
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Masefield, rather than specifically the specie potentially means that such a ransom would not 
be a sue and labour expense or a general average sum under the hull policy.865 This argument 
has yet to be determined. 
 
General average expenses, to be recoverable, must be ‘reasonable’. While “At least in one 
sense, no ransom payment could ever be described as “reasonable”. Pirates are criminals 
engaged in extortion and their demands are unlawful and deplorable… The idea of a 
“reasonable ransom” is radically misconceived and the term an oxymoron”,866 the real issue 
was whether it was reasonable for owners to pay the sum, and reasonable to expend money in 
negotiating the ransom down. The correct approach was to test this by the sums expended in 
relation to the value of property – in the Mitsui case, the expenditure was held to be reasonable 
as it totalled about one sixths of the value of the property. Accordingly, the ransom and 
negotiation expenses were allowed in general average, and recovered from cargo interests by 
the owners. While suggesting that failure to ransom might be a breach of the sue and labour 
clause,867 given that the courts do not see a ransom as ‘reasonable’, the better view seems to 
be that courts could not find it ‘unreasonable’ to refuse to pay. 
 
e Whether Ransom a proper means an insured must employ to recover for total loss 
 
The discussion of whether ransom was ‘legal’, concluding that the person paying ransom will 
be an ‘innocent’ party,868 as addressed in Masefield, did not address the question of whether 
failure to pay this would undermine a constructive total loss. The question of illegality might 
be a problem in future cases. President Obama’s executive Order of 13 April 2010, and 
Council Regulation (EC) No 356/2010 potentially raise issues of illegality in relation to future 
ransom payments. Insurers on the London market adopted clauses preventing any 
contravention of any UN, US or EU resolutions or sanctions or laws,869 so the issue now 
potentially arises in English law.  
 
Does a refusal to pay ransom prevent an insured from claiming for total loss? Nothing in 
Emerigon’s extensive discussion on ransom and general average indicates that a master was 
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ever required to negotiate ransom,870 and the issue was little treated in later academic 
discussion. In Royal Boskalis, as in Masefield, no consideration was given as to whether the 
possibility of ransom payments postponed any claim for recovery by the insured. Instead, 
Royal Boskalis left open issues of public policy on ransom payments. It was expressly left 
unresolved “whether a sue and labour clause covers payments made under threats of total 
loss, from whatever source, which are totally repugnant to English law notions of legality. Is 
the payment of a type the law should recognise as entitling the payer to claim as sue and 
labour, given a public interest in the issue of extortion of money from shipowners in 
circumstances of duress and illegality?” It was acknowledged that payment under such a 
threat might be reasonable for the purposes of s 78(4) of the 1906 Act, but knowledge that the 
insurers would be liable, and that there would therefore be money to be paid, might encourage 
such threats.871 
 
Masefield answered these issues by finding that a ransom payment was not contrary to public 
policy, so that it was a proper means that an insured might use to restore recovery. Masefield 
went further than prior authority on the point that an insured could not recover on his policy 
if a ransom payment would be accepted. Interestingly, the judgment does not record any 
reference to arguments that Somali piracy extorted ransom payments under threat of total loss. 
Conceivably, were the point were more fully argued, it is far from clear that a future tribunal 
would come to Rix LJ’s conclusion on the public interest point in, effectively, requiring such 
payments to be made. 
 
In Ikerigi Compania Naviera SA v Palmer, Global Transeas Corp v Palmer, The Wondrous'872 
– in a passage approved in Handelsbanken ASA v Dandridge and others (The Aliza Glacial)873 
and The Atlasnavios –  the court considered whether concerned whether an insured’s refusal 
to pay ransom would deprive him of a claim, on the basis that the failure to sue and labour 
became the proximate cause of the loss. Comparison was made to clauses excluding cover for 
losses arising from ‘any financial cause’. This was rejected: "Wide as the words 'any financial 
cause' are… they must have some limitation. Suppose that a vessel was seized by a terrorist 
organisation wanting to raise money, a ransom demand was made for a million pounds and 
the owner declined to pay the money: could it be said that the detention of the vessel thereafter 
was through a financial cause? In a literal sense, it could, but no one would suggest that such 
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a conclusion would accord with the spirit of the policy".874 While obiter, this strongly supports 
the construction that a refusal to pay a ransom demand would not break the chain of causation, 
and the cause remains the original seizure. Policy considerations do not prevent an insured 
from claiming where the ransom is demanded by terrorists. If that is settled, it is difficult to 
see that non-terrorist capture provides a satisfactory distinction for an insured. How, for 
example, would the line between terrorist and non-terrorist be drawn? Such a rule would 
appear to be commercially undesirable. 
 
Masefield indicated that payments are not treated as a ‘bribe’ to obtain an improper 
advantage.875  This is significant, as bribery payments were discounted as things a prudent 
shipowner should have done in Pannamanian Oriantal. It is difficult, however, to distinguish 
the potential payments into court in Pannamanian from ransom, since the aim of both 
payments was to release insureds’ own property.  
 
American laws provided certain rules applicable to ransom situations. The act of the master 
in ransoming the vessel from a captor could not undo a total loss where abandonment had 
already been made, reinforcing the certainty accorded to the assured on serving notice. Where 
an insured vessel was captured and condemned, notice of abandonment was given and refused 
by insurers, and where after condemnation the master made a compromise with the captors 
and secured the vessel’s release, it was held that the total loss was fixed by the abandonment. 
Therefore, it was not in the power of the master by any act of his to change the total into a 
partial loss, without the subsequent assent of the insured. Accordingly, the purchase of the 
vessel by the master was for the benefit of the insurers, if they chose to take it, buy even if 
they did not, still their refusal to do so could not affect the abandonment.876 Clearly, the 
possibility of compromise existed but did not undermine the total loss. Following Masefield, 
on this express authority, there appears to be a distinction to English law. Arguably, the rule 
that the act of the master in ransoming be held to be the act of the insurer is desirable in 
providing a certain rule. The alternative construction, that the situation will be understood by 
a doctrine of ‘relating back’ a later act to the initial seizure clearly involves an element of 
uncertainty (cf Pollurian877). 
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It remains arguable that while the possibility of ransom payments being accepted means that 
there is no actual total loss, claims for constructive total loss might still be made successfully. 
The appeal in Masefield was confined to actual total losses:  
“The fact that there may be no duty to make a ransom payment does not turn a potential 
total loss which may be averted by the payment of ransom into an actual total loss: any 
more than the fact that there is no duty to spend an extravagant sum seeking to save a 
vessel driven onto the rocks means that there is an ATL (as distinct from a potential 
CTL) if, quite sensibly, the money and effort are not expended on such a forlorn and in 
every way undesirable venture. In any event, all such questions of reasonableness are 
pertinent to CTL, but not to the incidence of ATL”.878 
 
The difficulties of this decision can be reconciled by appreciating that Rix LJ’s judgment 
applies to actual total losses, and that the arguments in relation to constructive total losses 
remain open to insureds. 
 
The precedent of describing ‘no ransom payment as reasonable, leaves the issue to be 
determined finally – notwithstanding the first-instance decision in Masefield – that it was a 
reasonable means an insured might use to recover property, by an appellate court in relation 
to a constructive loss. Indeed, a strict analysis of Masefield is that it concerned a situation 
where another party would probably offer ransom, not a situation where ransom was not 
offered by the insured, and for actual, not constructive loss.  
 
ii. By litigation 
It was observed in Masefield that in Stringer the plaintiff was involved in the litigation in the 
American Admiralty Court to recover his property, and the English court investigated the 
chances of his success. However, no requirement rested on insureds to issue claims, however 
meritorious. Instead: 
“In general, whenever a ship is taken by the enemy, the insured may abandon, and 
demand as for a total loss; and he is not bound to make any claim or appeal in the 
enemy’s courts of admiralty, or to litigate there the validity of the capture”.879  
  
Goss anticipated this. An instant right of abandonment upon capture had no meaning if the 
insured was required to commence litigation. In Lozano v Janson,880 the court considered 
whether an insured should have provided security to a prize court holding his goods. In the 
circumstances, providing security was ‘un-commercial’, so that no reasonable merchant 
would have done so. The principle hinted at, that an insured might be required to give security, 
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was never followed, even in Stringer.881 In Stringer, when the ship was first taken, and it was 
inevitable that capture would be adjudicated before an American prize court: ‘…upon the 
capture of the ship, it was competent for Walsh, the owner of the goods, if he had thought fit 
so to elect, to treat the case as a total loss’.882 Whether security should have been given was 
a consideration only after insureds had decided to initiate legal process, indicating his wish to 
treat the property as his own, establishing an estoppel that prevented him from claiming for 
total loss. 
 
The master was under a duty when the vessel was captured, to put in a claim to recover it,883 
and this duty was widely recognised.884 It did not suspend the insured’s right to claim for total 
loss, otherwise this would have been noted in academic works. The argument that the master 
should make efforts to recover property was not made, e.g. in Mellish v Andrews885 the insured 
cargoes were seized and carried off by persons purporting to exercise governmental authority 
in the port of Carlshamn. There was no defence advanced that there should have been an 
attempt to retrieve them by any means. 
 
In American jurisdictions failure to litigate would not defeat the claim, and there was no 
requirement to litigate on capture.886 Marshall v Delaware Ins Co was followed in Adams v 
Delaware Ins Co,887 where the insured did not recover for total loss where notice of 
abandonment was given while the vessel was captured, but, unknown to insured, an order for 
restoration had been made by the prize court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confirmed 
that the insured would have recovered for a total loss if abandonment was given before order 
for restoration, notwithstanding the obvious likelihood of restoration on the facts as 
subsequently known.888 Likelihood of restoration, even, evidently a certainty of restoration, 
would not have defeated the claim if made in time.  
  
                                                     
881 (1870) LR 5 QB 599 
882 ibid, 601-2 (Kelly CB) 
883 Marshall v The Union Ins Co 2 Wash CC Rep 557 
884 Sherman (1841), 281 
885 16 East 312 
886 Russell v Union Ins Co 4 Dall (US) 421, Joyce JA, A Treatise on Marine, Fire, Life, Accident and All Other 
Insurances (1897), Vol 4, [3005] 
887 4 Binney 287 
888 Clark Hare JI, Wallace HB, American Leading Cases: Being Select Decisions of American Courts, in Several 
Departments of Law; with Especial Reference to Mercantile Law (3rd edn, 1852), 338 
170 
 
iii. By paying salvage or security 
Policies might contain clauses preventing recovery for total loss where there has been a failure 
to provide security. The Atlasnavios889 considered failure to provide security where the vessel 
was confiscated in contravention of local anti-drugs laws, when, unknown to her crew, 
concealed drugs were smuggled under her hull. The insurers relied on cl 4.1.6 of the Institute 
War and Strikes Clauses, and contended the loss of the vessel arose from failure on the part 
of the owners to provide security. It was accepted the security in question must be reasonable 
security:  
"In this connection, however, if it be shown that it was not reasonable for the owners 
to provide the surety demanded in respect of the vessel because the sum required 
exceeded the full value of the ship and would otherwise enable her to be treated as a 
constructive total loss, the exclusion should be treated as inapplicable".890 
 
In Melinda Holdings SA v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd,891 the 
Egyptian court attempted to fine a vessel for compensation for environmental damage done 
by another vessel, in a process that was neither ordinary nor judicial. The insured’s decision 
not to give security, but to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest, did not amount to a breach 
of the sue and labour clause.  
 
Comparison to the South African position indicates a strict approach is taken to the payment 
of court fines. In Incorporated General Insurance Ltd v Fisheries,892 the Supreme Court of 
South Africa, Appellate Division held: The Mozambican tribunal imposed a fine. Had that 
fine been paid the loss would not have resulted. In my view the confiscation did not result 
from the arrest of the trawler, it resulted from the failure to pay the fine. That failure was 
therefore the proximate cause of the confiscation of the trawler. The fact that the plaintiff was 
unable to pay the fine is irrelevant.” Given the findings of fact, that the insured was unable 
to pay the fine, the strict application of causa proxima created a harsh result for the insured. 
Given the result, it was unsurprising that no link was made to the long history of similar cases 
in argument or the judgment. As this point was not fully argued with reference to early English 
authorities, it is questionable whether contemporary English courts would follow the South 
African decision. The issue has been considered in other contexts, of whether the insured’s 
election not to take a step to recover property is the proximate cause.  
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Arguably, these authorities are inconclusive. For example, in Pringle v Hartley,893 on 
recapture the vessel was sold as no person appeared to answer for the moiety to satisfy the 
salvage. This was held to be a total loss justifying abandonment, so that the failure of the 
insured to act did not defeat the claim, or break the chain of causation from the original peril. 
Contrastingly, in Powell v Gudgeon894 perils of the sea caused damage to the ship. For want 
of funds to make repairs, the cargo was sold. It was held (per Ellenborough CJ) that the 
proximate cause of the loss was the sale, not the perils of the sea, and accordingly the insured 
did not recover. This was stated not to be a general rule, and the cases of jettison or general 
average were expressly left out of consideration.   
 
Naturally, an insured may wish to recover the vessel, and in certain circumstances these efforts 
to sue and labour do not undermine a constructive total loss. In Suez Fortune Investments Ltd 
v Talbot Underwriting Ltd, where the vessel was boarded by pirates, and – in circumstances 
that remained in dispute – in the course of defending the vessel a fire started in the engine 
room that caused the ship to be a constructive total loss, the expenditure on tugs so as to 
prevent the vessel from being a hazard to shipping, and to tow it to a port where the cost of 
repairs could be valued, were recoverable sue and labour expenses. The fact this expenditure 
was undertaken did not undermine the notice of abandonment.895 At all times, the intention to 
abandon must be clear, and this activity did not undermine that abandonment. 
 
iv. By the insured’s election 
Conversely, the insured’s election might break the chain of causation. In Inman Steamship v 
Bischoff,896 by a charterparty dated 20 February 1879, by which the Admiralty chartered for 
three months a steamship owned by the appellants, the owners covenanted that the ship should 
at all times during the continuance of the charter be in every respect seaworthy, and it was 
also provided that if at any time the ship became incapable, from any cause whatsoever, to 
perform efficiently the service contracted for, "it shall and may be lawful to and for the 
[charterers] … to put the ship out of pay, or to make such abatement by way of mulct out of 
the hire or freight of the said ship as they shall adjudge fit and reasonable". On 22 February 
the appellants effected a time policy on "freight outstanding" against the ordinary marine 
perils including perils of the sea. On 21 March, during a voyage to South Africa, the ship 
struck a rock, and sustained damage which rendered her unfit to perform the chartered service. 
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The charterers thereupon put her out of pay as respected the remaining period of the charter. 
It was held that the cause of the loss of freight was, not a peril of the sea, but the exercise by 
the charterers of the special power conferred on them by the charterparty; loss through the 
exercise of that power was a distinct and different risk from that of loss by perils of the sea; 
the appellants were insured against the latter risk but not against the former; and, therefore, 
they were not entitled to recover on the policy. 
 
v. Other issues 
 
In the case of freight policies, the common-law established that where a vessel was lost and 
abandoned to hull insurers, there could be no claim for loss of freight if the freight were 
subsequently earned by hull insurers, the loss of freight to the assured was caused not by a 
peril of the sea but rather by abandonment of the vessel to the hull underwriters.897 Under the 
Institute Hulls Clauses, hulls underwriters now waive their right to freight. A similar situation 
may arise under a hull or cargo policy, where the master determines in the case of emergency 
to sell the subject-matter following damage: if the sale is unjustified in that there is no actual 
total loss, the assured will be confined to claiming for a partial loss.898  
 
A final note of caution is that a master, in endeavouring to have his vessel released, might 
void the policy. Prize law, old authority but nowhere overruled, provided that, “If the captain 
of a neutral vessel which has been captured by a belligerent, attempts to rescue her, it is a 
sufficient cause for condemnation, inasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nations, and if the 
attempt to do so is caused by any misinformation by the captors, it will not, as between the 
underwriter and the insured, excuse the act”.899 Accordingly, potential traps exist for an 
insured who has chosen to see if property can be recovered. While this has not arisen in recent 
authorities, it is possible to contemplate situations where the insured’s efforts effectively make 
an uncertain situation more difficult. How the courts would resolve issues of causation 
remains unknown. 
Overall, the courts consider the cause of the loss on a common sense basis. On perils of the 
sea preventing the voyage from starting, it was argued in Jackson that the doctrine of causa 
proxima, non remota, spectetur, applied, so that the proximate cause of the loss of the freight 
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was the refusal of the charterers to load. However, it was held that the voyage or adventure 
was frustrated by perils of the seas. Both parties were discharged; a loading of cargo in August 
would have been a new adventure. Even if that were not the case, the maxim did not apply. 
Perils of the seas did not cause something that caused another event. The freight was lost 
unless the charterers choose to go on, which they did not. 
 
The law appears to take a commercial view of the loss. Applied to a loss of possession 
situation, prior to Masefield, it would have been difficult to argue that non-payment of ransom 
or court charges amounted to a break in the chain of causation. This should be understood 
alongside the definitions of the perils. These perils were complete when possession was lost, 
as there was no relation back. Failure to pay a ransom could hardly, especially after 
observations in Mitsui, be said to be an unreasonable refusal, regardless of the sums 
demanded. It is arguably unlikely that such should break the chain of causation.  Arguably, if 
there were a refusal to pay ransom, then the chain of causation from the peril of loss of 
possession would not be broken. This adds weight to a presumption of total loss, and the 
exclusion of recoverability for losses flowing from delay should not undermine the 
presumption.  
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8 PRESUMPTIONS LOST AFTER 1906 
 
The presumption that insureds could recover on perils of loss of possession immediately was 
once settled. In M’Iver v Henderson900 where recapture occurred after proceedings were 
instituted, it was indisputable that there was sufficient ground of abandonment on capture.901 
Yet in Masefield, after capture lasted over a month, the insured did not recover. Rather, “It 
was a typical “wait and see” situation. The facts would not even have supported a claim for 
a CTL, for the test of that is no longer uncertainty of recovery, but unlikelihood of recovery”. 
How were settled presumptions lost, so the spes recuperandi become relevant to total loss? 
Dicta and academic commentary stating that the spes was tested had not, by 1906, replaced 
the presumption. The draftsmen intended that insureds could recover on loss of possession 
where circumstances were ‘uncertain’, although demonstrably a test of ‘uncertainty’ had 
never applied. After the 1906 Act the chance of recovery was usually assessed, and the 
presumptions largely ignored. The statutory tests played a significant part in destroying the 
presumptions, but it was arguably consistent with the Act to preserve them, and it is suggested 
that there remains limited scope for parties to reply on the presumption. In American laws, no 
such statutory change occurred, and while there are few recent American authorities, the better 
understanding is that American courts would continue to apply the presumptions, which is 
consistent with finality and the discouragement of litigation. 
 
8.1 Pre-1906 Act Classification; Notice of Abandonment 
 
In Masefield the insured pleaded both constructive and actual total loss. Was this an accurate 
reflection of the pre-Act law? Were perils causing loss of possession treated as actual or 
constructive total losses pre-1906? This is answered by reviewing situations in which notice 
of abandonment was unnecessary. Notice of abandonment indicates that the insured intends 
to allege total loss, protecting insurers from late claims and affording them the opportunity to 
attempt to preserve/recover the specie. While in Kaltenbach v MacKenzie, abandonment was 
described as the custom of insureds, only later becoming a condition precedent to recovery,902 
the eighteenth century reports imply that notice was expected and given in all cases on valued 
policies,903 with ‘actual total loss’ developing as the exception. In Goss, Mansfield LCJ noted 
                                                     
900 (1816) 4M&S 575, (1816) 105 ER 947 (KB) 
901 ibid, 583 
902 ibid 
903 Kulen Kemp v Vigne (The Emanuel) (1786) 1 TR 304, (1786) 99 ER 1109; Marshall (1802) suggested that 
Mansfield misunderstood the case and erred in treating it as a wager. Marshall’s suggested his reasoning was 
appropriate to a valued policy. The report clearly shows the policy took effect as a wager. 
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that ‘in all cases the insured may chuse not to abandon’,904 the sense ‘give notice of 
abandonment’905 being supported by The Selby, The Lady Mansfield,906 and Tunno v 
Edwards.907 By Davy and another v Milford the more specific rule emerged that notice was 
necessary where the property survived in specie908 capable of being restored.909 In practice, 
notice was invariably given until at least the 1850s.910 
 
Exceptions permitting recovery without notice appeared during the early nineteenth century. 
First was physical destruction of the specie by shipwreck. Three plaintiffs argued 
unsuccessfully that total loss without abandonment arose on capture by comparison to 
shipwreck.911  The second was the justifiable sale of the vessel by the insured following 
stranding or damage,912 or damage where repair was uncommercially expensive.913 Third, in 
The Martha914 notice of abandonment was unnecessary after property had been sold by a prize 
court, and similarly in Cossman v West; Cossman v British America Assurance Co (Le 
Cann).915 In Stringer, judicial sale established total loss without notice of abandonment.916 
Commentary related the requirement for notice to the spes:  total loss was “either total per se, 
or that which may be rendered so by abandonment”,917 and further:  
“…abandonment, in such cases, is … to exclude any inference that the insured still 
intend to adhere to it as their own." Tunno v Edwards918 laid down the doctrine 
distinctly, that wherever the thing insured subsists in specie, and there is a chance of 
its recovery, there must be an abandonment”.919 
These cases re-introduced property law considerations (“has property been sold?”), excluded 
by Goss, but in the limited context of whether notice was necessary. This left unchanged the 
circumstances where the insured had the right to abandon. Other textbooks went further than 
the authorities. Arnould stated: ‘If the privation exists as at the time the action is brought, the 
                                                     
904 (1758) 2 Burr 698 
905 2 Burr 1198, 1211 (Mansfield CJ) 
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909 Holdsworth v Wise (1828) 7 B&C 792, 799 (Ellenborough CJ) 
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919 Smith (1834), 381 
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assured may recover for an actual total loss, even though he has given no notice of 
abandonment’.920 M’Iver v Henderson,921 cited for this, does not support that rule. There, the 
vessel was captured, damaged, brought to a port in England and proceedings instituted before 
a prize court, and abandonment given in time. The guidance notes on s 61 of the 1906 Act 
provided that after capture the insured will have to give a notice of abandonment,922 suggesting 
absent sale, loss of possession would be a potential constructive total loss only. Nevertheless, 
the procedural requirement to serve notice of abandonment did not disturb any substantive 
presumption of total loss.  
Arguably, situations of sale following loss of possession should be considered actual total 
loss. In Fooks v Smith, it was noted the headnote to Cossman v West had stated: “…it is not 
necessary that a ship should be actually annihilated or destroyed. If it is lost to the owner by 
an adverse valid and legal transfer of his right of property and possession to a purchaser by 
a sale under decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in consequence of a peril insured 
against, it is as much a total loss as if it had been totally annihilated”.923 Total destruction 
would be actual total loss, and the lack of requirement for notice of abandonment for situations 
of sale indicated an analogous approach. 
The requirement to give notice of abandonment prevents insureds from invoking any wait-
and-see approach for constructive total loss. Insureds must give notice to the insurer ‘with 
reasonable diligence after the receipt of reliable information of the loss’.924 A similar 
requirement is found in American laws.925 A ‘reasonable time’ is interpreted strictly, meaning 
‘as soon as they were informed of events’,926 or at the ‘first opportunity’.927 Where master or 
recaptor continued to act for the insured’s interest after the casualty, where the insured was 
notified, failure to abandon was construed as adopting the acts of the master/recaptor, 
effectively estopping abandonment. The requirement promptly to serve notice prevailed over 
the ‘sue and labour’ clause. In Kaltenbach v MacKenzie928 the election had to be made when 
the insured was aware that ‘there is imminent danger of its becoming a total loss…’929 While 
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suggesting a test of foreseeability, this did not change the substantive test of what facts gave 
the right to serve notice. The general rule remained that insureds must abandon quickly. 
While in the The Bamburi notice of abandonment was held valid when served a year after the 
detention,930 there is no authority granting the insured this much time. Previously, the longest 
period appeared to be two months; where an obsolete battleship stranded in December, and 
only in February was the claim for total loss and notice of abandonment given, this was made 
within a reasonable time.931 The only general dictum supporting a waiting-period is Roux v 
Salvador: “"If in the event the loss should become absolute, the underwriter is not the less 
liable upon his contract because the assured has used his own exertions to preserve the thing 
insured, or has postponed his claim till that event of a total loss has become certain which 
was uncertain before",932 but contextually, what was apparently meant was that if a 
constructive loss was followed by an actual total loss, the insured could still recover, not that 
he could recover after any period of waiting on a constructive loss. The right to abandon may 
arise on a change of circumstances,933 but not where this is brought about by an action of the 
insurer.934 It seems clear that a simple extension of a detention would seldom be classified as 
a ‘change in circumstances’, but instead as a continuation of the peril.  Stringer endorsed 
Phillips’ opinion935 that notice for perils of detention should be given at once, indicating that 
wait-and-see is a difficult doctrine to apply. If he delays, the insured loses the right to abandon. 
He expressed the opinion that “if an embargo or other detention were, in the result, to turn 
out much longer than was reasonably anticipated, the assured, though he might in the first 
instance have elected to treat the loss as partial, might, on discovering this, treat it as total, 
unless something had occurred in the interval to prejudice the underwriters in consequence 
of the delay, although the detention had never changed its nature, and by condemnation or 
sale been turned into a total destruction of the thing”. This was not fully endorsed in Stringer, 
and the idea that an insured could abandon later was confined to situations where “the delay 
occasioned by the detention is much greater than could have reasonably been anticipated at 
the time of the election”. In the circumstances of Stringer, the length of the litigation by the 
further appeal could have been reasonably anticipated, and there was no change of facts 
through the length of the peril.936  
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This sets a potential trap for insureds since if ‘wait-and-see’ applies early abandonment might 
be premature. Conversely, abandonment is out of time if they wait. For example, in Fooks v 
Smith abandonment was held late when it was given only when the facts were eventually 
known to the insured, long after the actual loss. The facts were not known, so far as the 
frustration of the voyage was concerned for seven years. The seizure and sale were discovered 
only five years after the event. There, “it could not be suggested that a notice of abandonment 
given seven years after the event could by any possibility be a good notice”.937 Notice of 
abandonment served even one month later may be too late. Where the insured was informed 
of a loss on 7 February, and on 23 February told what sum she would fetch if sold, an 
abandonment on 10 March was too late.938 If insureds waited for the delay to last as long as 
expected at the outset, it would be difficult for them to then serve notice of abandonment.  
A large number of American authorities confirmed that the insured must not await results,939 
and in particular, American authorities confirmed that abandonment 2 months after 
knowledge of condemnation of the vessel was too late,940 and even only 5 days after 
knowledge of condemnation.941 The argument that a longer time is permitted to insureds in 
capture or detention cases, while considered possible in 19th century American commentary, 
is doubted. The argument was founded on statements in American cases that loss must 
‘continue to the time of abandonment’,942 and it was suggested this indicated that if the loss 
did continue to time of abandonment, months or even years were allowed for the insured to 
abandon. Such a rule would have contradicted the rule that insureds must abandon at once, 
and no authority supports the granting of insureds any longer time to consider whether to 
abandon.943  
 
Wait-and-see is incompatible with this requirement for insureds to act promptly. The pre-Act 
authorities clearly suggest that notice of abandonment was required, and that loss of 
possession situations were usually constructive total losses, unless there had been 
condemnation or sale. That clear understanding makes the litigation strategy in Masefield 
difficult to understand, as the better argument was abandoned on appeal. If wait-and-see is a 
proper doctrine for marine perils, practically it appears to be a one-sided doctrine favouring 
insurers by granting time denied to insureds (further, issues of the recoverability of damages 
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for late payments aside944). Where notice has been given, and the action issued, it is contrary 
to the requirement of certainty if the insurer could at that stage invoke ‘wait-and-see’ before 
paying any sum on the policy, where the insured is not granted any waiting period. Wait-and-
see to the extent that it is a proper doctrine, must necessarily be a one-sided right to wait, 
favouring the insurer.  
8.2 Constructive total loss 
 
i. Polurrian v Young 
Polurrian v Young,945 the first post-Act authority on constructive total loss, indicated that the 
statutory test of constructive total loss modified a former test of ‘uncertainty’ of recovery to 
‘unlikelihood’ applicable to all perils. Arguably, this was incorrect. In Polurrian the insured 
vessel was seized in 1912 by the Greek Navy, Greece being at war with Turkey. The Greeks 
appropriated the cargo of coal, stating that the vessel would be put before a prize court. The 
owners abandoned on 26 October, by agreement taken as the date of the writ. She was released 
on 8 December. The owners claimed constructive total loss, relying on Goss and The Romulus. 
At first instance and on appeal, the spes recuperandi was treated as a relevant consideration. 
Kennedy LJ held that, before the 1906 Act, she would have been a constructive total loss: 
“[before] that Act, the seizure or arrest or detention of a vessel for that which was 
either avowedly or obviously a temporary purpose, which will end within a period not, 
from the commercial standpoint, unreasonably long, as in the case cited by Arnould on 
Marine Insurance, 9th ed, vol ii s.1108, from Emerigon, gives no ground of 
abandonment. But if the taking of the vessel, lawful or unlawful, out of the possession 
of the owner was, at the date of the commencement of the owner’s action to enforce his 
notice of abandonment, a taking which still continued in operation, and the owner’s 
loss of the use and disposal of the ship, once total, was at that date one which might be 
permanent, and was, at any rate, of uncertain continuance, the owner who had duly 
given notice of abandonment was held by English law entitled to recover upon his 
insurance for a constructive total loss”.946 
 
Kennedy LJ’s consideration of the prior rule repeated an error in Arnould. The case from 
Emerigon was not authority for the rule that an apparently temporary capture gives no ground 
of abandonment. Contrastingly, Emerigon stated: 
‘…, on the occasion of a famine at Corfu, some Venetian cruisers, meeting at sea a 
Genoese ship laden with corn, carried her into Corfu, and after taking out and paying 
for the corn let the ship go free, this was decided in the Rota Court of Genoa to give no 
ground of abandonment to the assured on ship’.947 
                                                     
944 A related issue, that of the injustice caused by late payments of claims by insurers, was recently recognised by 
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Detention was over by the date of action; this situation was materially identical to The Little 
Mary,948 not Polurrian. Accordingly, the Genoese case was cited for a rule it never supported. 
Emerigon stated English law to be the opposite of that stated in Arnould and cited in 
Polurrian, ie that insureds were considered as having lost their property, on account of the 
uncertainty, and having an instant right to recover’.949  Emerigon’s other statements on capture 
supported the presumption: ‘Piracy is presumed to be fatal. The insurer is liable for it’,950 and 
similarly on unlawful captures by allies it was presumed fatal.951 Nothing in Emerigon’s 
extensive discussion on ransom and general average indicated a master was ever required to 
negotiate ransom,952 or to litigate to recover property for the insured to recover on his policy. 
It was therefore incorrect to suggest that the issue had ever been whether the detention “was 
at that date one which might be permanent, and was, at any rate, of uncertain continuance,” 
A subsisting detention was presumed to be permanent. 
 
Kennedy LJ then addressed s 60. The errors stating earlier law resulted in his finding that the 
s 60 test had changed: 
“…statute has modified the pre-existing law to the disadvantage of the assured. One is 
always properly afraid of incompleteness in attempting a definition, but I venture to 
say that the test of "unlikelihood of recovery" has now been substituted for "uncertainty 
of recovery." The assured must now show two things - the first, that he has been 
deprived of the possession of his ship; the second, that it is unlikely that he can recover 
it. Whence the statute derived the phrase "unlikely that he can recover" as expressing 
a necessary condition of the assured's right to recover for a constructive total loss by 
capture I do not know. I have referred to many of the reported capture cases and have 
been unable to find it used judicially in any of them. But there it stands in the section 
of the Act of Parliament; its meaning is quite clear”. 
 
Any such change to the law was unintentional. The draftsmen’s guidance notes to the 1906 
Act enshrined the definitions of actual and constructive total loss stated in Roux v Salvador.953 
This framed primarily the distinction between physical and mercantile impossibility. The 
guidance referred predominantly to actual total loss on wreck and constructive total loss 
arising from sea-damage. Neither the Act nor the guidance notes to ss 57 or 60 stated whether 
capture or seizure simpliciter was actual or constructive total loss. Nevertheless, a 
presumption of total loss on capture was nevertheless in the contemplation of the draftsmen. 
Le Cann, cited in the notes to s 57, quotes De Mattos v Saunders, in that: ‘The cases cited of 
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hostile seizure and condemnation by a prize court … In such a case, the original seizure is 
prima facie a total loss; …’954 In the guidance notes to s 60 the presumption was confirmed 
in relation to 60(2)(i) by the example: 
 
“Insurance on goods from Bombay to London with Liberty to send them through 
France. On arrival in Paris they are detained in consequence of the siege, and it is 
uncertain what will become of them. The assured may treat this as a constructive total 
loss”.955 
 
There was no attempt to substitute a stricter test to apply to the situation of Rodonacci v Elliott. 
The draftsmen clearly never intended a test of ‘unlikelihood of recovery’ to apply. Instead, 
the draftsmen intended that the presumption would continue. 
 
Different pleading in Polurrian might have followed and thereby preserved the presumption. 
Arguably, the facts in Polurrian fell within the ordinary meaning of the words of s 60(1) as a 
loss which ‘appeared to be unavoidable’. The court was bound by s 92 to consider all the 
different constructions of s 60(i), and follow any that preserved the common-law. In focusing 
on the word ‘unlikely’ Kennedy LJ ignored the word ‘appeared’ and did not consider the 
construction compatible with the prior established law. Arguably the Act allowed for the 
survival of this presumption; the draftsmen’s guidance notes envisaged that it would survive. 
It was precisely Mansfield LCJ’s intention to avoid testing that spes which provided the ratio 
in Goss. There was never a test of ‘unlikelihood’ on capture to be modified by s 60. 
Accordingly, Polurrian, contradicted 150 years of established cases following a presumption 
of a total loss. These were neither distinguished nor considered. Arguably, as Kennedy’s 
decision was founded on a new rule, introduced via the error in Arnould, that the court would 
consider the length that any detention or capture would last, the decision was per incuriam.  
 
ii. Capture 
This test of ‘unlikelihood’ was subsequently applied strictly. In Marstrand Fishing Co Ltd v 
Beer (The Girl Pat)956 the policy covered a trawler fishing the North Sea near her home port 
in March 1936. The captain had other ideas. When proceedings were issued, she had been last 
sighted at Dover, and missing for over a month. Subsequently, she was reported in Spain, then 
West Africa, and finally detained - disguised and heavily altered - in South America. Porter J 
dismissed the owners’ claim, applying the ‘unlikelihood’ test. It is difficult to imagine a more 
concerted attempt to steal a ship, or evidence establishing prima facie ‘capture’. It is difficult, 
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if The Girl Pat was correctly decided, to foresee claims succeeding for loss of possession, 
short of an actual sale (unless a policy contained an express ‘frustration clause’). Since sale 
would arguably be an actual total loss, it is difficult to see, if The Girl Pat applied the test of 
unlikelihood accurately, that s 60 retained much meaningful application to capture cases.  
 
Two wartime cases mitigated Porter J’s stringent test. The Minden; Wangoni; and Halle957 
concerned three joined appeals by British cargo-owners whose goods were loaded on German 
flagged vessels at the start of the War. German captains had orders to put into a neutral port, 
then return to Germany. If caught by the British blockade of Germany, they were to scuttle 
their vessels. Two ships were scuttled, the third reaching Germany. The policies contained a 
frustration clause, excluding claims for loss of the voyage.  
 
The vessels became actual total losses by scuttling (Viscount Simon LC), but possession was 
lost when the orders of the German government were acted upon, the master holding ships 
and cargo as agent for the German Government (Wright LJ). Once these orders were executed: 
‘Prima facie, when once it is accepted that there has been a seizure or capture of the 
goods, there is ‘the right of abandoning immediately’ and this right subsists so long as 
the property is detained by the captors or by their government, whether in port or at 
sea’.958  
 
This ‘right of abandoning immediately’ is the presumption of irretrievable deprivation. 
Arguably this rule correctly followed the pre-Act authorities. This House of Lords dictum 
should have been binding upon Steel J and Rix LJ. It was not cited by either, supporting the 
argument that their decisions on constructive total loss are per incuriam. However, Wright LJ 
then restated the test of unlikelihood citing Polurrian – seemingly ignoring its incompatibility 
with an instant right of abandonment. Either there is an instant right of abandonment ignoring 
a test of any remaining spes, or there is an investigation into the parties’ rights, potentially 
inviting a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. This tension in the authorities has attracted little academic 
attention. Further, the presumption is still acknowledged, eg where Templeman959 suggests 
that irretrievable deprivation, ie actual total loss, may be caused by ‘capture or seizure’.960 
The definition of seizure has never included an intention to permanently deprive, and 
undermines the applicability of a wait-and-see approach.  
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iii. Restraint and detention 
After the 1906 Act, authorities suggested that this presumption operated only by the loss of 
the venture. Fooks v Smith suggests that the voyage might be a constructive total loss on actual 
restraint. There, the German government restrained cargo in wartime. The cargo was sold one 
year after the restraint, and notice of abandonment was given after seven years, when the 
insured discovered what had happened. It was stated that a policy on goods insured, or was 
intended to insure, their safe arrival at the port of destination. The policy of insurance covered 
the adventure. If therefore the adventure was prevented by a peril specified in the policy there 
was a claim on the insurers. If the risk was such that the adventure was frustrated, but that the 
goods remain in safety and uninjured, there was a constructive not an actual total loss. In order 
that to be enabled to claim for a constructive total loss, notice of abandonment was necessary 
and must be given as soon as there was a reasonable opportunity for ascertaining the facts. In 
the circumstances, it was held that with due diligence sufficient facts might well have been 
ascertained long before they were”.961Accordingly, notice of abandonment was held to have 
been served well out of time. It is unclear, from the report, why the requisition and sale – 
arguably an actual total loss – was held a loss within the Lloyd’s war risk policy, as a separate 
ground for total loss, but the judgment does not address that issue, and it appears that the 
argument was not made, albeit a difficult issue for the claimants would have arisen that the 
loss might have been outside the limitation period if it were deemed to have occurred at once.  
 
In American works, Rononacci was approved that where goods are trapped in a city and can 
not be sent to their destination, that amounted to total loss, although temporary detention 
would not be sufficient.962 This suggests that American lawyers continued to observe a 
presumption that war would be of indefinite and protracted duration. Despite this, and the 
authority of Rodonacci and Miller, the contrary, irreconcilable, result was reached in Mitsui v 
Mumford,963 where timber stored in a warehouse in Antwerp was overtaken by the German 
occupation of Antwerp. Bailhache J held that there was no loss of the timber. He said, in a 
passage later approved in KAC v KIC:964 
"Now goods of private persons on shore are, by the law of nations, not liable to 
confiscation, and I ought not judicially to assume that the Germans will commit a 
breach of international law. No doubt the timber might be taken by the Germans for 
the purposes and necessities of war, but I must not assume that they would not pay for 
it. Even if I make these assumptions which the plaintiffs desire, the timber is at present 
in the hands of the plaintiffs' agent, no loss by confiscation has happened, there has 
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been no seizure by the Germans, and the policy has expired. Without seizure the 
plaintiffs cannot lay any foundation upon which to support this claim, and it fails".965  
 
This was used to support the conclusion that there was no total loss arising on the moment of 
loss of free use and disposal. However, this isolated extract ignores that there was no contract 
of sale. The timber was stored in the warehouse awaiting an opportunity to sell. For this 
reason, Mitsui v Mumford was distinguished from Rodoconachi v Elliott, and similar cases 
where there might be a loss of the voyage. It was held ‘impossible to apply’ the notion of the 
loss of the venture.966 Implicitly, had Mitsui v Mumford been a marine policy covering a cargo 
in transit, there would have been a constructive total loss on the same facts. The extract relied 
upon by Rix J applied to the plaintiff’s alternative case, that it appeared likely that the goods 
would in fact be confiscated at a future time. Importantly, the above dictum did not apply to 
the existing fact of the occupation applied to a marine policy, which would have justified a 
total loss on a marine policy, albeit by this time understood to be a claim under loss of the 
voyage, rather than loss of the physical subject matter.  
In Wilson Brothers Bobbin Company Ltd v Green967 a cargo was declared contraband by a 
belligerent government. The plaintiffs’ policy covered a cargo of wood laden on a Norwegian 
ship for a voyage from a Baltic port to an English port. The policy was against war risk only, 
and excluded all claims arising from delay. Soon after sailing in November 1914, the vessel 
was stopped by a Kaiserliche Marine vessel, and the master was informed that wood had been 
declared contraband by the German Government, and that the vessel would not be allowed to 
pass the Sound. The vessel was diverted into a neutral port in Norway, where the cargo was 
discharged, and stored. Ultimately, the cargo was reshipped on another vessel. The insured 
brought an unsuccessful action claiming loss of the voyage. The attitude of the Norwegian 
government was critical, as they first gave a guarantee to the German government that the 
cargo would not be transhipped to England during the war, but in February 1915 it became 
apparent that the plaintiffs were free to arrange the transhipment, which was only arranged 
after September on two different vessels.968 In July, the action was heard on the claim to 
recover as for a constructive total loss. Bray J then held that on 3 December 1914, it could not 
be said that the total loss of the venture was unavoidable, or that it was unlikely that the goods 
could reach their destination in England. He accordingly decided that the claim for a 
constructive total loss failed. Given that the cargo was initially declared contraband and 
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accordingly liable to confiscation, it is difficult to understand why this case was not treated as 
part of the settled category where detention resembled capture.  
In Moore v Evans, heard in 1918, where jewels were overtaken by the German occupation of 
Belgium during the Great War, a strict approach was likewise applied. It was thought that the 
loss could only be described as an inability of the insured, as a consequence of hostilities, to 
access their goods, and that there was a probability that this state of things would continue 
‘for some considerable time’. This was, in contrast to the pre-1906 marine authorities, held 
not to be a loss within the policy. A similar interpretation applied to this non-marine policy as 
that applied to the policy in Mitsui, namely that it did not cover the venture separately to the 
physical goods,969 and it could not be argued rationally that the cover extended to the 
voyage.970 It was an important part of the reasoning in Moore that marine authorities provided 
no precedent for land-based contracts,971 and the court in Mitsui was criticised for appearing 
to apply the doctrines of constructive total loss, and the 1906 Act, to non-marine 
circumstances to which these did not apply.972 Inability to access the cargo, which had 
supported a total loss in similar circumstances in Rodocanachi and others v Elliot,973 was held 
insufficient to justify a total loss claim, but suggests in that case, that the loss was only a loss 
of the voyage. 
 
Further significant change in approach appeared by Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance 
Co (KAC v KIC).974 There, Rix J noted Mitsui v Mumford and Moore v Evans, and the 
Dawson’s Field arbitration. In each, the loss of possession was not sufficient to claim a total 
loss. Rix J noted that in Dawson’s Field, the above authorities were applied, and it was held 
that a ‘wait-and-see’ approach should apply to loss of possession cases, to see whether the 
property was lost. This suggested that an insured should “allow for the lapse of a period of 
time to form a view about the prospects of recovery”.975 The approach of the three cases 
treated by Rix J in KAC v KIC amounts to a clear reversal of the previous decisions on 
embargo and loss of possession situations, if these are applied to govern claims on marine 
policies. First, the idea that abandonment or a claim should be made at once has changed to 
wait-and-see. Secondly, the reasoning that marine cases were of no application applies in 
reverse: these situations were not applicable to marine policies. Arguably, it is an error to refer 
to non-marine policies as definitive interpretation of a marine policy. For those reasons, it is 
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suggested the dicta in these authorities are unpersuasive guides to the interpretation of a 
marine policy. At most, they might clarify the nature of a loss on the marine policy, that the 
right to abandon at once should be understood as referring to the loss of the voyage. Later, 
these authorities were applied in Masefield, in support of the conclusion that there was no 
total loss. 
The most recent consideration of detention without application of force was The Bamburi, 
where claimant shipowners successfully claimed damages for a constructive total loss by 
restraint of princes. In September 1980, the vessel was detained in Shatt-al-Arab during the 
war between Iraq and Iran. The state authorities ordered the vessel not be moved. The claimant 
served notice of abandonment a year later, and issued arbitral proceedings seeking damages 
for a total loss. Strictly, the arbitral award does not provide binding authority,976 but the 
decision was published as it raised issues common to about 70 other vessels detained during 
in the same conflict. The test of unlikelihood of recovery was applied. The factual background 
was one of restraint of princes, and not capture. Crucially, possession was not lost, so the 
situation was not one of ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’.  In The Bamburi, the arbitrator first found that 
the loss fell within the peril of ‘restraint of princes or peoples’ clause, and it was not a loss by 
detention or any other peril. The next issue was whether there was a total loss by that peril 
within the meaning of the 1906 Act. It was found that there was no loss of legal possession in 
the sense of property law. The relevant part of the judgment concerned whether there could 
be a loss by a ‘restraint of princes’ which could found a claim within s 60 of the Act. The 
arbitrator held that there could be a ‘loss of possession’ within the meaning of the Act where 
there was a ‘loss of free use and disposal’.977  
When considering the likelihood of recovery, there was some discussion978 whether the time 
ran from the moment of the casualty, or from the issue of the notice of abandonment. 
Expressing no conclusive view, the arbitrator held that the time to be considered was after the 
notice of abandonment. This is doubtful authority, as it unclear from where speculation on 
this issue derived. Overall, it was held ‘within a reasonable time’ meant 12 months, not 
counting time that had run before the notice. Again, it is unclear what authority that relied 
upon, other than ‘bidding’ between the counsel. In the circumstances, it was not likely that 
the vessel would be recovered. Arnould subsequently questioned whether The Bamburi 
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establishes any general guidance979 –– while noting that temporary obstruction measured in 
weeks rather than months would not be sufficient.980  
iv. Masefield; the contemporary tests 
Steel J’s judgment that there was no constructive total loss contained three difficulties. First, 
he relied on definitions of total loss from textbooks, ultimately deriving from stranding and 
damage cases, not tests of total loss judicially expressed. Authorities for the presumption of 
total loss on capture were not mentioned. Secondly, he reintroduced property law 
considerations into the test of total loss by his ‘fact sensitive’ approach, without reference to 
the binding authority excluding property law. Inconsistently with the pre-Act law, he ruled 
that captures are ‘fact sensitive’ cases.  
 
Steel J’s reliance on authorities on damage or stranding, rather than on authorities on capture, 
is illustrated by his reliance on Roux v Salvador,981 stating: 
 
“[t]he need to draw a distinction between a claim for an ATL where property is beyond 
recovery and a claim for a CTL with an associated requirement for notice of 
abandonment where recovery is uncertain was well established in the early 19th 
century”.982  
 
Roux was a case of sea-damage to cargo, and capture cases contemporary to Roux do not 
suggest that this procedural requirement for notice ever implied that the insured had to prove 
an unfavourable spes in relation to a subsisting capture. A requirement for notice of 
abandonment did not necessarily mean that the test was ever ‘uncertainty’. Steel J erred in 
following that the summary of Roux changed the test for loss ‘without abandonment’.  
 
The second difficulty is that his finding that the legal consequences of a capture are fact 
sensitive reintroduces property law considerations, contra Goss and The Romulus: 
“(i) Where a vessel is seized as a prize and condemned in a prize court, property is 
transferred and on any view the former owner is irretrievably deprived of the vessel. 
Mere seizure by pirates without more has no impact on the proprietary interests in the 
vessel. The suggestion in regard to the present case that in demanding a ransom the 
pirates were requiring the owners to repurchase the vessel and cargo is a felicitous but 
inaccurate summary of the situation. What has been transferred is possession and not 
title and the question thus arises, in my judgment, as to whether recovery of possession 
is legally or physically impossible.  
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(ii) of course, where possession is lost, recovery will often be unlikely… whereby the 
threshold requirement for a CTL claim may be established…”983 
 
Considering title as relevant is an error of law in light of Goss and the Romulus. Furthermore, 
it conflicts with his citation from Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright,984 
where judicial condemnation was not ‘irretrievable deprivation’. Only five paragraphs after 
citing Panamanian Oriental, Steel J concludes that condemnation would be actual total loss, 
(neither Steel J nor Mocatta J referred to earlier reported authorities on capture) that being 
plainly inconsistent with Panamanian, and indicating that the authorities on total loss were 
not fully explored.  
 
By importing a distinction between actual and constructive total losses from Roux into the 
mid-nineteenth century law, Steel J’s interpretation of Dean v Hornby was flawed. He 
considered that since notice of abandonment was served, the claim therefore one for 
constructive total loss, and must therefore include a test of ‘unlikelihood’. Steel J ignored that 
the court in Dean ought properly, on then contemporary authorities, to have found a total loss 
where abandonment was unnecessary, following The Martha and Le Cann, consistent even 
with dicta in Stringer. He erred in finding that because notice was given, a test of 
‘unlikelihood’ had necessarily been considered.  
 
Thirdly Steel J held that ‘abandonment’ in s 60(1) meant abandonment of any spes 
recuperandi or property to the insurer,985 citing The Lavington Court986 that the phrase 
‘abandoned on account of its actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable’ meant the same 
as ‘abandoned by a master’– meaning the physical desertion of the vessel by the crew and not 
the service of a notice of abandonment.987  He observed that such abandonment by the crew 
never occurred.988 However, ‘notice of abandonment’ was meant in s 60.989 The distinction 
attributed to The Lavington Court neither appears in the draftsmen’s guide to the Act990 nor 
in the 6th edition of Arnould, used in drafting s 60.991 Contrastingly, the guidance notes 
clarified that ‘abandonment’ in ss 60-62 meant not the notice, but ‘the voluntary cession by 
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the insured to the insurer of whatever remains of the subject matter insured’.992 Further, the 
Lavington Court nowhere provided that abandonment under s 60 has to have that meaning, 
only that the decision to abandon pursuant to s 60 ‘may and very often must be by the master 
in exercise of his authority … but usually pursuant to his general powers of agency…993. This 
can only be understood against the Crown’s unsuccessful submissions in Lavington Court, 
that abandonment under s 60 could exclusively be made by the insured, never the master. The 
decision permitted the master to abandon a vessel with the accompanying legal consequence 
of abandoning vessel to the insurer under s 60, but did not exclude the insurer from 
abandoning, and they clearly retain that capability.994 In Masefield, it was physically 
impossible for the master and crew to desert the vessel upon the capture with the legal effect 
in s 60, even had they wanted to do so – and further there is a rule that leaving a vessel under 
compulsion or violence cannot have that effect.995 Finally, the claimant in Masefield, as a 
cargo interest, did not have an agent on the vessel to physically abandon its interest. 
Accordingly, the Lavington Court does not support Steel J’s interpretation that ‘abandonment’ 
within s 60(1) must be the act of the master. 
 
Finally, Steel J held that his finding that an actual total loss was not unavoidable applied 
equally to the constructive total loss claim.996 While clearly the spes remained, Steel J did not 
deal with the presumption. Accordingly, Steel J’s judgment on constructive total loss is open 
to doubt. On appeal, Rix LJ did not revisit Steel J’s findings on constructive total loss. He 
simply concluded that, under the terms of the policy, ‘deprivation of possession was only 
covered in the case of an ATL, ie in the case of irretrievable deprivation’.997 
 
 
v. Overview of Constructive Total Losses 
Emerigon and early authorities were clear that loss of possession simpliciter permitted an 
insured to abandon to the insurer. The definitions of the perils of arrest, restraint and detention 
clearly included situations where it was foreseeable that the property might be returned to the 
insured. This ongoing possibility of restoration did not prevent abandonment to the insurer. 
Unlike the French laws, English law permitted an instant right of abandonment. This was 
recognised in situations where the ‘authority’ intended to deprive the assured of possession, 
where the circumstances were akin to a capture. Additionally, they included situations where 
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there was a simple embargo, and this allowed an abandonment. It was clear that, under an 
embargo or detention, the master might be left in actual possession of the property. However, 
there was still a recognised right of abandonment. The early authorities on this were not clear 
whether this was considered a loss of the property – as a capture – or a loss of the voyage. 
Arguably, the view better fitting the language of the earlier authorities was that it was deemed 
a loss of the property, because of the uncertainty. 
The 20th century cases changed this understanding. It appears that the right to abandon for 
arrest or embargo is now understood as a loss of the voyage only. It is unclear to what extent 
Mitsui v Mumford and Moore v Evans properly apply to marine claims. However, both 
authorities received approval in KAC v KIC and Masefield. Interestingly, in the Bamburi, the 
insured was held to have lost ‘possession’, where the master remained in control of the vessel. 
This conflicts with the ratio in Mitsui, where there was held to be no loss of possession. The 
key issue, loss of possession, was not explored as a potential ground of distinction between 
these cases. Arguably, the better view is that where possession is in fact lost by an embargo, 
this is considered a loss of the property aside from any loss of the voyage. However, this is 
not compatible with the analysis of Masefield. The idea that a vessel has to remain out of the 
possession of the insured for 12 months or more to claim a constructive total loss derived from 
the Bamburi, and provides an unclear rule. Might it be possible to claim for a shorter period 
of dispossession, absent a particular term in the policy? The overriding theme is one of 
declining certainty.  
The investigation into the hope of recovery in Masefield contradicted the rule established in 
Goss v Withers, and the Romulus. As the former case was decided by Mansfield LCJ, and was 
settled law for over 150 years, and confirmed by the House of Lords in the Romulus, it ought 
to have been especially persuasive, and at least considered. The post-Act authorities, 
especially Polurrian, fail to address adequately the prior law, so that it is difficult to say that 
the court had consciously overruled the ‘old’ law in favour of a completely new test. In 
particular, it was nowhere considered whether the old law was consistent with a claim under 
s 60(1), and this failure means that the court’s approach, in making a ‘new’ test, is inconsistent 
with s 90(1) of the Act preserving the common-law. The argument that there should have been 
found a total loss under s 60(1) is supported by the House of Lords dictum in the Minden; 
Wangoni; and Halle: 
“If there can be an actual total loss in such cases through ‘irretrievable deprivation’ 
under s 57, I can see no reason why the law should not recognise a constructive total 
loss under s 60(1)…”998 
 
                                                     
998 [1942] AC 50 (HL) 
191 
 
This ought to have been considered by Steel J, when he ruled that there could not be such a 
loss, as ‘abandonment’ in s 60(1) had to be an act by the master. This House of Lords dictum 
arguably makes his per incuriam. Arguably, Masefield could have claimed successfully under 
s 60(1).  
 
8.3 Actual Total Loss 
 
i. Capture 
After Polurrian the test under s 57 was seldom considered. Common-law situations justifying 
total loss without abandonment might have become statutory actual total losses. However, in 
Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright,999 Mocatta J stated obiter that the 
vessel detained by Vietnamese customs officials, and subsequently confiscated by an 
executive act - a military tribunal convened outside the ordinary judicial system1000 - was not 
an actual total loss. He considered that by payments of fines and bribes, the vessel could have 
been released and concluded: 
 
“[The] claim for an actual total loss on the basis that the plaintiffs were irretrievably 
deprived of the Anita is somewhat academic. The question has to be answered as at the 
date of the writ. It may be true that the order of confiscation divested the plaintiffs of 
the legal ownership as is the case of a ship by a Prize Court. But the test of irretrievable 
deprivation is clearly far more severe than the test of unlikelihood of recovery of 
possession…’1001 
This disregards prior authorities on capture indicating that confiscation established loss 
‘without abandonment’ before the 1906 Act, as would any condemnation or sale. Mocatta J’s 
strict test is problematic; short of total physical destruction what could satisfy the test for 
irretrievable deprivation? It is unclear what if any authority supports Mocatta’s view, which 
can only be explained by his considering the interpretation of ‘irretrievable deprivation’ de 
novo, without reference to established authorities. 
 
In KAC v KIC, aircraft captured when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 were later destroyed. Rix 
J noted that: 
‘In Rodocanachi v Elliott,1002  Brett J described capture as 'the hostile seizure of goods 
with intent to deprive the owner of them. In case of capture, because the intent is from 
the first to take dominion over a ship, there is an actual total loss straightaway, even 
though there later be a recovery: see Dean v Hornby (a case of piratical seizure), and 
Andersen v Marten’.1003 
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Rix J stated that actual total loss arose where there was a capture with an intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of possession, but there made no mention of a hope of recapture. ‘Wait-
and-see’ is an innovative, permutation of the test for actual total losses. If it is to be taken as 
the test to be applied, it conflicts with Panamanian Oriental Steamship,1004 since, on any view, 
a tribunal ruling divesting the owners of legal ownership is plain evidence of a capture with 
an intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Rix J did not address that a test 
of the captor’s intention had been absent from all earlier cases of maritime capture. It is 
unclear from where Rix J derived that test into the captor’s intention, since the definition in 
Rodocanachi1005 long postdates established authorities for capture, where insureds were not 
required to prove the captors’ intention.  
 
ii. Restraint and subsequent sale 
Sale following restraint would not necessarily be actual total loss, a reminder that the separate 
perils fall to be treated independently so it is dangerous to apply principles from restraint or 
detention to seizure or capture. In Fooks v Smith (the Stambul),1006 the plaintiff sold parcels 
of hides in Calcutta to a Bulgarian in Varna, under a contract dated April 1914. On July 31, 
1914, in view of the imminence of hostilities, he insured against war risks, including restraint 
of princes. The ordinary course of transit was by ocean to Trieste, and thereafter by coasting 
steamer to Bourgas. The goods arrived at Trieste in July 1914, and were reshipped on the 
Stambul, an Austrian-flagged vessel. She left Trieste on July 30, but on 3 August the master 
was ordered by the Austrian government to return to Trieste. The court held that act 
constituted a restraint of princes (following Sanday1007). War between Great Britain and 
Austria was declared on 13 August 1914. The hides were discharged at Trieste in September, 
and remained there. They were requisitioned in 1916 by the Austrian Government and sold 
for a sum which, owing to the exchange, was small. The plaintiff discovered these events in 
1921, and gave notice then. He claimed under his war risks policy for actual total loss, or 
alternatively for constructive total loss. Bailhache J’s analysis accepted that where ‘by a peril 
insured against there is a constructive total loss and no notice of abandonment is given, then 
if in the ordinary course of an unbroken sequence of events following upon the peril insured 
against the constructive total loss becomes an actual total loss - as, for instance, if there is a 
capture followed by confiscation…’ there was a total loss. However, citing De Mattos v 
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Saunders,1008 Stringer, and Le Cann he held that the total loss had to be a consequence of the 
peril insured against. Although the sale could not have occurred without the detention, he 
held, ‘seizure and sale was a nova causa superveniens, and was not the necessary and direct 
result of the restraint of princes’.1009 His reasoning relied on the question of whether it would 
have been possible to claim for a total loss if the ship had been destroyed by fire while at 
Trieste, and held that it would not. This decision was arguably per incuriam in light of The 
Romulus, which was neither cited in argument nor considered in the judgment. It remains 
doubtful whether there was such a fine distinction between cases of ‘seizure’ and ‘capture’ to 
permit such a different result. Effectively, this was a case of hostile capture – hostilities being 
anticipated – and the fact that the restraint of princes took place before the formal declaration 
of war (technically, a ‘capture’) is an unsatisfactory distinction; further restraint of princes 
followed by sale – absent a declaration of war – was an established ground of abandonment 
without notice. Where the sale had not appeared inevitable; in Stringer, where the insured had 
long hoped that the court would order restitution of his goods, sale provided a ground for 
abandonment. If the reasoning in the Stanbul is applied to Stringer, the eventual sale would 
not have been a total loss. Finally, there was no ‘novus actus interveniens’ in the Minden; 
Wangoni; Halle, which was decided in similar circumstances, establishing a constructive total 
loss – yet the Minden did not provide sale was not an actual total loss. Arguably, the sale 
established loss without notice of abandonment under the pre-Act law – and the Act should 
not have changed this. 
 
iii. Masefield 
Rix LJ’s judgment primarily concerned actual total loss, as the appeal in relation to 
constructive loss was abandoned at the hearing, albeit the cases considered were cases 
illustrating constructive losses. He repeated in substance Steel J’s assessment of Mocatta J’s 
obiter statement in Panamanian Oriental,1010 although conceding that the statement was not 
necessarily very helpful to the insured, as the ‘facts were obscure and the matter was treated 
lightly’.1011 Rix LJ relied primarily on Dean v Hornby as the most relevant authority. He stated 
that no reported authority found a total loss where the insured could have paid ransom,1012 and 
distinguished the cases on that ground. The reference to the possibility of ransom payments 
in submissions in Goss was ignored – even though by their exclusion from the judgment where 
ransom payments were lawful and common-place, Mansfield LCJ had clearly dismissed that 
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consideration. Rix LJ held that Dean v Hornby was inconclusive,1013 and referred to several 
cases concerning capture. The first case he referred to was, however, not a capture case, but 
Roux v Salvador. Arguably, the test in Roux, formulated later than the test in capture cases, 
could not have changed the established rules for capture cases. When Rix LJ considered 
Stringer,1014 he did not fully articulate the significance of the insured’s choice not to abandon. 
The paragraphs that he cited refer to the situation where the insured had chosen to keep the 
spes in the property for many months. Further, he noted that the sale by the Prize Court in 
Stringer was a situation of actual total loss,1015 thereby undermining the authority of Mocatta’s 
dicta in Panamanian Oriental.1016 However, Rix LJ did not acknowledge that the plaintiff in 
Stringer could have successfully abandoned and claimed for constructive total loss within a 
reasonable time of the capture. 
 
A further material distinction between Stringer and Masefield was that the claimant in 
Masefield was essentially passive. Cargo interests seldom participate in the negotiation 
process, which is ordinarily conducted by the hull owner. Consequently, the insured had no 
say in or control over the ransom process. Contrastingly the shipowner had decided to instigate 
the process of negotiation, therefore placing himself in a position akin to the plaintiff in 
Stringer. This reflects different policy interests; a vessel is a valuable asset expected to be 
owned for years if not decades, cargo is normally expected to be sold at the end of the voyage. 
Rix noted that in Cory & Sons v Burr1017 the test for a total loss was whether the assured ‘but 
for their own fault’ might get the property back. Whether the insured would be ‘at fault’ in 
not making a ransom payment is doubtful (Chapter 7.3 ante). He noted a statement of the law 
in Arnould’s 17th edn suggesting capture ordinarily gives rise to constructive total loss.  
Having surveyed the dicta inter alia from Dean v Hornby, the Romulus, and The Girl Pat, Rix 
LJ concluded: 
 
“…subject to … the public policy of paying a ransom… where there was not only a 
chance, but a strong likelihood, that payment of a ransom of a comparatively small 
sum, relative to the value of the vessel and her cargo, would secure recovery of both, 
was not an actual total loss. It was not an irretrievable deprivation of property. It was 
a typical “wait and see” situation. The facts would not even have supported a claim 
for a CTL, for the test of that is no longer uncertainty of recovery, but unlikelihood of 
recovery. That is itself recognised by the insured's dropping of its CTL claim. … In the 
circumstances, Dean v Hornby, is best explained as a case concerning CTL, which in 
any event reference there to the assured's notice of abandonment strongly suggests…” 
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Masefield produces the opposite result to Goss. In Masefield the claimant failed because of 
the investigation into the hope of recovery. In Goss the plaintiff succeeded for a total loss 
claim despite there being a strong hope of recovery. Consequently, Rix LJ reached the right 
result on the appeal for an actual total loss, as even under the pre-Act law the insured would 
have been required to serve a notice of abandonment. Arguably, Masefield remains doubtful 
in its treatment of constructive total losses. 
 
8.4 A new consensus? 
 
The most recent cases indicate that insureds no longer argue total loss in England on events 
of capture. Conceivably, Masefield itself is seen to have provided a new rule.1018 Is this fair to 
the insured?1019 At this point, it is worth considering the American position. There are 
apparently no reported cases of loss of possession in any American jurisdiction where the 
issue of ‘unlikelihood’ of recovery was argued, after the 1906 Act was passed in England. 
Although an argument from silence, it is a powerful indication that the American position, 
both on the effect of giving notice, and of the ongoing presumption of total loss, provides 
much greater certainty, and is effective in preventing disputes.  
Problematically, the Masefield interpretation potentially creates injustice, in particular to the 
CIF buyer. These purchase all risks cargo cover taken out by the seller, and property will pass 
to them on shipment, but they may be left exposed to an uninsured risk of loss by piracy where 
the same results in delay to arrival of cargo. Simply, where frustration does not operate to 
relieve sellers of obligations under a sale contract, the lack of compensation for total loss on 
a loss of possession situation leaves insureds unable to obtain cover. Further, the approach 
applied in the Bamburi provides little clarity. For example, where a vessel were detained for 
a year, and the parties decided to ‘wait-and-see’, if the insured then gave notice of 
abandonment, there would then be a test of whether he were likely to recover. If, at that time, 
restoration were considered a possibility, he might not be able to abandon. He could be 
deprived of his property for a considerable period of time, and not be able to purchase effective 
cover. The difficulties inherent in the contemporary approach would be avoided, certainty 
increased, and precedent respected, if there were a way the presumption could still operate. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Delay and Contemporary Total Loss Claims 
 
“Remember that TIME is Money”.1020 
 
Claims on loss of possession concern situations where insureds, having lost and possibly 
regained possession of their property, will suffer financial loss by interruption to their 
business. Mansfield’s and Ellenborough’s observation that delays in and interruption to 
commerce are particularly harmful to cargo interests remain applicable.1021 Clearly, 
interruption to a voyage causes financial loss to parties engaged in trade. Where possession is 
not regained, a wait-and-see approach means insureds conceivably suffer further by late 
payments under the policy.1022 Where property is released, an approach that categorises 
insured’s losses as flowing from delay means they will be uncompensated. To what extent 
should the exclusion, preventing compensation for delay, restrict recovery for total loss, if the 
insured issues a claim during the duration of the peril? This thesis has aimed to demonstrate 
a presumption of total loss that arose on perils of loss of possession, and which remains 
arguable under the 1906 Act. 
 
9.2 The Lost Presumption 
 
English law recognised a legal presumption of total loss on all subsisting perils causing loss 
of possession or free use and disposal. Since the 1906 Act this presumption has been applied 
only once in England, and is ignored in recent English authorities. This stricter rule diverges 
from American laws, and arguably leads to less commercially advantageous outcomes. The 
best argument that this presumption still applies to claims of constructive total loss on capture 
and subsisting detentions, notwithstanding the statutory changes of 1906, has not been made. 
It remains to be judicially considered. This presumption is, prima facie, compatible with the 
Act. If it were recognised, English law and usage would be more in harmony with the 
American market. It would provide greater certainty of outcome, and it would discourage 
litigation.  
Insurance law is the interpretation of the contract. While it is always open to parties to draft 
their contracts with foresight as respects potential situations of total loss, recent authorities 
                                                     
1020 Benjamin Franklin “Advice to a Young Tradesman, Written by an Old One” (New-Printing-Office, 1748, 
Philadelphia) 
1021 Chapter 1.4.iii (above), fn 124 
1022 On effects of late payments on insureds, see Law Commission 2014 Report, ‘Insurance Contract 
Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers’ Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment 
(Law Comm No 353) 
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indicate significant delays in the determination of disputes on loss of possession. An 
underlying law encouraging quick resolution of these issues has greater commercial merit.1023 
Presumptions of total loss potentially may provide greater litigation certainty, and may work 
to discourage disputes.  
The underlying issue is ‘when can the insured recover’? The issue of when an insured can 
expect to make a claim for compensation under his policy for a loss of possession is not the 
subject of direct recent English judicial commentary. The answer as to when has to be 
identified by a series of rules standing as exceptions to the general rule that insureds will not 
be compensated for any losses caused by delay – albeit that these ‘exceptions’ were settled by 
the time when the exclusion for delay was established. The survey of insurance authorities 
indicates a position that changed significantly in the early 20th century, although on arguably 
doubtful authority.  
Claims for loss of possession, where the insured property is eventually recovered, reveal 
difficulty in striking a fair balance between insureds and insurers. For insurers, it is accepted 
that: “the mere retardation of the adventure, and the consequent inconvenience and expense 
arising from it are not a substantive cause of loss where the particular thing assured has not 
received damage".1024 Clearly, this applies to situations where storms protract the voyage. 
These must be ordinary risks expected on any charter. Nevertheless, considerations that arise 
on loss of possession arguably fall outside this general rule. 
If applied in future cases, the presumption ought arguably to reflect a return to long-
established industry norms. It would have the key practical effect of encouraging quick 
payments to cargo interests, where possession was lost for a time. This would reflect the nature 
of a traders’ business, which often requires quick turnover of goods transported, and in some 
markets sales while a vessel is at sea. Mansfield’s observation that a trader’s capital locked 
up during a long period of uncertainty continues to apply, and the presumption if applied 
would protect traders from this situation. Since traders are not generally required to be 
involved in the resolution of any loss of possession of a vessel – save for contributing to 
general average expenses, for which they in turn may be reimbursed, there appears little 
disadvantage in this. The increased premiums that would be necessary would properly share 
the risk across the market. 
                                                     
1023 Though an extreme example, delays exceeding 8 years before judgment on a loss of possession case are 
known; “This is not satisfactory either from a commercial point of view or for the purposes of administration of 
justice. It cannot be in the interests of any participant in the insurance market that there should be such 
uncertainties and delays.” Kuwait Airways Corp and another v Kuwait Insurance Co SAK and others [1999] 1 
All ER (Comm) 481, 487 (Hobhouse LJ) 
1024 Everth v Smith (1814) 2 M&S 278 (Lord Ellenborough CJ) 
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The larger potential change relates to hull insurance. The owners – during a loss of 
possession scenario – face losing the freight expected, and the future use of their vessel. This 
frees owners from the anxiety caused in fixing future voyages, where the vessel’s possession 
is lost. The vessel owners are normally responsible for arranging for a vessel’s release from 
a loss of possession situation (although in Masefield, and presumably frequently in relation 
to capture and hostage situations, negotiations may be conducted by other government 
agencies). This may require insurers, rather than owners, to engage negotiators, but this 
activity is not a core business of an owner, just as it is not an insurer. There is no reason why 
the insurer should not, in appropriate cases, undertake this role. A wider survey of the 
opinion of the market on whether there should be prompt payments for loss of possession is 
outside the scope of a survey of the law. Nevertheless, given it was an argument in Masefield, 
it arguably reflects some recent market opinion.  
9.3 Wait and See or Presumption of Loss 
 
The idea of the presumption of total loss is supported by two statements of law. First, that 
there was a prima facie right to abandon. Secondly, that situations of restoration were 
universally described as bringing the loss to an end, ie that losses were established while the 
perils lasted, and never, until ‘wait-and-see’ evolved as evidence that a loss was not 
‘complete’. 
Resolution of total loss claims, actual or constructive, involves two competing ideologies. 
First, as expressed in Masefield, is ‘wait-and-see’, doing justice to the insurer by waiting to 
see what the ultimate event of the peril is. Almost inevitably, this will apply to a capture 
situation, as the intention of the captor will best be illustrated by the event. Contrastingly, 
there is an analysis of total loss claims based on probabilities, which is entirely opposed to a 
‘wait and see’ construction. The disadvantage of waiting for condemnation or sale was 
recognised by Mansfield, and there remains considerable justification in presumptions of total 
loss, on all the marine perils covered by the policy. Emerigon provided on loss of possession:  
“As against the merchant, the property tied up and uncertain is considered in some 
manner as if it no longer existed”.1025  
This was understood in English law, where at the moment of capture, or the moment 
possession was lost, ‘then, in fact, a total loss has occurred.’… ‘…once there has been a total 
loss by capture, that is construed to be a permanent total loss unless something afterwards 
occurs by which the assured either has the possession restored, or has the means of obtaining 
                                                     
1025 Emerigon, (1850 edn), 670-671 
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such restoration’.1026  Further, it was confirmed … ‘though the ship was brought into port, 
yet the capture, as between assurer and the assured, was a total loss”.1027 
This analysis was set out fully in Roura and Forgas v Townend. It was noted that restoration 
of a captured ship before action prevented an owner from alleging constructive total loss. In 
Roura, dicta collecting suggestions that there was no constructive total loss until the fate of 
the vessel was finally known, such as Tunno v Edwards,1028 but these were disapproved. In 
particular, this ‘wait-and-see’ approach was “contrary to a large body of decisions; see in 
particular Andersen v Marten and … Polurrian Steamship Co, Ltd v Young”. Further, 
although the test under s 60 was noted, the view was that there was a loss while the peril 
subsisted: 
“… What is perhaps more important is that the argument is contrary to the Marine 
Insurance Act, 1906, s 60, which makes probability and not the event the test. The true 
view, in my judgment, is that restoration precludes recovery, not because in such a case 
there never was a constructive total loss, but because an assured cannot under a 
contract of indemnity, although he may at one time suffered a loss, recover in respect 
of such loss if before action it has already been made good to him”.1029 
This is perhaps the correct understanding of total loss claims for ‘loss of possession’ 
situations. In particular, it recognises that the loss was suffered while the peril persisted, and 
further, discounts correctly any doctrine of ‘relation back’. Nothing additional was needed to 
make the loss ‘complete’. 
While there is merit in the pragmatic rule that there should be a wait-and-see, presumptions 
have a long-established place in insurance laws. Emerigon observed, in relation to whether 
property could be salvaged in part from a shipwreck, that “It is possible that the goods insured 
may be saved from shipwreck without having suffered any alteration; but this case is rare; in 
the meanwhile a general rule is wanted to prevent disputes”.1030 Clearly, salvage technology 
has so evolved that that presumption has little contemporary application.1031 However, the 
considerations on ‘loss of possession’ cases appear to turn on factual patterns that have little 
changed, as recognised in the survey of authority in The Bamburi. Given that consistency the 
guidance that a rule discouraging disputes is still relevant, and the rules in capture cases 
remain pertinent. In Global Process Systems it was reaffirmed that “In marine insurance it is 
                                                     
1026 Dean v Hornby (1854) 3 El&Bl 180, 190 
1027 Cazalet v St Barbe (1786) 1 TR 187, 191 (Buller J) 
1028 12 East 490 
1029 [1919] 1 KB 189; [1918-19] All ER Rep 341, 345 
1030 Emerigon, (1850 edn), Ch XII, s XII 
1031 Captain J A Cates Tug and Wharfage Company v Franklin Insurance Company [1927] AC 698, 28 Ll L Rep 
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above all things necessary to abide by settled rules and to avoid anything like novel 
refinements or a new departure”.1032 Further merit for this exists in the key difference between 
American authorities and the English, in that the American courts look to the position at the 
time of abandonment, and do not investigate matters subsequent to that date. This must be an 
effective method of discouraging disputes, and may account for the fact there are fewer 
American decisions in this area.  
 
9.4 Loss of Possession as an insured peril 
 
The idea that loss of possession simpliciter was not an insured peril1033 conflicts with early 
authority,1034 and academic definitions of the perils.1035 In any event, the imprecision of 
definitions between the different perils counts against a strict definition of losses under the 
same. Loss of possession simpliciter was an insured peril, and it was clear that certain perils 
were treated as a loss of possession at once. The competing understanding that an intention 
had to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances derives from non-marine cases1036 
considering the non-marine test of uncertainty1037 and is arguably an error given the 
established marine authorities.1038  
In non-marine cases it is clear that no doctrine of non-marine constructive loss ever applied. 
Instead, a test of ‘uncertainty’ was applied.1039 Arguably, any test of ‘uncertainty’ derives from 
non-marine cases, and it is clear that the wait-and-see approach evolved as a development of 
the non-marine ‘uncertainty’ test. Arguably, the non-marine authorities were not strong 
authority for marine cases. Consequently, where established marine authorities expressly dealt 
with an issue of total loss, these should have been preferred. Consequently, the authority of 
the evolution of ‘wait-and-see’ as an approach is doubted. This study suggested care in 
identifying where ‘uncertainty’ was reintroduced to the marine insurance context. It argues 
that marine authorities, where different, provided more appropriate authority (Chapter 2.4, 
ante).  
 
9.5 Delay and causation  
                                                     
1032 Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd v Hamilton, Fraser & Co (1887) 12 App Cas 484, 502 (Lord 
Macnaghten); Global Process Systems [2011] UKSC 5, [66] (Mance SCJ) 
1033 Dawson’s Field (Michael Kerr QC); Kuwait Airways Corporation and Kuwait Insurance Company [1996] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 664 (QB) (Rix J) 
1034 The Lady Mansfield (1787) 1 TK 609; Powell and Others v Hyde (1855) 5 El&Bl 607 
1035 Emerigon (1850 edn), Ch XII, s XXI; Marshall (1802), 418 
1036 Moore v Evans [1918] AC 185; Mitsui v Mumford [1915] 2 KB 27 
1037 Webster v General Accident [1953] 1 QB 520 
1038 Applied in marine context only in Masefield 
1039 Webster [1953] 1 QB 520, following Moore v Evans 7 AppCas 49; [1918] AC 185; Mitsui v Mumford [1915] 
2 KB 27 
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The prima facie position that losses flowing from loss of possession are necessarily losses by 
delay is an inaccurate summary of marine insurance law, that has expanded the proper 
operation of the exclusion to cover situations that historically it did not. It is important to note 
that the exclusion for delay evolved after the presumption of total loss on loss of possession. 
It was not initially understood as an absolute rule. First, it does not apply to situations where 
the voyage begins late. In those situations, such as in Jackson, the late commencement of the 
voyage will amount to a loss of the voyage. Although from the insured’s perspective, the 
distinction between delay before and delay during the voyage is hardly satisfactory, this 
distinction is well settled. However, the exclusion for delay should arguably be confined to 
‘perils of the sea’ such as wind and wave that might extend a voyage and should not apply to 
situations where possession has been lost. Arguably, the modern doctrine of causation means 
that the correct approach would be to identify the real cause of the loss as the loss of 
possession, and not the inevitable consequence of this act, which is delay. Arguably, the only 
way to understand the exclusion for losses for delay co-existing with decisions permitting 
total loss, is to recognise that in the pre-1906 law, a different approach was taken in relation 
to different types of loss. Further, as understood in contemporary law, the doctrine of 
proximate cause means that the exclusion for delay applies only in narrow circumstances.  
9.6 Actual Total Loss  
 
The understanding of actual total loss appears to have become less favourable to the insured 
over time. By the mid nineteenth century, the definition of actual total loss was not settled on 
whether it protected merchants from unreasonable expense. Arnould contained two 
contradictory definitions. The first was that actual total losses did protect merchants in such 
situations:  
“in matters of business a thing is said to be possible when it is not practicable; and a 
thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive of unreasonable cost. 
A man may be said to have lost a shilling when he has dropped it in deep water, though 
it might be possible, by some very expensive contrivance, to recover it”.1040 
 
However, this was contradicted by the example: 
“Thus, if a ship founders at sea, or goods go in bulk to the bottom of the ocean, so as 
to leave no reasonable chance of their recovery, this is a clear case of total loss. If, on 
the other hand, they be merely submerged in shallow water, so that there is a chance 
of getting them up again, but at a very considerable expense, this is only a constructive 
total loss, and the assured, in order to recover the whole amount of the insurance, must 
give due notice of abandonment”.1041 
                                                     
1040 Arnould (3rd edn, 1866), 883; 2 Emerigon Ch XVII, [3], 213; Moss v Smith 9 CB 103 (Maule J); Murray v 
Hatch 6 Mass Rep 465 (Sewall J) 
1041 Arnould, (3rd edn, 1866) vol II, 885 
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Over time, the latter understanding of actual total loss appears to have been accepted, and is 
now beyond challenge.  
 
9.7 Constructive Total Losses 
 
The English law was widely understood to have been altered by the 1906 Act in respect of 
constructive total losses: “…English Marine Insurance Act in requiring, where the assured is 
in possession of the ship or goods, that an actual total loss appear "unavoidable"' rather than 
"highly probable,"' and, where the assured is deprived of possession, that recovery of the ship 
or goods be "unlikely"1042 rather than merely "uncertain,"1043 imposes more stringent 
requirements than either English1044 or American common law rules”.1045 Both in respect of 
the lack of change intended to be made by the 1906 Act, as indicated by the guidance notes 
to s 60(2)(i),1046 and in the American rule as to the time the parties rights are finalised, there 
is considerable superiority in the American rule: Any other rule would furnish but a very 
imperfect indemnity to the assured if we regard either the character of these seizures and the 
irregularities attending them, or the trouble, expense, and delay consequent upon the duty or 
burden of proving in a court of justice the unlawfulness of the act. It is never, therefore, a 
question between the insurer and the insured whether the capture be lawful or not.1047 The 
difference between the English and American positions is of real practical significance. It was 
well-recognised that circumstances could arise, where the application of the English rather 
than the American rule would prevent the finding of a constructive total loss, and effectively 
bar recovery for that loss. If the policy of the doctrine of constructive total loss of goods was 
to insure greater stability and certainty in the maritime industry, it would be better fulfilled by 
the more permissive American rule. This tended to diminish delays in the shipment of other 
goods because of doubts as to whether abandonment for a constructive total loss was justified. 
Specifically, the requirement that subsequent events could not divest rights arising from a 
constructive total loss both accorded with that policy, but encouraged settlements. Insured 
would not be pressed to begin an action immediately after abandonment, and the insurer was 
less likely to delay a compromise although there may be a possibility of future recovery of the 
                                                     
1042 Citing the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 60(2)(i); Czarnikow Ltd v Java Sea & Fire Ins Co 166 LT 104 (KB 
1941); Roura & Forgas v Townend [1919] 1 KB 189 (1918) 
1043 Citing Peele v Merchants' Ins Co 19 Fed Cas No 10,905, 111-12 (CCD Mass 1822); Polurrian Steamship Co 
v Young [1915] 1 KB 922, 935 
1044 Citing Polurrian Steamship Co v Young [1915] 1 KB 922, 936-37 
1045 ‘Constructive Total Loss Doctrine in Marine Insurance’, 51 Columbia Law Review, No 4 (Apr 1951), 526, 
527 
1046 (Chapter 8.2.1, above) 
1047 (1867) 73 US 1, [19] 
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goods.1048 Consequently, it was seen as desirable that American laws are stipulated in an 
American policy.1049 Even such statements contemplated that the situation would be settled as 
of the date of the action; allowing for uncertainty to persist beyond the date of the action, as 
in Masefield, further reinforces that policy argument.  
The wide definition of capture supports the presumption of total loss. Early cases did not 
consider the intention of the captor. Contrastingly, the wait-and-see approach does consider 
the intention. This increased obligation on insureds to adduce motives of captor make a quick 
decision to claim difficult. After abandonment is given, where motive is unclear, the approach 
suggests that insureds will have to ‘wait’. In finding this wait-and-see doctrine applied, it was 
arguably surprising that non-marine cases were held to be a guide of when marine property 
should be considered lost. The law was derived from maritime authorities, and the lar 
merchant; both encapsulated the practices of merchants, who themselves had established 
common principles to regulate their dealings. Marshall1050 stated the policy aim of insurance 
was stated in the preamble to 43 Eliz c 12,1051 that indicated that insured losses should not fall 
on individual merchants, but be shared by the market. Merchants themselves understand the 
consequences of delay: “One can readily understand that those willing to adventure, who had 
possessed themselves of expensive but money-making chattels like ships for the purpose of 
their adventures, should, if they insured, be protected as far as possible from having their 
capital locked up unprofitably in ships whose fate they were unable actually to ascertain and 
prove”.1052 Significantly, the reasoning in Scott v Copenhagen points away from commercial 
certainty, and against the background of the marine authorities, the approach: had the question 
been asked on 2 August “is the aircraft lost?” the answer would have been “I don't know. 
Wait and see”1053 was both novel and promoted uncertainty. The presumption of loss provided 
a commercially workable answer, and has a long history in marine authorities. 
The wording of the policy was once understood to be inclusive, as indicated by perils eiusdem 
generis falling within the policy. It is conceivable that the large number of specified perils in 
the SG policy were included because the policy intended the insurer to be liable for all hurts 
to the vessel. The growth of law on this topic to radically narrow the scope of the cover, shows 
ever increasing restriction on cover, and does not fully consider the material facts that insureds 
                                                     
1048 Constructive Total Loss Doctrine in Marine Insurance, 51 Columbia Law Review, No 4 (Apr, 1951), 526, 528 
1049 ibid, 529 
1050 Marshall, (3rd edn, 1823), 3ff 
1051 See n 120, above 
1052 Moore v Evans 7 AppCas 49; [1918] AC 185, 194 
1053 ibid, [58] 
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successfully claimed upon in early authorities, which amounted simply to the fact of loss of 
possession simpliciter. 
The presumption of total loss was established by Emerigon, and was stated most clearly on 
capture: “As against the merchant, the property tied up and uncertain is considered in some 
manner as if it no longer existed. Hence, according to the Ordonnance, its loss is presumed 
to be total, and it is allowed to make abandonment to the insurers of the effects insured”.1054 
This further reinforced the undesirability in preventing merchants from having access to their 
invested capital pending the outcome of an insurance dispute.  
Later, the presumption was established also on embargo, “An embargo laid by a foreign 
government on the ships or goods of any other than its own subjects, entitles the assured at 
once to give notice of abandonment, and, if the embargo continues down to the time of action 
brought, to recover as for a total loss”.1055 The presumption extended to detention. As stated 
in Murray et alia v The United Insurance Company:  
“Carrying into port denotes strong suspicion; it is good ground to calculate on a 
serious litigation, and it is prima facie evidence of total loss. In such cases the English 
law does not require a delay, in imitation of some foreign rules. The activity of trade 
rather demands decision and certainty, and that the capital and business of the 
merchant should not be kept in suspense”.1056 
The presumption that a loss is total while the specie is in the possession of others is endorsed 
by textbooks, in contrast to a situation where the loss had ended by recapture;1057 Arguably, 
this was a practical commercial presumption, allowing quick and easy resolution of disputes, 
suitable “in treating of a contract of practical indemnity against substantial losses”.1058 In 
relation to the variety of perils causing loss of possession, it has been observed that there was 
‘[not] much difference between a restraint by a blockading force and a restraint arising under 
the operation of a sanitary law’.1059 By extension, in all perils where the insured is no longer 
in control, the practical effect of loss of possession will be similarly dire. The underlying law 
points against both doctrines of ‘wait-and-see’ and ‘relation back’. Support from Beale v 
Thompson,1060 was in the context of contract of employment, not of insurance. Insurance 
                                                     
1054 Emerigon (1850 edn), 670-671 
1055 Rotch v Edie 6 T Rep 413; Arnould (1st edn, 1848), 813 
1056 (1801) 2 Johns Cas 263; (1801) NY Lexis 36 (Supreme Court of Judicature New York) 
1057 Benecke W, ‘A Treatise on the Principles of Indemnity in Marine Insurance, Bottomry and Respondentia: 
And on Their Practical Application in Effecting Those Contracts, and in the Adjustment of All Claims Arising Out 
of Them’ (1824, Baldwin Cradock and Joy, London), 355 
1058 Arnould (3rd edn, 1866) Vol II, 882 
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authorities, including House of Lords, did not adopt the doctrine, such as in Anderson v 
Marten.1061 
Importantly, there are no issues in recent reported decisions in America arising from 
considerations of unlikelihood of recovery. For example, Tillery v Hull Co Inc1062 concerned 
a vessel confiscated by a Mexican court, where the loss was excluded as being due to barratry 
of the master which was not insured. Significantly, there was no consideration of unlikelihood. 
In Commodities Reserve Co v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co,1063 where a cargo owner sought 
to recover costs of transhipment, so that the cargo was not detained and at risk of infestation 
at the port where the vessel was improperly detained in Crete, the cause of the loss was held 
to be the detention, not delay.1064 Again, likelihood or otherwise of recovery was not an issue 
considered. The American FC&S clause was relevant because it excluded loss during 
detainment by customs that would otherwise be covered.1065 The issue does not appear to be 
causing disputes in American laws, and arguably, this is because the underlying presumption 
continues, and discourages litigation. 
9.8 Whether the presumption survives 
 
Arguably, the presumption ought to have survived the Act in a presumption of constructive 
total loss. First, statutory tests may be supplemented to a limited extent by prior common-law 
rules. In the Polurrian1066 the test under s 60(2)(i) was supplemented by the words ‘within a 
reasonable time’. Contrastingly, in Hall v Hayman (1912),1067 a common-law rule was 
excluded by the new wording. In Robertson, Porter LJ addressed the issue of the completeness 
of s 60 directly, stating that s 60 was intended to be a complete section, and that the particular 
examples given in sss (ii) and (iii) were in addition to the more general words of sss (i).1068  In 
Irvine v Hine1069 the insured conceded that its claim was untenable under any of the heads 
specified in s 60 of the Act. However, it contended that the claim was justified at common-
law, not inconsistent with s 60, and accordingly valid by virtue of s 91(2).1070 Devlin J held 
that the wording of s 60 could not be modified to such an extent as to add a whole new ground 
of abandonment, notwithstanding the precedent of Polurrian. The difference between the two 
cases is significant. The common-law presumption of total loss arguably fell within the rule 
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1062 717 F Supp 1481 (MD Fla 1988) 
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in s 60(1) as the loss appeared to be permanent, and arguably not within the exclusionary rule 
in Hall v Heyman or Irvin v Hine. 
 
In Polurrian it was stated that the test across all perils, including capture or detention, was 
‘unlikelihood’. If that was correct, a clear error in the statutory drafting occurred. Strikingly, 
the draftsmen published, in leading practitioner works, a statement of the law contrary to its 
construction in Polurrian. Further, the doctrine of the loss of the voyage should, at least for 
goods policies, support a presumption of total loss on loss of possession. The loss of the voyage 
is still a part of contemporary insurance. It is well recognised that goods at a destination port 
are often of a very different value to goods at their load port. The underwriter undertakes an 
obligation to compensate the insured if the goods fail to arrive at their destination uninjured by 
an insured peril. It is settled that the insurance covers the venture, and loss of the venture is a 
constructive total loss of goods.1071 
 
From 1758, when policies for interest superseded wagers in the English market, there was a 
presumption of total loss on every peril causing a loss of possession. It was assumed that when 
the property was taken out of the control of the insured or his agents, that amounted to a total 
loss. This justified an instant right of abandonment (Emerigon; Marshall; early Arnould; The 
Minden; Wangoni; Halle). The parties’ rights settled on the date of issue of the writ, and it was 
possible that return by that date reduced the presumed total loss into a partial loss (where there 
was damage), or no loss at all (if undamaged, there being no compensation for any delay).  
Other perils, such as stranding, prompted an investigation into the chances of the property’s 
recovery. To claim for a total loss, notice of abandonment was required, unless there had been 
subsequent destruction or on-sale, via-judicial condemnation or otherwise, and so these perils 
of loss of possession were constructive total losses. The draftsmen intended to preserve this in 
the 1906 Act. The leading post-Act authority on constructive total loss after capture (Polurrian) 
was per incuriam. First, the prior law was misstated; the court assumed that a test of 
unlikelihood applied where in fact this only applied after stranding or damage. Secondly, 
Polurrian, quoting an error in contemporary Arnould, stated that Emerigon provided that a 
capture avowedly for a temporary purpose gave no ground for abandonment. Instead, the 
authority concerned different circumstances where possession had already been restored. 
Emerigon clearly recorded the presumption of total loss in English law.  
In Polurrian, the presumption was not apparently argued, and the court did not decide whether 
the presumption survived. KAC v KIC and Scott v Copenhagen further were not marine 
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insurance authorities. The better view must be that loss of possession justifies an instant claim 
for constructive total loss, and that the common-law presumption of constructive total loss 
survives.  
The presumption arguably survives in American laws, since the parties’ rights will be finalised 
as of the date of abandonment to the insurer. Comparison with English laws clarify that the 
American law in this respect is workable, and discourages disputes. It is more commercially 
sensitive than the English doctrine, which encourages litigation. A properly pleaded claim for 
constructive total loss on loss of possession in the English courts may allow the presumption to 
be revived, as it appears compatible with the Act, and in conformity with the American 
understanding. Commercial law should be simple and certain. It was well observed in the 
employment context that: “When a ship is put under detention by a declaration of war, I cannot 
see room for a condition of affairs which would leave parties in suspense, feeling that they are 
bound if the war be short but free if the war be long”.1072 The presumption of total loss on perils 
of loss of possession is workable, prevents uncertainty. The presumption has not been argued 
for in post-1906 Act authorities, and accordingly has not been dismissed. It is supported by a 
body of pre-Act authority, and, if properly argued, it should be upheld. When should an insured 
be compensated for loss of possession by a marine peril? If the presumption is upheld, his 
entitlement to compensation arises at once on any peril causing, for the time, a loss of 
possession, and it continues while the loss of possession lasts.  
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APPENDIX I   MARINE INSURANCE ACT 1906 
 
The 1906 Act, so far as material, provides: 
 
3  Marine adventure and maritime perils defined. 
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Act, every lawful marine adventure may be the subject of a 
contract of marine insurance.  
(2)In particular there is a marine adventure where—  
(a)Any ship goods or other moveables are exposed to maritime perils. Such property 
is in this Act referred to as “insurable property”; 
 (b)The earning or acquisition of any freight, passage money, commission, profit, or 
other pecuniary benefit, or the security for any advances, loan, or disbursements, is 
endangered by the exposure of insurable property to maritime perils; 
(c)Any liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of, or other person 
interested in or responsible for, insurable property, by reason of maritime perils. 
  “Maritime perils” means the perils consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of the sea, that is to 
say, perils of the seas, fire, war perils, pirates, rovers, thieves, captures, seisures, restraints, and 
detainments of princes and peoples, jettisons, barratry, and any other perils, either of the like kind or 
which may be designated by the policy. 
 … 
55  Included and excluded losses. 
(1)Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is 
liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but, subject as aforesaid, he is 
not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a peril insured against.  
(2)In particular 
(a)The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of the 
assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for any loss proximately 
caused by a peril insured against, even though the loss would not have happened but 
for the misconduct or negligence of the master or crew;  
(b)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer on ship or goods is not liable for 
any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured 
against;  
(c)Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is not liable for ordinary wear and 
tear, ordinary leakage and breakage, inherent vice or nature of the subject-matter 
insured, or for any loss proximately caused by rats or vermin, or for any injury to 
machinery not proximately caused by maritime perils 
 
56  Partial and total loss. 
(1)A loss may be either total or partial. Any loss other than a total loss, as hereinafter defined, 
is a partial loss. 
(2)A total loss may be either an actual total loss, or a constructive total loss.  
(3)Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the policy, an insurance against total 
loss includes a constructive, as well as an actual, total loss. 
 (4)Where the assured brings an action for a total loss and the evidence proves only a partial 
loss, he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, recover for a partial loss. 
(5)Where goods reach their destination in specie, but by reason of obliteration of marks, or 
otherwise, they are incapable of identification, the loss, if any, is partial, and not total. 
 
57  Actual total loss. 
(1)Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a thing of the 
kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof, there is an actual total loss. 
(2)In the case of an actual total loss no notice of abandonment need be given. 
 … 
60  Constructive total loss defined. 
(1)Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss where the 
subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss appearing to 
be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual total loss without an 
expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred.  
(2)In particular, there is a constructive total loss— 
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 (i)Where the assured is deprived of the possession of his ship or goods by a peril 
insured against, and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the ship or goods, as the case 
may be, or (b) the cost of recovering the ship or goods, as the case may be, would 
exceed their value when recovered; or 
 (ii)In the case of damage to a ship, where she is so damaged by a peril insured against 
that the cost of repairing the damage would exceed the value of the ship when repaired. 
In estimating the cost of repairs, no deduction is to be made in respect of general 
average contributions to those repairs payable by other interests, but account is to be 
taken of the expense of future salvage operations and of any future general average 
contributions to which the ship would be liable if repaired; or 
(iii)In the case of damage to goods, where the cost of repairing the damage and 
forwarding the goods to their destination would exceed their value on arrival. 
  
61  Effect of constructive total loss. 
Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a partial loss, or 
abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as if it were an actual total 
loss. 
  
62  Notice of abandonment. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where the assured elects to abandon the subject-
matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice of abandonment. If he fails to do so the loss 
can only be treated as a partial loss. 
(2) Notice of abandonment may be given in writing, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing 
and partly by word of mouth, and may be given in any terms which indicate the intention of the 
assured to abandon his insured interest in the subject-matter insured unconditionally to the 
insurer. 
(3) Notice of abandonment must be given with reasonable diligence after the receipt of reliable 
information of the loss, but where the information is of a doubtful character the assured is 
entitled to a reasonable time to make inquiry. 
(4) Where notice of abandonment is properly given, the rights of the assured are not prejudiced 
by the fact that the insurer refuses to accept the abandonment. 
(5) The acceptance of an abandonment may be either express or implied from the conduct of 
the insurer. The mere silence of the insurer after notice is not an acceptance. 
(6)Where notice of abandonment is accepted the abandonment is irrevocable. The acceptance 
of the notice conclusively admits liability for the loss and the sufficiency of the notice. 
(7) Notice of abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the assured receives 
information of the loss, there would be no possibility of benefit to the insurer if notice were 
given to him. 
(8) Notice of abandonment may be waived by the insurer. 
(9)Where an insurer has re-insured his risk, no notice of abandonment need be given by him. 
  
63  Effect of abandonment. 
(1) Where there is a valid abandonment the insurer is entitled to take over the interest of the 
assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter insured, and all proprietary rights 
incidental thereto. 
(2) Upon the abandonment of a ship, the insurer thereof is entitled to any freight in course of 
being earned, and which is earned by her subsequent to the casualty causing the loss, less the 
expenses of earning it incurred after the casualty; and, where the ship is carrying the owner’s 
goods, the insurer is entitled to a reasonable remuneration for the carriage of them subsequent 
to the casualty causing the loss. 
  
91  Savings.  
             … 
(2) The rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to contracts of 
marine insurance. 
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FIRST SCHEDULE 
Form of Policy 
Lloyd’s SG policy 
Be it known that as well in own name as for and in the name and names of all and every other person 
or persons to whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain, in part or in all doth make assurance and 
cause and them, and every of them, to be insured lost or not lost, at and from 
 
Upon any kind of goods and merchandises, and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, 
artillery, boat, and other furniture, of and in the good ship or vessel called the whereof is master under 
God, for this present voyage, or whosoever else shall go for master in the said ship, or by whatsoever 
other name or names the said ship, or the master thereof, is or shall be named or called; beginning the 
adventure upon the said goods and merchandises from the loading thereof aboard the said ship. 
upon the said ship, &c. 
 
and so shall continue and endure, during her abode there, upon the said ship, &c. And further, until the 
said ship, with all her ordnance, tackle, apparel, &c., and goods and merchandises whatsoever shall be 
arrived at 
 
upon the said ship, &c., until she hath moored at anchor twenty-four hours in good safety; and upon the 
goods and merchandises, until the same be there discharged and safely landed. And it shall be lawful 
for the said ship, &c., in this voyage, to proceed and sail to and touch and stay at any ports or places 
whatsoever 
 
without prejudice to this insurance. The said ship, &c., goods and merchandises, &c., for so much as 
concerns the assured by agreement between the assured and assurers in this policy, are and shall be 
valued at 
 
Touching the adventures and perils which we the assurers are contented to bear and do take upon us in 
this voyage: they are of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of 
mart and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, 
and people, of what nation, condition, or quality soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of all 
other perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the 
said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., or any part thereof. And in case of any loss or misfortune 
it shall be lawful to the assured, their factors, servants and assigns, to sue, labour, and travel for, in and 
about the defence, safeguards, and recovery of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., or any 
part thereof, without prejudice to this insurance; to the charges whereof we, the assurers, will contribute 
each one according to the rate and quantity of his sum herein assured. And it is especially declared and 
agreed that no acts of the insurer or insured in recovering, saving, or preserving the property insured 
shall be considered as a waiver, or acceptance of abandonment. And it is agreed by us, the insurers, that 
this writing or policy of assurance shall be of as much force and effect as the surest writing or policy of 
assurance heretofore made in Lombard Street, or in the Royal Exchange, or elsewhere in London. And 
so we, the assurers, are contented, and do hereby promise and bind ourselves, each one for his own part, 
our heirs, executors, and goods to the assured, their executors, administrators, and assigns, for the true 
performance of the premises, confessing ourselves paid the consideration due unto us for this assurance 
by the assured, at and after the rate of 
 
In Witness whereof we, the assurers, have subscribed our names and sums assured in London. 
N.B.—Corn, fish, salt, fruit, flour, and seed are warranted free from average, unless general, or the ship 
be stranded—sugar, tobacco, hemp, flax, hides and skins are warranted free from average, under five 
pounds per cent., and all other goods, also the ship and freight, are warranted free from average, under 
three pounds per cent. unless general, or the ship be stranded.   
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APPENDIX II   CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF TOTAL LOSSES 
 
The following table arranges the most significant cases in chronological order, grouped by the peril 
found to be operative. It notes time out of possession of claimant, time before abandonment, and the 
court’s judgment on the issue of total loss. 
 
Enemy Capture 
 
 
CASE PERIL SUBSEQUENT  
EVENT 
TIME OF ABANDONMENT TIME IN 
CAPTIVITY 
RESULT 
Wagering Policies/ early policies: 
 
 
East-India Company v. 
Sands 
Enemy capture Sold, resold, recapture, 
Restoration to original 
owner 
Unrecorded 4 years  
(1691-
1695) 
No change of 
property 
Assievedo v Cambridge 
(the Ruth) 
Enemy capture recapture unrecorded 9 days No change of 
property (no decision 
on the wagering 
policy) 
Berkley v Cullen Requisition by 
government 
none unrecorded Until after 
end of 
voyage 
Voyage lost (total 
loss on a wager) 
Dapaba v Ludlow  Piratical Capture recapture unrecorded 9 days Voyage lost; (total 
loss on  a wager) 
Pond v King (the 
Salamander) 
Piratical capture Recapture before taken 
into enemy port 
Unrecorded 1 day Voyage (of 3 
months) interrupted; 
total loss 
established. 
Whitehead v Bance 
 
Enemy capture (French 
Privateer) 
recapture unrecorded 12 days 
(and 
carried 
into port) 
Voyage interrupted – 
total loss of the 
voyage established. 
Dean v Dicker (the 
Dursley) 
Enemy capture (Spanish 
Privateer) 
recapture unrecorded 8 days Voyage lost – total 
loss. 
Pole v Fitzgerald (the 
Goodfellow) 
    No loss of the 
voyage – loss of 
voyage not 
applicable to vessel 
Valued Policies (Policies for interest ) 
Goss v Withers (the 
David and Rebeccah 
Enemy Capture (French 
vessel) on 23 December 
1756 
Recapture on 31 
December 1756, returned 
to England 18 January 
1757 
Abandoned 18 
January  
8 days No change in 
property. 
Total loss of vessel 
Total loss of cargo 
(& Total loss of 
voyage) 
Hamilton v Mendes 
(The Selby) 
Enemy Capture Recapture Abandoned 1 month 
after return to England 
17 days Partial loss only – 
abandonment out of 
time. 
Milles v Fletcher (the 
Hope) 
Capture American 
Privateers on 23 May 
(1778?) 
Recaptured. Taken to 
New York by  23 June. 
Voyage to London 
intended to be by July. 
Embargo at New York 
until December. Captain 
sold vessel. Insured 
informed in February 
following year. 
Insured abandoned in 
February.  
unclear Total loss.  
Primarily, decided on 
ground of loss of the 
voyage.  
(also, damage to 
ship extensive). 
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Mitchell and Others v 
Edie (the Lady 
Mansfield) 
Insurance on goods. 
Capture by American 
Privateer, early 1782 
Stores, rigging and part 
crew removed. 
Vessel set at liberty. 
Impossible to complete 
intended voyage, 
deviation to nearer port. 
Insured goods sold by 
part-owner of vessel, who 
later became insolvent.  
Abandoned after 3 
years 
A few days Not a total loss.  
Abandonment out of 
time. 
Bainbridge v Neilson 
(the Mary) 
Enemy capture 21 
September 1807. 
Recapture 25 September. 
Insured informed of 
capture on 30 September. 
Informed of recapture on 6 
October. 
Abandoned on 1 
October. 
4 days Partial loss. Ship 
recaptured at time of 
abandonment.  
Parsons v Scott (the 
Little Mary) 
Insurance on ship. Enemy 
Capture 29 March 1809.  
Master made contract to 
sail as a cartel ship, and 
paid ransom for its 
liberation. Released on 19 
April.  Arrived on 13 May 
in England. 
Insured voyage (deliver a 
cargo salt within fishing 
season, not possible that 
year) 
Abandoned on 1 May. 
Insured refused to 
reimburse master the 
ransom.  
 Owner entitled to 
retake ship, already 
safe in English port.  
No loss of the 
voyage on the ship.  
(obiter – may be loss 
of voyage on 
cargo?) 
 
McIver v Henderson Capture recapture Restoration after 
abandonment but 
before action 
 Total loss – 
possibility that 
repairs might be 
prohibitively 
expensive sufficient 
for constructive total 
loss. 
Mullett v Sheddon (the 
Martha) 
Insured cargo captured. Condemned by prize court 
and sold. 
unrecorded months Total loss.  
Abandonment 
unnecessary 
following sale. 
Brotherston and 
Another v Barber (the 
Fanny) 
Capture American 
Privateer 19 April 1814 
Recapture by Royal Navy 
on 12 May 1814. Reached 
destination port on 26 
September.   
Abandoned 25 April 
1814. Proceedings 
issued in Michaelmas 
1814 
24 days No total loss. 
Restoration before 
issue of 
proceedings.  
Cologan and another v 
London Insurance (the 
Friendship) 
Insured cargo on vessel 
captured by American 
Privateer 22 October 
1812 
Recaptured by Royal 
Navy on 6 November 
1812. Taken to Bermuda, 
where damaged part of 
cargo destroyed, and 
remainder held under 
embargo.  
Abandoned on hearing 
news of part 
destruction and 
embargo. 
16 days Total loss. Cargo not 
restored at time 
proceedings 
brought.  
Dean v Hornby Insured vessel captured 
by Pirates in December 
1851 
Recapture by Royal Navy 
in January 1852. Taken 
back to load port. 
Afterwards,  
Vessel sold by Prize 
master in August.  
Owner abandoned in 
April, on hearing of 
capture and recapture 
at same time. Action 
commenced in 
December for total 
loss. 
c. 1 month Total loss. 
Total loss while 
captured. 
Total loss on sale. 
Post-Act Decisions 
Roura and Forgas v 
Townend (the Igotz 
Mendi) 
 
Cargo interest insured 
charterparty on vessel 
captured in autumn 1917 
by German ship. 
Ship sailed to Denmark 
where it grounded. 
German crew abandoned 
her. Salvaged in March 
1918. 
Claim made on 14 
March after vessel 
salvaged. Parties 
agreed that insured 
need not serve notice 
of abandonment. 
3 ½ 
months. 
Total Loss.  
Test on balance of 
probability as stated 
in Polurrian satisfied. 
Rickards v Forestal 
Land, Timber and 
Railways Co Ltd (the 
Minden); Robertson v 
Middows Ltd (the 
Wangoni); Kann v W W 
Howard Brothers & Co 
Ltd (the Halle) 
Insured goods laden on 
three German vessels in 
1939. Masters received 
orders on 3 September to 
put into neutral port and 
head back to Germany. If 
intercepted by Royal 
Navy, had orders to 
scuttle. 
Two ships scuttled. Third 
reached German port.  
Requirement to give 
notice of abandonment 
waived by insurers. 
Frustration clause 
prevented loss of 
voyage claims.  
Various. Constructive total 
loss as of 3 
September.  
C Czarnikow Ltd v Java 
Sea and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd; Leslie & 
Anderson Ltd v Java 
Perishable goods on 
German ships in Italian 
ports in August 1939.  
One ship captured by 
British in 1941. Other 
vessel remained in Italian 
port. 
October 1939 3 months Constructive total 
loss on outbreak of 
war, abandonment in 
time.  
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Sea and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd (The Oder; the 
Lichtenfels) 
Masefield v Amlin 
Corporate Member 
Vessel captured by 
Somali Pirates 19 August. 
Released after ransom 
negotiations on 28 
September 
18 September 41 days No total loss. 
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Barratry 
 
Falkner and 
others v Ritchie 
Insured ship victim of 
barratry of crew. 
Recaptured by Royal Navy 
the following year. 
Owner hear d of loss 
and recapture at same 
time. Abandoned. 
months No total loss. 
Loss of the voyage does not 
apply to ship. 
Marstrand Fishing 
Co Ltd v Beer 
(the Girl Pat) 
Barratry of master in 
March 1936, taking 
vessel on local cruise 
in North Sea. 
Sailed to Dover, Spain, 
Dakar, and reached British 
Guiana, where arrested on 
19 June. 
Proceedings issued 
when missing for a 
month,  
3 
months. 
No total loss. Balance of 
probabilities unclear, so case 
for constructive total loss not 
made out. 
 
 
Seizure  
 
 
Andersen v Marten 
(the Romulus) 
Insured neutral German vessel 
captured by Japanese – intending 
to condemn contraband cargo 
(and vessel by alleging forged 
papers) 
Wrecked while in 
control of captors. 
Japanese prize 
court condemned 
vessel and cargo. 
Abandonment after 
condemnation 
Not in 
issue 
Total loss arises 
immediately on capture. 
(capture not covered by 
policy, so owner could not 
recover). 
Polurrian v Young 
(the Polurrian) 
Insured ship seised by Greek 
navy on 25 October 1912, 
intending to requisition cargo and 
possibly seize ship also. 
Ship released on 8 
December. 
Owners abandoned on 
26 October (taken as 
date of issue of writ). 
 No total loss.  
Could not show unlikelihood 
of recovery on balance of 
probabilities.  
Actual total loss not 
considered. 
Panamanian Oriental 
Steamship 
Corporation v Wright 
(1970) 
Ship condemned following 
infringement of Vietnamese 
customs regulations. 
   No total loss (obiter?) 
 
 
Embargo in port 
 
Rotch v Edie (1795) French Embargo on vessels in 
loadport 
   total loss  
Barker v Blakes 
(1808) 
American vessel detained 17 
August by Britihs Embargo. 
Restitution ordered on 8 October. 
From 6 September destination port 
under blockade 
   Abandonment on 14 
October out of time. 
 
Frustration 
 
Hadley v Clarke (the Pomona) 
(1799) 
Embargo in friendly port by order of 
Council 
Embargo lasted 2 
years 
No frustration of charterparty 
Touteng v Hubbard (1802) Swiss vessel detained by English 
Embargo for 6 months 
Charterer refused 
to load as fruit 
season over 
No frustration of charterparty 
Embiricos v Sydney Reid & Co 
(1914) 
Voyage abandoned where 
Dardanalles closed to shipping by 
Turks in anticipation of war 
 Frustration of charter – war 
might be of unknown duration, 
construed as permanent 
Watts, Watts & Company Ltd v 
Mitsui & Company Ltd (1917) 
Voyage abandoned on 1 September 
1914 in anticipation of British 
prohibition on vessels sailing into 
Black Sea 
 No frustration, as prohibition 
not issued until 26 September. 
Modern Transport Co v Duneric 
(1917) 
Requisition 1 month into 12 month 
time charter 
 No frustration (might have 
been frustration of single 
voyage charter - obiter) 
Edwinton Commercial Corporation 
& Anor v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide 
Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea 
Angel) 
Unlawful detention Lasting 3 months 
on 20 day 
charterparty 
No frustration 
Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co 
(1919) 
Time charter 12 months  Requisition by 
home government 
Frustration 
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F A Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd v 
Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products 
Co Ltd 
Time charter 60 months  Requisition by 
home government 
No frustration 
Larrinaga & Co, Ltd v Societe 
Franco-Americaine des Phosphates 
de Medulla (1923) 
Voyage contemplated in 1919 in 
charter 7 ½ years after signing of 
long-term charter prevented by 
requisition 
Requisition  No frustration, although 
previous severable voyages 
were considered frustrated 
Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship 
Co, Ltd (1926) 
Time charter 10 months Requisition by 
home government 
Frustration after wait-and-see 
demonstrated return would be 
slow. 
Assicurazioni Generali v SS Bessie 
Morris Company Limited (The Bessie 
Morris) 
Collision damage  No frustration – physically 
possible to repair 
W J Tatem Ltd v Gamboa (1938) Vessel seized by Spanish 
nationalists 
 Frustration of voyage charter 
Larrinaga & Co, Ltd v Societe 
Franco-Americaine des Phosphates 
de Medulla 
Long term charter. Requisition of 
vessel during war 
 
 No frustration after 7 ½ years, 
although earlier severable 
charters had been furstrated. 
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